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ABSTRACT 
This research investigated the effects of escape route design and specification, and time 
taken on evacuation process in high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia. The aim is to 
produce a fire safety model on how fire safety standards in high-rise residential buildings 
can be achieved by investigating the relationship between human behaviour and structural 
design, particularly escape route design and specification. 
In Malaysia, research on fire safety is very new, particularly research on provision of fire 
safety in high-rise residential buildings. The number of fire cases involved residential 
buildings is significantly high compared to other building types. Thus, escape routes in 
high-rise residential buildings should be designed and constructed to enable the occupants 
to evacuate the building as soon as fire has been detected. 
Mixed methodologies i.e. quantitative and qualitative methods were adopted in this 
research. There are three research methods adopted i.e. observation, simulation and 
questionnaire.  Observations were carried out to identify any problems encountered and to 
develop the study models for further analysis. Investigations of the effects of escape route 
design and specification on evacuation process were carried out using specialist software, 
i.e. Simulex, which simulates the evacuation of people from the building. The aim is to 
study escape route specifications i.e. staircase, fire door and corridor. Questionnaire 
surveys were than carried out to investigate the occupant’s characteristics, behaviours, 
perceptions and motivation factors to evacuate the building. 
From this research, fire safety models proposed for high-rise residential buildings as 
follows, (1) Fire safety model to achieve fire safety standard in high-rise residential 
buildings, (2) Escape route designs and specifications, and, (3) Human behaviour model. 
There are five fire safety components that need to be enhanced i.e. (1) Fire Safety 
Awareness, (2) Fire Safety Design, (3) Fire Safety Equipments and Evacuation Skill, (4) 
Fire Safety Audit, and (5) Fire Safety Enforcement. Besides, there are four factors which 
highly influence the evacuation process, fire and casualty risk i.e.: (1) People behaviour – 
knowledge and experience, (2) building element and escape routes design, (3) active fire 
protection system, and (4) legislation and enforcement. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Fire safety in buildings is not a new topic but seriously being developed by many 
researchers over a period of time, especially fire safety in workplace. However, research 
in fire safety for high-rise residential buildings is not many have been done. The first 
research on occupants’ behaviour in high-rise apartment buildings was done following the 
fire incident at the MGM Grand Hotel and two incidents in University residence halls 
involving jumping behaviour by occupants previously injured while using the means of 
egress system in evacuation attempts in the 1970s. The first seminar on human behaviour 
was conducted in 1977 at the University of Surrey and the seminar proceeding from then 
became the first complete book on human behaviour in fire ever published (Bryan, 2002). 
The second seminar was conducted in October 1978 at the National Bureau of Standards, 
US. Both seminars were primarily involved with the examination and development of the 
methods for investigation of the behaviour of the occupants in a fire situation. The 
emphasis of the study was to define the behavioural actions of occupants in fire 
situations, examination of the then popular concept i.e. Panic Behaviour, and study of the 
evacuation process in high-rise building (Bryan, 2002). However, study concerning fire 
safety in high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia is very new and very limited 
resources are available to review. Even in the United Kingdom, not many studies 
concerning fire safety in high-rise residential buildings have been done. 
1.2 Fire safety issues in Malaysia and United Kingdom 
Fires in buildings are always related to either the human error or human negligence. Even 
a small fire can cause devastation if it has involved the dwelling buildings. Ten years fire 
statistics in Malaysia (1990 to 1999) show that there are 154,987 fire cases in Malaysia. 
From that figures, 23,911 or 15.45% cases involved buildings. Average more than 2000 
fire cases annually involved buildings are significantly high. Among the types of 
building, residential buildings are the highest i.e. 9,512 cases followed by shops 2,767 
cases, plants 2,636 cases and stores 1,489 cases (Bomba, 2001). From this statistic, it 
shows that residential buildings are the highest risks of possibility of fire break out. It 
includes high-rise accommodation buildings i.e. flats buildings, apartment buildings and 
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condominiums. At this moment the recent statistics for the next ten years of fire statistics 
is not available and due to be compiled in the year 2010. 
According to Datuk Dr. Ting Chew Peh (Statement in Berita Mingguan 26 Oct., 1996) 
fire had claimed 840 victims annually with the average of 70 persons monthly. In one fire 
case, which took place at 3.30 am on 16 July 1998, 4 persons died and 18 others were 
wounded when a fire broke out at their double story link house. The four are believed to 
have died because they were trapped inside the house as a result of delay to open the iron 
grills fitted at the main door and all windows. It is a trend in Malaysian buildings that all 
doors and windows are fitted with iron grills as an extra safety precaution to restrict the 
intruder from entering their building. At the same time, besides of extras precaution, this 
practice as well has created a death trap to building occupants. Fitting an iron grill to all 
doors and windows has reduced the chance for the building occupants to exit the building 
if a fire breaks out. 
There are hundreds of thousands of fires in buildings, about 400 people will lose their 
lives and 14,000 people will suffer injury most likely from burns or smoke inhalation in 
United Kingdom annually (Billington, et. al. 2002). Ramachandran (1999) says that every 
year fires in the UK kill about 800 people and cause non-fatal injuries to 15,000 people. 
On average per year, the direct material damage is about £1,200 million and the indirect 
loss is about £120 million. The direct and indirect losses in the UK represent about 0.21 
per cent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The average number of people dying in fire 
in UK has dropped about 50% after three years but the numbers of casualty increased by 
about 7.14%.  
The total number of fire in the United Kingdom involving dwellings is about 35,000 per 
year in 1966 (JFRO, 1968) and this statistic has shown the upward trends which increased 
at about 8% every year until 70’s (JFRO, 1970). The upward trends continued where in 
1994 the dwelling fires were 66,300. In 1997, there were 72,200 dwelling fires where 
around three-quarters of all fires and casualties occur in dwellings. Even though the 
number of people killed each year in fires in the UK was decreasing, which 1994 was the 
lowest for 30 years, but yet there were still 676 deaths, 475 of which were in their own 
homes (Home Office, 1996). The reduction in deaths in the years 1994 has been attributed 
to the fact that more households have installed smokes alarm (Home Office, 1995). 
However, a number of death in UK increases again that estimated 560 people died in fires 
in their home and about 14,900 other were injured i.e. 5% increased on 1996 (HRO, 
1998). The death tolls seems to fluctuate after 1996 where the estimated a number of 
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deaths in accidental dwelling fires in 2001 was 435, compared to 397 in 2000 (ODPM, 
2003). Even though a number of deaths was relatively decreased compare in 90’s, but still 
many people died and some things should be done to increase the fire safety aspects in 
dwellings, especially high-rise residential buildings because risks of fire in dwelling 
buildings are greater than other categories of buildings. 
In Scotland there are many high-rise residential buildings. Fire statistics in Scotland have 
shown tremendous figures that should be caused concern and should open many people’s 
eyes. In comparison to the other UK countries, Scotland reported both the highest number 
of fatal casualties per million populations and the highest rate of non-fatal casualties (to 
those not working for fire brigades) per million populations. However, the difference 
between Scotland and the rest of the UK has narrowed since 2001, when Scotland had 
nearly twice the fatal casualty rate of the other UK countries (Scottish Executive, 2004). 
A number of main points about the fire cases in Scotland that involving the buildings as 
published in Statistical Bulletin, Criminal Justice Series (Scottish Executive, 2004) are as 
follows: 
• Over one-third of all fires were primary fires. Of those, almost two-thirds (63 per 
cent) of primary fires were in buildings, Since 2001, primary fires have fallen by 3 
per cent, secondary fires by 15 per cent and chimney fires by 28 per cent in 2002.  
• In Scotland there were a total of 77 fatal casualties in 2002 – a decrease of 19 fatal 
casualties, or 20 per cent, on the figures from 2001. Sixty-three fatal casualties 
(82%) occurred in dwelling fires and seven (9%) were in road vehicles. The 
number of non-fatal casualties in Scotland in 2002 was 2,045, a decrease of 2% 
compared with 2001.  
• It is of note that the Scottish rate of fatal casualties per 1,000 dwelling fires in 
2002 was similar to the rates in the other UK countries. This suggests that the 
reason for Scotland’s higher overall fatality rate per million populations in 2002 
reflected a higher risk of dwellings fires rather than a greater likelihood of a fatal 
casualty occurring in such fires.  
• The principal cause of fatal casualties was being overcome by gas and smoke (46 
fatal casualties). A further 13 fatal casualties were caused by burns alone, and 12 
fatal casualties were caused by a combination of burns and being overcome by 
smoke.  
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• In the years since 1994, the majority of fatal casualties have occurred in dwellings 
fires where either the smoke detector was present but failed to operate or in 
dwellings fires where a smoke detector was absent.  
We also can not rule out the fact that in the real world many combustible materials have 
been brought into the flats by residents after the building was completed. The intensity of 
fire, especially if highly flammable material stored in a flat catches fire, will cause 
devastation and would cause the building to collapse. It becomes critical to ensure that all 
occupants in an affected building are evacuated before its collapse. 
A fire accident in a building will generally start at a single location within a room, or 
compartment. In the early stages, it will present a threat to the occupants of that particular 
room, but if allowed to grow unchecked, adjacent rooms and indeed the whole building 
will eventually be placed at risk (Bishop and Drysdale, 1998) 
The biggest threats of fire to people are heat and smoke released. Canada Wood Council 
(2000) quoted their research studies on major causes of fatalities in residential buildings 
concluded that only 0.2% of the deaths were attributable to fires where a floor or wall 
collapsed but smoke and heat generated from the burning building contents cause about 
90% of the deaths (Christain, 1974), (Harwood, et. al, 1989), (Miller and Alison, 1991), 
(Ahrens and Marty, 2000). It can be concluded that the most threat to people when fire 
breaks out in the buildings is smoke and heat. These elements are needed to be tackled 
prior the initial development of fire in order to minimise the risk of casualties to the 
people during the evacuation processes. This is because risks to the building occupants 
are increased because of decreased of time available to escape. 
From opinion surveys, 40.9% occupants of high-rise residential buildings when asked 
what they are going to do first if fire alarm went off, said that they will immediately 
evacuate from the building and 59.1% said that they will do something else e.g. call 999, 
try to put out fire, save possessions, etc. (Yatim and Harris, 2007b). It seems like majority 
of the building’s occupants are unaware about what the consequences would be if they 
were caught in uncontrollable of fire. 
Even though, many measures have been taken to prevent ignition and spread of fire 
within the building particularly residential and high rise buildings, numbers of fires 
recorded never show a significant sign that they will be drastically reduced and this 
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should alarm many people about the consequences of fire as according to Mehaffey 
(1987) in seminar paper presented in Canada that: 
“Despite efforts to restrict the use of combustible material in buildings and to prevent 
ignition, fires will continue to start. Whether this fire grows and how quickly, depends to 
a large extent on the basic flammability of building materials and contents, as well as on 
the building design. The more quickly a fire develops, the less time occupants of the 
building have to escape”. 
Time factor is one of the attribute risks. In evacuation processes if evacuation time has 
increased, it will increase the risk to evacuees as well. It means that it will increase the 
tendency of casualties among the building occupants. Hence risk factors are another 
variable that are needed to be identified to ensure the high-rise residential buildings of the 
future are not being fire traps neither for the building occupiers nor the first time visitors. 
The questions are what are the actual problems encountered in high rise residential 
building in Malaysia? Do human factors or structural factors contribute more in delaying 
an evacuation process? Are the escape route design and specification sufficient enough to 
cater for the crowds during the evacuation process? What is the optimum and the 
effective dimension of escape routes? How can we ensure that escape routes are always in 
good condition and do not pose any difficulties during evacuation process? 
1.3 Fire safety model analysis 
Fire safety analysis is a generic phrase that covers many approaches to decision making 
about the uncertainties of losses from fire. Within this general structure are techniques for 
both qualitative and quantitative fire risk analysis, fire modelling techniques, fire safety 
evaluation, and active and passive fire safety measures, etc.  
The purpose of having a fire safety model analysis is to provide a guideline to relevant 
authorities such as local authorities, consultants, professional bodies and others before 
any proposal to build a new building in the future can be granted. For instance, a risk 
analysis technique has been used to evaluate the safety of building e.g. Delphi Technique 
(Marchant, 1988). Delphi used two set of questionnaires i.e. one is for the building 
occupants response and another is purposely set for the discussion and judgement of the 
professionals. The results would lead to decision making on the components of fire safety 
to be selected within the available technology and technique for fire fighting. Even 
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though the results are very important as it provides a rationale using a flexible approach, 
the level of safety is not very clear and needs to be enhanced. 
Another technique is “The Fire Safety Evaluation Scheme” which had been developed for 
the patient area within hospitals. (Marchant, et. al, 1982) This approach uses the 
contribution values assigned as a point’s scheme based on the checklist provided as an 
evaluation tool. Point’s scheme is basically to form the basis for further judgement on the 
adequacy of fire safety components or the level of safety against the level of risk or 
hazard of fire that is available within the system in a particular area. The areas than can be 
summarised in terms of their acceptable or not acceptable level of fire safety based on a 
number of points score compared to the stated benchmark. 
With the fire risk assessment modelling, the risk components would be identified at the 
earlier stage on the building design and it is hope that the building that is going to be 
constructed will not be a death trap to the occupants as mention by (Berndt and 
Richardson,1982) that:  
“What can be done to control a fire hazard? How can a building designer be sure that he 
is not creating a death trap for the occupants? These problems can be addressed by three 
basic methods for controlling fire hazards in buildings: prohibition, isolation and 
protection”. 
A multiattribute Evaluation Model is the most convincing method in fire safety 
assessment because the nature of its circumstances, in that fire safety decisions often have 
to be made under conditions in which the data are sparse and uncertain. It is complex and 
involves a network of interacting components, factors, elements, attributes, parameters, 
variables and so forth. Interactions are normally nonlinear and multidimensional. 
Sparseness and complexity of data, however, do not make it impossible to happen. A 
complex circumstance needs a complex system to solve it. Therefore one applicable 
approach to fire safety evaluation is Multiattribute Evaluation (Rasbash et at, 2004). 
We should have a mechanism to enable the selection of the most effective method for 
controlling a particular hazard. The prohibition, isolation and protection methods, taken 
individually, may be inadequate; consequently, most designs specify a combination of 
methods to achieve the desired result. It is often extremely difficult for a designer to 
choose the most appropriate method since this requires an awareness of the many 
situations which could lead to an uncontrolled fire in a building. Frequently, the control of 
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these hazards is the last consideration in the design process and, as a matter of 
convenience, there is a tendency to rely on the letter-of-the-law requirements set down in 
various provincial or municipal codes. In the process, designers may neglect to consider 
the objective of these requirements and thus overlook the alternatives available to them 
(Thompson and Marchant (a), 1995)  
One method of risk assessment is the assignment of points or scores to answers to 
questions in forms / questionnaires / worksheets, e.g., points scheme system, Gretener 
method, risk ranking, risk assessment schedules, points scheme for assessment of fire 
safety in hospitals, UK; Dow’s fire and explosion index, merits and demerits of points 
and ranking schemes. 
In view of the complexity of modern buildings, it is difficult to determine the escape 
pattern of occupants by simple calculations. With the advancement of digital computers, 
many computer-based evacuation models have recently been developed. According to 
Gwynne et al. (1999) they found that about 22 evacuation models have been developed or 
are under development. Most of them are designed using computational fluid dynamic 
(CFD) programme.  
When evacuating through fire environments, the presence of smoke may not only have a 
physiological impact on the evacuees but may also lead occupants to adapt their 
evacuation strategy through the adoption of another exit. By simply considering physical 
or geometrical factors, the most important variable is omitted; namely occupant 
behaviour. For a more accurate depiction of events, the occupant's decision-making 
process should, even in a rudimentary form, be represented and should be able to 
influence the actions of the simulated occupants. (Gwynne (b) et al, 2001) 
According to Proulx (1995), elderly people and people with disabilities did not impede 
the evacuation since occupants who were mobility impaired waited in their unit to be 
rescued. The problem is if the building is not provided with a fire lift, firemen have to use 
the routes used by evacuees to rescue the mobility impaired persons. This will delay the 
evacuation process and increase the evacuation time. 
This research is attends to investigate the effects of escape routes design and 
specifications on the evacuation process and the time taken to evacuate in high-rise 
residential buildings in Malaysia. This study attends to investigate the integration between 
the human behaviour and structural design particularly the escape route design and 
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specification. The aim is to produce a fire safety conceptual model on how fire safety 
standard in high-rise residential buildings can be achieved. Figure 1.1 below shows the 
outline investigation proposal, types of analysis and the aim of the research. 
 
Figure 1.1: The investigation, analysis and modelling of research framework model to 
achieve research objective. 
1.4 Rationale for research and development of fire safety model 
The provision for active fire fighting systems and improvements in the technology used in 
manufacturing of fire safety products such as fire detector devices, sprinkler systems, 
portable fire extinguishers etc. is actively being developed but there is still room for 
research in this topic. Furthermore, research concerning the provision of escape routes in 
high-rise residential buildings has not yet been carried out comprehensively, thus, a study 
in this particular topic is viable and essential. In Malaysia research regarding fire safety in 
buildings is very new, particularly research regarding the provision of fire safety in high-
rise residential buildings. Even in the United Kingdom, there has not been a great deal of 
research on fire safety in high-rise residential buildings. 
Statistics show that the risk of fire in residential buildings is high. Therefore escape routes 
in high-rise residential building should be designed and constructed to enable all 
occupants to evacuate the building in the shortest time possible. 
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From the groundwork done by the researcher in Malaysia, it was found that the difficulty 
in escaping from a building fire is largely due to several factors such as: 
• Unnecessary fitted ‘safety precautions’ which can create obstacles,  
• The design and construction of escape stairs which do not comply with the rules 
and regulations,  
• The number of people occupying the building at one particular time exceeding the 
design factor,  
• Difficulty in finding the exact location of escape stairs due to unclear or no exit 
signage,  
• Smoke entering the escape route and escape stair,  
• Poor illumination system, etc.  
Other factors of equal importance are: 
• Lack of facilities for disabled people to evacuate from the building,  
• No alternative escape route provided in the building,  
• No fire-fighting lift being provided,  
• Difficulties in identifying the location of egress due to unfamiliarity of the 
building environment. This is applicable to new tenants and visitors,  
• The condition of fire doors,  
• The size and shape of escape routes, and 
• Traffic congestion during evacuation processes. 
These factors have a potential to increase the risk of casualty to the building occupants. 
Therefore, research on a fire safety model for the high-rise residential building becomes 
essential. 
The purpose of this fire safety model is to provide decision makers, professional bodies, 
local authorities, building owners and building occupants a sound indicator of fire safety 
level for high-rise residential buildings. The indicator meant here is a fire safety audit 
form for auditing the fire safety level regarding the provision of escape routes in high-rise 
residential building. This will be part of the model developed by analysing all data 
gathered from the research on existing high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia. The 
benchmarks for creating this model are Building Regulations approved documents part B 
(England and Wales), Building Regulation Part 2 (Scotland) and Uniform Building By-
Laws 1984 (Malaysia). 
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If fire breaks out in high-rise residential buildings, it is expected that the occupants will 
evacuate the building using normal escape routes provided in the building unless they 
have caught fire. If fire and smoke conditions in the affected building are worse and 
threaten the occupants, then they may have no choice but to return to their respective 
apartments or seek refuge in other apartments and wait to be rescued by the fire fighter 
(Yung, et. al., 2001). 
Therefore, escape routes in high-rise residential buildings are supposed to provide a safe 
egress for the building occupants to reach at the safe designated area. Elements of escape 
route such as steps, handrail, balustrade and staircase slope should have been designed 
and installed in such a way that they are safe to use. Are the designs of those elements 
safe to use? Moreover, most of the time taken to evacuate from the building during a 
building fire is to open the fire doors, pass through many corner and U-Turn, horizontal 
and vertical exits. Are these hypothetical statements true, or there are other human factors 
perceived being the major factors contributing to the casualties? 
Any high-rise residential buildings in the future should have clear fire safety policies, 
objectives, tactics, components and elements, and a comprehensive fire evacuation plan 
and fire evacuation procedure. Those factors need to be identified and among the 
outcomes of this research is expected to suggest fire safety expectation i.e. fire safety 
components and elements, escape routes specifications, human behaviour factors 
regarding the evacuation process and how risk of fire and casualty can be reduced. 
Therefore, the main objective of my research is to produce a fire safety model for high-
rise residential buildings, mainly dealing with the safety attributes of escape routes and 
safe egress for the building occupants. 
1.5 Research Questions 
(i). What are the actual problems with the escape routes in high rise residential 
building in Malaysia?  
(ii). What are the factors that cause the evacuation to delay, human or 
structural?  
(iii). Is the current escape route design and specification sufficient to cater for 
the crowds during evacuation process?  
(iv). What are the optimum dimensions of escape routes?  
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(v). How can we be sure that escape routes are always in good condition and 
do not pose any difficulty during evacuation process? 
(vi). Are the escape routes elements safe to use?  
(vii). What factors most motivated people to evacuate the building once the 
alarm sounded? 
1.6 Research Objectives 
(i). To study the compliance of escape route design and construction in high-
rise residential buildings to the specification given in Uniform Building 
By-Laws 1984 (Malaysia).  
(ii) To formulate a fire safety model using qualitative and quantitative analysis 
techniques to improve fire safety standards in high-rise residential 
buildings. 
1.7 Research scope and limitations 
The scope of this research is:  
(i). Only escape routes components i.e. staircase, corridor, fire door and 
intermediate floor are considered in analysis. 
(ii). The study is focused on high-rise residential buildings with minimum of 
five storeys height. 
(iii). Risk factors in building will be analysed according to the personal and 
damage hazards of fire as ruled out by Jabatan Bomba dan Penyelamat 
Malaysia. 
(iv). Analysis of evacuation processes will be done using SIMULEX simulation 
software for the selected high-rise residential buildings. 
1.8 Thesis organisation structure 
There are nine chapters in this thesis with reference and appendixes. 
Chapter 1 
Chapter one is a brief introduction to the overall thesis 
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Chapter 2 
Chapter two reviews the background studies or related literature that directly influences 
our general understanding of the area of concern. Understanding the principle of fire 
technology, provision for escape route in building regulation and Uniform Building By-
Laws, fire safety evacuation model, human behaviour, escape route design and 
specifications, and fire plan and evacuation procedure. 
Chapter 3 
Chapter three outlines the methodology used for this thesis. Mixed methodologies 
adopted in this thesis i.e. qualitative and quantitative technique used to develop fire safety 
model proposed. Mixed research methods used include analysing observations, 
questionnaires and computer simulation data.  
Chapter 4 
Chapter four concerns observation of escape routes in high-rise residential buildings and 
formulation of study models for further analysis. In these observation exercises, 462 
staircases, 1536 staircase steps, i.e. 33.29%, have been investigated in six high-rise 
residential buildings. Also, another six buildings have been visited to study their internal 
layout and circulation patterns. 
Chapter 5 
Chapter five is an evaluation of the condition of escape routes in high-rise residential 
buildings, based on the observation of twelve buildings in Kuala Lumpur and Penang.  
Chapter 6 
Chapter six is a study of human behaviour response issues in high rise residential 
buildings in Malaysia. A questionnaire survey was used to collect research data by 
distributing them to all residential units in selected high-rise residential buildings in Kuala 
Lumpur. 
Chapter 7 
Chapter seven is an evaluation of the provision of escape routes in high-rise residential 
buildings in Malaysia by analysing the escape route design and specification using special 
computer simulation. Based on the study models developed in chapter four, i.e. 225 
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models tested using speciality software call SIMULEX, specification for corridor, 
staircase, fire door, and intermediate and landing floor widths can be suggested. 
Chapter 8 
Chapter eight discusses the development and content of a fire safety model in high-rise 
residential buildings. 
Chapter 9 
Chapter nine contains conclusion and recommendations for further research.
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter definitions of high-rise building from various references will be given 
followed by a brief description of Malaysian populations and the need for the housing. 
The current Malaysian population is estimated at 27.49 million with an annual growth 
rate of 2.6%. With huge numbers of foreign workers i.e. estimated about more that 7 
million currently working in Malaysia, especially in the construction industry, 
manufacturing, housemaid, etc, high demand for housing has driven private and 
government-linked companies to build more high-rise residential buildings.  
To understand the effects if fire breaks out in enclosed spaces, the science of fire and fire 
characteristics are also discussed. A literature review for escape route provision in 
Malaysia and United Kingdom building codes will also be presented followed by 
literature on the evacuation simulation package and fire safety management, fire risk 
assessment, and human behaviour studied by other researchers. 
2.2 Definition of high-rise buildings 
Most building codes define the high-rise building in terms of height and/or storeys. The 
fire department tend to thinks of high-rise buildings as being beyond the reach of the 
ground equipment available to them (Klaena, and Sanders 2000). The National Fire 
Protection Association (NFPA, 2000) defined a high-rise building as a building taller than 
75 ft (23 meters) in height measured from the lowest level of fire department vehicle 
access to the floor of the highest occupiable storey. Another opinion says a high-rise 
structure is one that extends higher than the maximum reach of available fire-fighting 
equipment and it is between 75 ft and 100 ft. A particular building is deemed a high-rise 
specified by the fire and building codes in the area in which the building is located 
(Craighead, 2003). 
Terpak, (2003) says the definition of high-rise building is any building exceeded 75 ft 
where fire department operation cannot be considered ground based. Meanwhile, Avillo, 
(2002) mentioned that a definition for the categorisation of a high-rise building is any 
building over 75 ft in height and equipped with a standpipe and/or sprinkler system. This 
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definition of a high-rise is not totally accurate from a strategic and logistical point of 
view. Many departments have limited or non-existent aerial capability. 
Building codes vary in their definition of high-rise buildings, but the intent is to define 
buildings in which fires cannot be fought successfully by ground-based equipment and 
personnel. Thus, ordinarily, high-rise means buildings 100 ft or more high (Merritt and 
Ricketts, 2000). Encyclopaedia Britannica gives a definition of a high-rise building as a 
multi-story building tall enough to require the use of a system of mechanical vertical 
transportation such as elevators (Britannica online). From the building construction 
article; the high-rise building is generally defined as one that is taller than the maximum 
height which people are willing to walk up; it thus requires mechanical vertical 
transportation (Britannica online). 
A building is defined by the Uniform Building Codes as a high-rise building when it has 
floors for human occupancy which are more than 75 ft above the lowest level of fire 
department access. Second definition as stated in Uniform Building Codes is the 
buildings meet the definition to be equipped with an automatic fire sprinkle system 
designed in accordance with requirements in Uniform Building Codes (Patterson, 1993). 
Therefore, for the purpose of this research, high-rise residential buildings to be selected 
for study are those buildings taller than 75 ft or roughly buildings taller than five storeys 
in height are categorised as a high-rise building. 
2.3 Population and Housing in Malaysia 
Malaysia became independent from Britain on 31st August 1957 with the name of 
Federation of Malaya or Persekutuan Tanah Melayu which consists of nine Malay States 
or Negeri-Negeri Melayu i.e. states that governed by the Malay Kings in the peninsular of 
Malaya. In 1963, all Malay States, including of Melaka, Penang, Sabah, Sarawak and 
Singapore were joined together to form Malaysia. Singapore then separated from 
Malaysia in 1965 to become Republic of Singapore.  
Since the formation of Malaysia in 1963, there are four censuses on the Malaysian 
population i.e. in the year 1970, 1980, 1991 and 2000. It is expected that the next census 
exercise will take place around the year of 2010 i.e. every ten years. In the year 2000 
census, the total population of Malaysia was 23.27 million with the majority ethnic Malay 
58%, followed by Chinese 24%, Indian 8% and other 10%, and average annual growth 
rate of 2.6% over the period of ten years (1991 – 2000). This growth rate was similar to 
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the previous census i.e. 2.6% for the period of 1980 – 1991 (Malaysia Statistics, 2000). 
The estimated current population of Malaysia is 27.49 million according to Malaysia 
statistics’ website www.statistics.gov.my. Besides that there are more than 7 million 
foreign workers from varies countries i.e. Indonesia, Thailand, Philippine, Bangladesh, 
Burma, India, China, etc to work in various sectors. The most popular sectors that have 
employed substantial numbers of workers from foreign countries are the construction 
industry, housemaid, manufacturing and estates. These populations need buildings to 
house them. High-rise flat buildings seem to be the best solution to provide shelter in 
highly populated areas such as Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaysia. Therefore the 
number of high-rise accommodation buildings in Kuala Lumpur and nearby townships 
has drastically increased in the past few decades. It is expected that many more high-rise 
residential buildings will be built in the near future because of the high price of land in 
the town area, high demand from the first time purchaser and from the people who wants 
to buy a second house near to their workplaces. 
The construction of new high-rise residential buildings should not only be viewed from 
the prospective of economics and construction technology but equally important is that 
they are viewed from the perspective of fire safety as well. Research on effective design 
and specification of escape routes in high-rise residential buildings becomes essential to 
ensure building occupants are able to evacuate the building safely in the event of fire. 
2.4 The science of fire and fire spreading in building 
In the event of fire, deaths are mostly caused by smoke or smoke inhalation related 
causes, instead of direct burning. Smoke and heat become a major threat in building fire, 
therefore understanding the characteristic of smoke and heat are crucially important in 
building fire for the sake of life safety. With the knowledge and understanding of the 
behaviour of smoke and heat, one can be expected to be able to make a wise decision 
once in a critical situation i.e. dealing with the building fires. Life safety would be 
increased if occupants of the high-rise residential buildings know at what limit that the 
risk can safely to be taken. By understanding the science of fire and fire spreading in the 
building, evacuation process would be eased because occupants in high-rise buildings 
know what to do in the event of fire.  
The size of a fire is related to the heat release rate. To determine a design fire, a database 
on heat release rate should thus be developed (Peacock et al, 1994). The size of the fire 
and its heat release rate is the first and most important element among the parameters 
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commonly used to characterize an unwanted fire (FPEH, 2002, Huggett, 1980). However, 
the threat to the occupants may be minimized and the damage to the fabric and structure 
of the building could be reduced to an acceptable level by increasing knowledge of fire 
science and the principles of fire safety engineering (Bishop & Drysdale, 1998). 
A fire tragedy will not only involve damage to property but also issues of life. Therefore 
we must be very careful when dealing with the elements having a high risk of fire 
ignition. Another important factor that needs to be considered is the fire load1 stored in 
the building. According to Clark (1988), even buildings constructed of non-combustible 
materials will almost without exception contain materials that burn under certain 
circumstances. On the other hand, materials that are designated as a combustible material, 
according to tests, may be of negligible significance in fires. Wood is a good example of a 
common material for which fire performance is difficult to predict. It ignites if its surface 
reaches about 300°C in the presence of a flame or perhaps 400-500°C in its absence. It 
may also ignite, however, at much lower temperatures if the time of exposure to heat is 
longer. Charring, a process related to ignition, has been recorded when the temperature 
was not much above 100°C. Before we go further about science of fire, let us look at the 
definition of fire and fire safety related attributes. 
2.4.1 Definition found in various references. 
The definitions of fire and fire safety attributes given in this chapter are gathered from 
various sources.  
i. Combustion: 
Oxford Dictionary (OD) and International Encyclopaedia (IE) gave the definition of 
combustion as follows:  
“A state of combustion in which the substances combine chemically with oxygen 
from the air and usually give out bright light and heat” (OD) 
“A rapid combustion characterized by high temperatures and flame. In order to 
produce fire, a combustible material and oxygen must be present and in contact at 
sufficiently high temperatures to initiate combustion” (IE) 
                                                 
1 Fire Load – Every thing inside the building which is form a part or not a part of the building 
structure such as people, furniture, finishing etc…. 
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Meanwhile, the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (AHDEL, 2004), 
gives the definition of combustion as the process of burning or a chemical changes, 
especially oxidation, accompanied by the production of heat and light. The word 
combustion was believed originated from the late Latin that combustiō, combustiōn or 
from Latin combustus that the past participle of combūrere which is giving a meaning of 
to burn up or blend of combustion or to burn around.  
The Columbia Electronic Encyclopaedia (CEE, 2003) defines combustion as a rapid 
chemical reaction of two or more substances with a characteristic liberation of heat and 
light; it is commonly called burning. The burning of a fuel (e.g., wood, coal, oil, or 
natural gas) in air is a familiar example of combustion. Combustion reactions involve 
oxidation and reduction. Before a substance will burn, it must be heated to its ignition 
point, or kindling temperature. Although the ignition point of a substance is essentially 
constant, the time needed for burning to begin depends on factors such as the form of the 
substance and the amount of oxygen in the air (CEE, 2003). However, combustion 
sometime may not involve oxygen to the process for the ignition to start e.g. hydrogen 
burns in chlorine to form hydrogen chloride with the discharge of heat and light that a 
characteristic of combustion too.  
Combustion or burning is an exothermic reaction between substances and gases to release 
heat. In chemistry, an exothermic reaction is one that releases heat. It is the opposite of an 
endothermic reaction which can be expressed in a chemical equation i.e. Reactants → 
Products + Energy. When using a calorimeter, the change in heat of the calorimeter is 
equal to the opposite of the change in heat of the system. This means that when the 
solution in which the reaction is taking place gains heat, the reaction is exothermic. In an 
exothermic reaction the total energy absorbed in bond breaking is less than the total 
energy released in bond making. Combustion normally occurs in oxygen (often in the 
form of gaseous O2) to form oxides, However, combustion can also take place in other 
gases like chlorine. The products of such reaction usually include water (H2O) as well as 
carbon monoxide (CO) or carbon dioxide (CO2), or both which is high in toxicity. Other 
by products, such as partially reacted fuel and elemental carbon (C), may generate visible 
smoke and soot. Generally, the chemical equation for combusting a hydrocarbon, e.g. 
octane, in oxygen is as follow: CxHy + (x + y/4)O2 → xCO2 + (y/2)H2O. For example, the 
burning of Propane is: C3H8 + 5O2 → 3CO2 + 4H2O. 
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ii. Rapid Combustion 
Rapid combustion is a form of combustion in which large amounts of heat and light 
energy are released. An example of rapid combustion is burning of fuel i.e. petrol or 
diesel in internal combustion engine, burning of highly combustible material in open 
burning, etc. 
iii. Slow Combustion 
Slow combustion is a form of combustion which taken place at a low temperature. 
Examples of slow combustion are what we see in everyday life e.g. gas cooker used to 
cook food, burning of candle, etc. 
iv. Fire 
According to Jerome (1994), fire is the manifestation of a chemical reaction called 
combustion. This reaction takes place between a fuel and oxygen but requires heat to 
initiate the reaction. When the reaction has started it generates its own heat and this 
reaction will continue until all available fuel finished. This reaction is called chain 
reaction,2 which means that fire spreads by it owns heat. In general terms, fire is defined 
as a rapid, persistent chemical change that releases heat and light and is accompanied by 
flame, especially the exothermic oxidation of a combustible substance. The word fire is 
used to refer to the combination of the brilliant glow and large amount of heat released 
during a rapid, self-sustaining exothermic oxidation process of combustible gases ejected 
from a fuel. The fire itself is a body of gas that releases heat and light. It starts by 
subjecting the fuel to heat or another energy source, e.g. a match or lighter, and is 
sustained by the further release of heat energy i.e. change reaction. Most commonly the 
word fire refers to uncontrolled fires than controlled fires. 
 v. Transfer of Heat 
Heat may be transferred from one substance to another by three means that of conduction, 
convection, and radiation. Conduction involves the transfer of energy from one molecule 
                                                 
2 According to the Encyclopedia Britannica Chain reaction is a series of reactions in which the 
product of each step is a reagent for the next. Many polymerization reactions are chain reactions. 
A simpler example, however, is found in the synthesis of hydrogen bromide. The overall 
synthesis equation is H2 + Br2 ® 2HBr. 
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to adjacent molecules without the substance as a whole moving. Convection involves the 
movement of warmer parts of a substance away from the source of heat and takes place 
only in fluids, i.e., liquids and gases. Radiation is the transfer of heat energy in the form 
of electromagnetic radiation, principally in the infrared radiation portion of the spectrum. 
 vi. Smoke 
Smoke is a visible gaseous product of incomplete combustion made up of small particles 
of carbonaceous matter in the air, usually comprises hot gas and suspended particles of 
carbon and tarry substances, fine solid or liquid particles in a gaseous medium, or soot 
and forming a cloud of fine particles resulting mainly from the burning of organic 
material, such as wood or coal. Smoke varies with its source, but it wood gives little 
smoke if burned when dry and if the fire is given a good supply of air. 
vii. Fire Safety 
Fire safety is a generic term normally used as a component of building fire safety which 
includes some elements as follows:  
• Maximum occupancy or occupancy load, that is, the number of people permitted to 
occupy any building at one particular time. This is to ensure that they all can 
evacuate the building as quickly as possible in an emergency situation.  
• There are sufficient fire exits and proper signage which is workable even if power 
failure occurs. The exit signage should be able to direct the occupants to the 
designated safe assembly area.  
• Fire extinguishers or fire suppression system and fire alarms are placed in an easily 
accessible location. The system should be regularly inspected and maintained. 
• All flammable materials are banned from being stored in building in large amounts 
unless permission has been given by the relevant authority. The place to store that 
material should be built with fire retardant materials and has passed the fire test. 
• Regular inspecting of public buildings should be carried out to check for violations 
of fire safety policy or fire precaution act, and if necessary a closing order issued 
until the violation is corrected, or in extreme cases the building is condoned. 
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viii. Fire Exit  
Fire exit is a fire escape route forming a part of the building component which is used by 
the people to evacuate from the building in a case of an emergency such as a fire. It is 
usually a strategically located (e.g. in a stairwell, hallway, or other likely place) outward 
opening door with a crash bar on it and with exit signage leading to it. A fire exit can also 
be a main doorway in or out. A fire escape is a special kind of fire exit, mounted to the 
outside of a building. 
2.4.2 Classes of fire 
Fire is categorised according to the types of fuel it consumes and named various classes 
of fires i.e. A to F or E (for United State) are detailed. In Europe and Australia, classes of 
fire are grouped into six groups as follows: 
• Class A: Fires that involve flammable solids such as wood, cloth, rubber, paper, 
and some types of plastics.  
• Class B: Fires that involve flammable liquids or liquefiable solids such as 
petrol/gasoline, oil, paint, some waxes & plastics, but NOT cooking fats or oils.  
• Class C: Fires that involve flammable gases, such as natural gas, hydrogen, 
propane, butane. 
• Class D: Fires that involve combustible metals, such as sodium, magnesium, and 
potassium.  
• Shock Risk Fire (formerly known as Class E): Fires that involve any of the 
materials found in Class A and B fires, but with the introduction of an electrical 
appliances, wiring, or other electrically energized objects in the vicinity of the 
fire, with a resultant electrical shock risk if a conductive agent is used.  
• Class F: Fires involving cooking fats and oils. The high temperature of the oils 
when on fire far exceeds that of other flammable liquids making normal 
extinguishing agents ineffective  
In the U.S., fires are generally classified into five groups: A, B, C, D and E. 
• Class A: Fires that involve wood, cloth, rubber, paper, and some types of plastics.  
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• Class B: Fires that involve gasoline, oil, paint, natural and propane gases, and 
flammable liquids, gases, and greases.  
• Class C: Fires that involve any of the materials found in Class A and B fires, but 
with the introduction of an electrical appliances, wiring, or other electrically 
energized objects in the vicinity of the fire.  
• Class D: Fires that involve combustible metals, such as sodium, magnesium, and 
potassium. 
• Class E: Fires involving cooking fats and oils. The high temperature of the oils 
when on fire far exceeds that of other flammable liquids making normal 
extinguishing agents ineffective  
2.4.3 Understanding the basic of chemical and physical nature of fire  
In spite of knowing the definition of fire and fire related terms, the basic chemical and 
physical nature of fire needs to be studied for better understanding of fire and how it can 
be controlled during initial growth and development. In fire science, the well known 
theory of fire is ‘Triangle of Fire’ model. Figure 2.1 illustrates the triangle of fire which 
having three components links together to form a triangle. Those components are fuel, 
oxygen and heat which chemically bond together to form fire characteristics that is flame, 
smoke and heat. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The triangle of fire concept model (Mehaffey (a), 1987) 
This triangle of fire can be used to explain that if we want to extinguish the fire, it can be 
done by isolating one of the three components from the combination. Fire can be 
suppressed by removing either heat, which commonly means using water spray to cool 
the heat, or by removing the fuel, which normally means limiting or turning off the flow 
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of gas in a gas stove or by removing the oxygen by smothering the fire with a fire blanket 
for example. However, we should not forget about the fact that ‘Chemical Reactions’ are 
also needed to keep the fire spreading. This reaction is known as the ‘Chain Reaction’ 
which is heated molecules freely and rapidly moving in all directions. These molecules 
are very active moving around and hitting the other molecules to set fire on other 
molecules. Fire will continue due to the chain reaction process in which the heated 
molecules will touch the others until the temperature reaches the state of auto combustion 
where hydrogen gas and oxygen gas from the air actively take part in the burning process. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the process of chain reaction in burning materials. 
 
Figure 2.2: The chain reaction process in burning material, (Mehaffey (a), 1987) 
How rapidly the chain reaction will take place depends on how fast the pyrolysis process 
occurs on the fuel. For example, polymer products of building materials e.g. synthetic 
polymers or plastic products have a very rapid chain reaction compared to organic 
carbonise construction materials e.g. woods. By breaking the chain reaction, fire can be 
suppressed and this allows for the possibility of a fourth extinguishment technique, that 
is, building components coated with fire retardant chemicals to react while being heated 
to break the chain reaction. Gypsum is one material which acts in this fashion. It is a 
mineral composed of calcium sulfate (calcium, sulfur, and oxygen) with two molecules of 
water. When it is heated approximately 150°C (302°F) partially dehydrates the mineral by 
driving off exactly 75% of the water contained in its chemical structure rather than 
increasing the temperature of the mineral. The temperature will rise slowly until the water 
is released as steam and delaying the burning process by slowing the chain reaction. The 
chemical formula for this process as follow: CaSO4·2H2O + heat → CaSO4·½H2O + 
1½H2O (steam). 
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Products of combustion rising above the flame are in the form of smoke and heat. Smoke 
consists of airborne solids (soot), liquid droplets, and gases, some of which may be toxic. 
Among the toxic gases produced, carbon monoxide is certainly the most lethal gas. 
However, Carbon Dioxide, Hydrogen Cyanide, Hydrogen Chloride, Nitrogen Dioxide 
and may others also be produced when the relevant material set on fire. Carbon monoxide 
is the main toxic gas produced from the combustion of polyethylene and other organic 
materials that are made up of carbon and hydrogen atoms. It is produced as a result of 
incomplete combustion when the oxygen supply is limited. When it is inhaled, it causes 
asphyxiation by combining with haemoglobin in a reversible reaction to form 
carboxyhaemoglobin. Its formation at the expense of oxyhaemoglobin reduces the 
availability of oxygen for the cellular systems of the body (Sumi & Tsuchiya, 1971).  
2.4.4 The stages of a fire  
Fires within an enclosed space behave differently and with a different rate of burning 
from those in the open (Stollard & Abrahams, 1999). The growth period lasts from the 
moment of ignition to the time when all combustible materials within the enclosure area 
are burned.  
Figure 2.3 shows the standard fire curve in a compartment fire. The Time – Temperature 
curve in this figure 2.3 is not according to the scale and the time taken in each stage 
cannot be directly measured to get an empirical reading but rather a conceptual graph to 
show the behaviour of fire in building. There are four stages all together i.e. initial stage, 
growth, steady combustion and decay. In the initial stage, fire behaviour largely depends 
on the types of fuel available in the building. If the fuel is in gaseous form, the ignition 
will be very rapid and if the fuel is in a solid material like timber, it will be a slow 
combustion or smouldering fire. On the other hand, fire behaviour is largely influenced by 
how fast pyrolisis processes take place. At the initial stage only smoke and heat will be 
released. Once smoke has been detected, i.e. fire alarm goes off, people in the affected 
buildings should start to make their way out to the escape stairs as soon as possible. They 
should not wait until the fire has emerged and become serious or uncontrollable before 
beginning to evacuate. The chance of saving life is greater if immediate action is taken to 
evacuate the building soon after the fire has been detected. 
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Figure: 2.3: A standard fire curve in enclosed spaces (CIBSE, 2003) 
The rate of development of fire and it duration are influenced by the nature of the 
contents of the building and materials of the room surfaces (Marchant, 1972). The phase 
of fire growth is started when ignition has begun and continues until all combustible 
materials are lighted. At this point flashover begins and the fire begins to enter the steady 
state combustion phase where most of the combustible materials are burning and the heat 
releases is maximum. For building fires the temperature at this stage ranges from 9000 C – 
1200 0 C and the duration of the fire is determine by the amount of air supplied and the 
quantity of combustible material available. After all the material has been consumed, it 
then starts to enter the next stage, the decay phase.  
In decay phase, the fire starts to decay until it stops completely if there are no more 
combustible materials available. The heat release will gradually reduce to leave charcoal 
and dust at the end of the combustion process. Even though fire is in a decaying process, 
it is still dangerous and still fatal if extremely exposed because there is still smoke in the 
fire vicinity which poses a danger to the people if they breathe this smoky air. It can 
possibly choke the respiration system and be lethal, since there are toxic gases produced 
during the combustion process. This can happen if the materials involved are classified as 
toxic materials such as materials containing high chlorinate or nitrite compounds. 
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2.4.5 Fire spreading in building 
When fire starts to burn in a compartment, i.e. after ignition, it burns just like in open 
space. After a short period of time, smoke produced by the burning processes starts to 
form a hot layer below the ceiling, heating the ceiling and upper walls of the room. 
Thermal radiation from the hot layer, ceiling, and upper walls begins to heat all objects in 
the lower part of the room and may augment both the rate of burning of the original object 
and the rate of flame spread over its surface as illustrated in figure 2.3a.  
 
Figure 2.3a: Fire behaviour in compartment (Mehaffey (b), 1987) 
To reduce the risk to persons if there is a fire, it is necessary to consider how to control or 
restrict the spread of fire and smoke in building because the majority of people who die in 
fires are overcome by the smoke and gases. Thick and black smoke can obscure vision, 
choke breathing, and block the escape routes. Fire can spread by three methods i.e.  
• Convection, 
• Conduction, and 
• Radiation 
Convection is the most dangerous and causes the majority of injuries and fatalities. Heat 
and smoke spreads by convection, once fire starts in an enclosed space, when heat and 
smokes rises from the burning material and is trapped by the ceiling and walls. Heat and 
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smoke will pass through any holes or gaps in the ceiling, walls, or floor into other parts of 
the building. The heat from the fire trapped in the building will increase the temperature 
of other combustibles until they reach their ignition temperature and ignite more or less 
simultaneously to cause flashover. 
Conduction occurs when heat absorb by metal and transmit it to other room where it can 
set fire to combustible materials that are in contact with the heated metal. 
Radiation transfers heat in the air in the same way that electric bar heater heats the room. 
Any combustible materials close to a fire will absorb the heat until they reach their 
ignition temperature and start to burn. 
2.5 Regulatory framework and escape routes provision in the Uniform Building 
By-Law 1984 in Malaysia. 
In this section, provision of escape route in UBBL 84, Malaysia, which is currently in use, 
and the Building Regulation, UK, will be discussed. Definition of terms and references 
used in the Uniform Building By-Laws 1984 can be found in appendix 2.0.  
2.5.1 Regulatory framework in Malaysia  
Local authorities are a government agency. One of it function is to check all applications 
for a new building to be built in their territory. Any application for a new building will be 
approved if it has fulfilled all requirements by the by-law. The consideration to approve 
any building plans submitted to the local authority will only be given after the local 
authority has received a written recommendation by internal and external technical 
departments. The application for a new building needs to be made by the developer or by 
the developer’s representative which is normally a registered architect. 
The number of internal technical department depends on the size of the local authority. 
For example the Kuala Lumpur Municipal Council has 12 internal technical departments 
i.e. Economy Planning and development department, Town Planning Department, 
Building Department, Mechanical Engineering Department, Architect Department, etc. 
Meanwhile, the Penang Municipal Council only has five internal technical departments 
i.e. Building Department, Engineering Department, Town Planning and Development 
Department, Licensing Department, and Urban Services Department. Among the internal 
technical departments, Building Department is the one who is responsible for controlling, 
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implementation and enforcement to ensure that all buildings in their area are safe for 
occupy. 
Besides that there are a number of external technical departments that the local authority 
will have to refer for the technical comments before any building plans can be approved 
that: 
i. Irrigation and Drainage Department, 
ii.  Fire Services and Rescue Department, 
iii.  Sewerage and Services Department, 
iv. Public Works Department, 
v.  Water Supply Department, 
vi.  Electrical Energy Department (Tenaga National Berhad) 
vii. Telecommunication Department (Syarikat Telekom Malaysia) 
Fire Services and Rescue Department is responsible to comment on the design and 
specifications of escape routes, emergency exits, party wall, and / or fire doors, fire 
barrier, compartment floors etc. Reference for regulatory requirement regarding the fire 
safety aspects in the building is The Uniform Building By-Law 1984 which uses by both 
departments i.e. Building Department, and Fire Services and Rescue Department for 
statutory satisfaction. 
2.5.2 Managing residential buildings  
The authority of the high-rise residential building is similar to the other buildings i.e. 
private property which after the building has been completed and handover to the 
purchaser, after two years of handover, all liabilities on the building i.e. maintenance, to 
keep the building clean etc is the owner’s responsibility. The owner is all the purchaser of 
the flats in that building. Two years is a developer’s liability period i.e. all maintenance is 
under the developer’s responsibility. After the liability period ended, the owners will have 
to appoint a Management Corporation (MC) to manage the building. The MC can be 
among the purchasers which mean they can form a committee to manage the building or 
appointing a proper building management firm to manage the building. All maintenance 
fees and costs, if any, are the liability to the owners. A normal practice is the owners will 
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pay a monthly “maintenance fees” to the MC. The MC will inform all owners about any 
maintenance cost involve if any part of the building or services in the building is needed 
for replacement.  
The problem starts to arise when some of the owners reluctant to pay the maintenance 
fees which has caused the MC of having a financial difficulty. This has caused the 
maintenance on the building can not be effectively completed. To overcome this problem, 
Joint Management Corporation (JMC) has been formed where the developer will be part 
of the Management Corporation i.e. to head the JMC to manage the building. It means 
that they will be joint responsibility between the developer and the management 
corporation on the managing of the building. For example if a state government agencies, 
e.g. State Economics Development Corporation (SEDC), as a developer, SEDC will head 
the JMC to manage the high-rise residential buildings. JMC has an authority to implement 
any measures to improve the fire safety standard in the building they manage. They shall 
be responsible to ensure any legal aspects in the buildings under their management are 
complied.  
2.5.3 Escape routes specification as in UBBL ‘84 
Staircase riser and tread dimensions 
The riser of any staircase shall be not more than 180 millimetres and the tread shall be not 
less than 255 millimetres and the dimensions of the riser and the tread of the staircase 
chosen shall be uniform and consistent throughout. Figure 2.4 shows the risers and the 
treads of the staircase form and dimension.  
The widths of staircases shall be in accordance with by-law 168. Sub-clause 2 stated that 
“staircases shall be of such width that in the event of any one staircase not being available 
for escape purposes the remaining staircases shall accommodate the highest occupancy 
load of any one floor discharging into it, calculated in accordance with provisions in the 
Seventh Schedule to these By-laws”. In sub-clause 3 it is stated that “the required width 
of a staircase shall be the clear width between walls but handrails may be permitted to 
encroach on this width to a maximum of 75 millimetres” and sub-clause 4; “the required 
width of a staircase shall be maintained throughout its length including at landings”. 
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Figure 2.4: Specification for treads and risers for difference types of staircase design. 
The depths of landings shall be not less than the width of the staircases. In residential 
buildings, a landing of not less than 1.80 metres in depth shall be provided in staircases at 
vertical intervals of not more than 4.25 metres and in staircases in all other buildings there 
shall be not more than sixteen risers between each such landing (UBBL, 108:1) and no 
part in any flight of any staircase shall have less than two risers (UBBL, 180:2). Figure 
2.6 shows the landing depth and width of the staircase. 
Handrail  
       
                  (a)                                                                     (b) 
Figure 2.5: (a) Wall mounted handrail, (b) Handrail detail 
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In clause 107 (4) it is stated that all handrails shall project not more than 100 mm from 
the face of the finished wall surface and shall be located not less than 825 mm and not 
more than 900 mm measured from the nosing of the treads provided that handrails to 
landings shall not be less than 900 mm from the level of the landing. Figure 2.5 (a) and 
(b) show the specification for handrail mentioned. It means that it has to be 900 mm for 
adult handrails. Children’s handrail can be provided between these ranges as an optional.  
 
Figure 2.6: The landing depth and width of the staircase 
Except for staircases of less than 4 risers, all staircases shall be provided with at least one 
handrail. Staircases exceeding 2225 millimetres in width shall be provided with an 
intermediate handrail for each 2225 millimetres of required width spaced approximately 
equally (see figure 2.7). In building other than residential buildings, a handrail shall be 
provided on each side of the staircase when the width of the staircase is 1100 millimetres 
or more. All handrails project not more than 100 millimetres from the face of the finished 
wall surface and shall be located  not less than 825 millimetres and not more than 900 
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millimetres measured from the nosing of the treads provided that handrails to landings 
shall not less than 900 millimetres from the level of the landing (UBBL, 107:1,2,3,4) 
 
Figure 2.7: Provision of intermediate handrail if staircase exceeded 2225mm width 
Spiral staircase 
Subject to the provisions of part VII and VIII of these By-laws spiral staircases may be 
permitted as a secondary staircase in buildings where the topmost floor does not exceed 
12.2 metres in height. Winding staircase may be permitted where they are not used as a 
required means of egress (UBBL, 109:1,2). 
Obstruction and projection on staircase 
There shall be no obstruction in any staircase between the topmost landing thereof and the 
exit discharge on the ground floor and there shall be no projection, other than handrails in 
staircases, in any corridor, passage or staircase at a level lower than 2 metres above the 
floor or above any stair (UBBL, 110:1, 2). 
Computing the staircase width 
There are some guidelines in computing the staircase width as stated in clause 177 the 
By-Laws i.e.: 
i. In a multi-storeyed building the staircases need be only wide enough to serve each 
floor but not less than the minimum width allowed and in every case one of the 
protected staircases shall be assumed to be inaccessible and the remaining 
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protected staircase shall be of sufficient width and number to accommodate the 
relevant occupancy. It means that staircase width is computed base on the 
maximum occupancy load of each floor. Calculation of occupancy load shall be 
accordance with the provision in the seventh schedule (see appendix 2.0). 
Underlying assumption is occupants at every floor evacuate at the same time and 
which the dynamic flows of occupants will allow the occupants at the lower floor 
to evacuate first. 
ii. Depending on the occupancy, street floor exits have to be sized to handle not only 
the occupant load of the street floor but also a percentage of the load of the exits 
discharging to the street floor from floors above and below; 
iii. Exits should never decrease in width along their length of travel and, if two or 
more exits converge into a common exit, the common exit should never be 
narrower than the sum of the width of the exits converging into it; 
iv. At least one of the staircases should be a minimum of two units width (One unit 
equivalent to 550mm)  except that 900 millimetres may be allowed where total 
occupancy of all floors served by staircases is less than 50; and 
v. There should be no decrease in width along the path of travel of a staircase. 
Clause 176 gives how to compute the required staircase width and the number of exits 
from individual floors of a building as follows: 
i. Calculate the floor area net or gross in square meter whichever is applicable; 
ii. Determine the allowance occupancy load factor from seventh schedule, i.e. at the 
second column. Occupant load residential flats are 24 per gross area. 
 iii. Divide the gross floor area by the occupant load to determine the number of 
occupants occupying for that floor. 
iv. Determine from the seventh schedule the capacity of the type of exit to be use for 
the purpose group. For stairs, the capacity exit is 45. 
v. To determine the staircase width in units, the number of occupants for that floor 
divided with the capacity exit. 
vi.  To determine the staircase width, units determined multiply by 550mm. 
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vii.  To determine the number of staircase needed, staircase width divides by 1100mm 
i.e. a minimum width of staircase as in clause 177. Its must also consider the dead-
end limit and maximum travel distance when calculating the number of staircase 
needed. 
An example calculation of the number of staircase needed is: 
If the gross floor area of one floor level of the flats building is 2.400 sq m. As specified in 
seventh schedule that the occupant loads for the residential flats is 24 (i.e. from seventh 
schedule, UBBL). Therefore the number of staircase needed is; 
 = 2,400/24 
 = 100 people 
 = 100/45 (i.e. 45 is the capacity exit for the stairs; from seventh schedule) 
 = 2.22 staircase width in unit 
This unit needs to multiply by 550 to obtain the staircase width in mm. Therefore; 
 2.22 x 550 = 1221 mm. 
To determine the number of staircase required if the minimum staircase width is chosen 
i.e. 1100mm. Therefore the number of staircase required for the 2400 sq m of the flats 
building is; 
 = 1221 / 1100 
 = 1.11 
Therefore 2 staircases i.e. 1100 mm width each are needed for this building because 1.11 
staircases needed but less than two staircases required. The rule of thumb is if the number 
of staircase needed is more than the round figure, the next round figure should be chosen. 
In this example the next round figure is 2, therefore 2 staircases are needed in this 
example. 
In terms of the maximum number of people allowed to exit via the specific width of 
staircase is not clearly mention in UBBL.  However, based on the above calculation, the 
maximum number of people can be calculated as follow: 
For the staircase width 914 mm, the staircase width in unit can be calculated by dividing 
the staircase width 914 mm with 550 = 1.7. Multiplying 1.7 with the capacity exit for the 
 - 35 - 
stairs i.e. 45 for the high-rise residential building, we can get the number of people for the 
staircase width 914mm. Therefore 1.7 x 45 = 76.5 i.e. 77 people allow for the staircase 
914mm width. Table 2.0 shows the staircases width correspondent with the maximum 
number of people allowed for one staircase width of individual floors. 
Staircase (mm) 914 1067 1100 1220 1372 1524 
No. of People 77 87 90 100 112 125 
Table 2.0: Staircase width and the maximum number of people allowed 
Measurement of travel distance to exits 
The travel distance to an exit shall be measured on the floor or other walking surface 
along the centre line of the natural path of travel, starting 0.300 metre from the most 
remote point of occupancy, curving around any corners or obstructions with 0.300 metre 
clearance there from and ending at the storey exit. Where measurement includes stairs, it 
shall be taken in the plane of the trend nosing. In the case of open areas the distance to 
exits shall be measured from the most remote point of occupancy provided that the direct 
distance shall not exceed two-thirds the permitted travel distance. In the case of individual 
rooms which are subject to occupancy of not more than six persons, the travel distance 
shall be measured from the doors of such rooms, provided that the travel distance from 
any point in the room to the room door does not exceed 15 metres. The maximum travel 
distances to exits and dead end limits shall be as specified in the Seventh Schedule of 
these By-laws (UBBL, clause 165 sub-section 1, 2, 3, and 4). 
Lighting and ventilation system in staircase 
In By-Laws 111 it is stated that all staircases shall be properly lighted and ventilated 
according to the requirements of the local authority. This is a general statement which did 
not give any detail about the types or technical specifications about what lighting system 
should be installed in staircase. Local authorities may have their own specification about 
how lighting should be installed in staircase and how many lux of the minimum 
illumination should be. 
Means of access and fire fighting in buildings over 18.3 metres high  
Every building over than 18.3 meters high should be provided with means of gaining 
access and fighting fire from within the building consisting of fire fighting access lobbies, 
 
- 36 -
fire fighting staircases, fire lifts and dry or wet rising systems. Fire fighting access lobbies 
shall be provided at every floor level and shall be so located that the level distance from 
the furthermost point of the floor does not exceed 45.75 meters. This in inline with the 
By-Law 229 (3) that Fire fighting access lobbies may be omitted if the fire fighting 
staircase is pressurised to meet the requirements of by-law 200 and all fire fighting 
installations within the pressurised staircase enclosure do not intrude into the clear space 
required for means of egress and (4) that a fire fighting staircase shall be provided to give 
direct access to each fire fighting access lobby and shall be directly accessible from 
outside the building at fire appliance access level. This may be one of the staircases 
required as a means of egress from the building. Besides that a fire lift as well shall be 
provided to give access to each of fire fighting access lobby or fire fighting access 
staircase in the absent of fire fighting access lobby on each floor.  
Provision for fire door 
Fire doors of the appropriate FRP, i.e. 30 minutes, shall be provided at compartment walls 
and separating walls in accordance with the requirements for that wall specified in the 
Ninth Schedule to these By-laws. Openings in protecting structures shall be protected by 
fire doors having FRP of not less than half the requirement for the surrounding wall 
specified in the Ninth Schedule to the By-laws but in no case less than half hour.  
Openings in partitions enclosing a protected corridor or lobby shall be protected by fire 
doors having FRP of half-hour (Clause 162 By-Laws). 
 According to clause 164 all fire doors shall be fitted with automatic door closers of the 
hydraulically spring operated type in the case of swing doors and of wire rope and weight 
type in the case of sliding doors. If double doors with rabbeted meeting stiles shall be 
provided with co-ordinating device to ensure that leafs close in the proper sequence and 
fire doors may be held open, provided the hold open device incorporates a heat actuated 
device to release the door. Heat actuated devices shall not be permitted on fire doors 
protecting openings to protected corridors or protected staircases. 
 Clause 173 (1) states that all exit doors shall be openable from the inside without the use 
of a key or any special knowledge or effort and exit doors shall close automatically when 
released and all door devices including magnetic door holders, shall release the doors 
upon power failure or actuation of the fire alarm.  
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Doors giving access to staircases shall be so positioned that their swing shall at no point 
encroach on the required width of the staircase or landing as stated in By-Laws 168 (5). 
Meanwhile clause 196 (1) states that access to a staircase smoke lobby shall be by means 
of fire doors opening in the direction of escape. 
Horizontal exits  
In accordance with clause 171, where appropriate, horizontal exits may be provided in 
lieu of other exits. Where horizontal exits are provided protected staircases and final exits 
need only be of a width to accommodate the occupancy load of the larger compartment or 
building discharging into it so long as the total number of exit widths provided is not 
reduced to less than half that would otherwise be required for the whole building. For 
institutional occupancies the total exit capacity other than horizontal exits shall not be 
reduced by more than one-third that would otherwise be required for the entire area of the 
building. 
Emergency exit signs 
In accordance with clause 172, storey exits and access to such exits shall be marked by 
readily visible signs and shall not be obscured by any decorations, furnishings or other 
equipment. A sign reading "KELUAR" which means “EXIT” with an arrow indicating 
the direction shall be placed in every location where the direction of travel to reach the 
nearest exit is not immediately apparent. Every exit sign shall have the word "KELUAR" 
in plainly legible letters not less than 150 millimetres high with the principal strokes of 
the letters not less than 18 millimetres wide. The lettering shall be in red against a black 
background. All exit signs shall be illuminated continuously during periods of occupancy. 
Illuminated signs shall be provided with two electric lamps of not less than fifteen watts 
each. 
Separate or alternative exits 
Separate or alternative exit shall be provided. It means that not less than two escape 
staircases shall be provided and they shall be sited within the limits of travel distance as 
specified in the seventh schedule i.e. 30 meter for unsprinklered high-rise residential 
buildings and readily accessible at all times (By-Laws 166). Clause 168 (1) states that 
every upper floor shall have means of egress via at least two separate staircases. 
Exceptions is given to the buildings which do not exceed 12 meters in height provided 
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each element of structure shall have a FRP of not less than one hour, no rooms or stories 
are used other than for domestic or office purposes except for the ground floor which may 
be used for shops or car park. In this case the staircase from the ground floor to the first 
floor shall be separated by a wall having a FRP of not less than two hours from the 
remainder of the ground floor utilities, the maximum travel distance shall be 12 meters, 
and in ground and first storeys which have windows containing opening lights sufficiently 
near the adjacent ground level as to make emergency escape by this means reasonable, a 
maximum travel distance up to 30 meters is permissible as stated in By-Laws 194. 
Arrangement of storey exits. 
According to clause 174 regarding the arrangement of storey exits, if two or more storey 
exits are required they be spaced at not less than 5 metres apart measured between the 
nearest edges of the openings.  Each exit shall give direct access to:  a final exit; a 
protected staircase leading to a final exit; or an external route leading to a final exit. 
Basements and roof structures used solely for services need not be provided with 
alternative means of egress. 
2.5.4 Escape route specification as in Building Regulation 2006 (UK) 
The Building Regulations 2006 came into effect on January 2007, based on the amended 
documents of Building Regulation 1984, then 2000 (England and Wales). Approved 
Document B1: Fire Safety became Approved Document B: Fire Safety Volume 1 
(Dwellings) and will be used as a reference in this literature review. All information and 
figures in this section are reproduced from the Building Regulation 2006, Approved 
Document B: Fire Safety (Dwelling), England and Wales as part of a literature review. 
Building Regulation paragraph 0.14, Fire Safety Engineering, mentions that fire safety 
engineering can provide an alternative approach to fire safety. It may be the only practical 
way to achieve a satisfactory standard of fire safety in some large and complex buildings, 
and in buildings containing different uses, e.g. airport terminals. Fire safety engineering 
may also be suitable for solving a problem in aspects of the building designs.  
For buildings with a special architectural or historical interest, it would be appropriate to 
take into account a range of fire safety features and fire safety assessment suggested in the 
Building Regulation to deal with an assessment of the hazard and risk peculiar to the 
particular case, factors that should be taken into consideration are: 
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i. The anticipated probability of fire occurring, 
ii. The anticipated fire severity, 
iii. The ability of a structure to resist the spread of fire and smoke; and 
iv. The consequential danger to people in and around the building. 
A wide variety of measures which could be considered appropriate in these circumstances 
are: 
i. The adequacy of means to prevent fire; 
ii. Early fire warning by an automatic detection and warning system; 
iii. The standard of means of escape; 
iv. Provision of smoke control; 
v. Control of the rate of fire growth; 
vi. The adequacy of the structure to resist the effects of a fire; 
vii. The degree of fire containment; 
viii. Fire separation between buildings or parts of buildings; 
ix. The standard of active measures for fire extinguishment or control; 
x. Facilities to assist the fire service; 
xi. Availability of power to require staff training in fire safety and fire routines; 
xii. Consideration of the availability of any continuing control under other legislation 
that could ensure continued maintenance of such systems; and 
xiii. Management. 
Means of warning and escape 
“The building shall be designed and constructed so that there are appropriate 
provisions for the early warning of fire, and appropriate means of escape in 
case of fire from the building to a place of safety outside the building capable 
of being safety and effectively used at all material times” 
This philosophical statement is deemed to have been met if the following measures have 
been put in placed i.e. 
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i. There are routes of sufficient number and capacity, which are suitably located to 
enable persons to escape to a place of safety in the event of fire; 
ii. The routes are sufficiently protected from the effects of fire by enclosure where 
necessary; 
iii. The routes are adequately lit; 
iv. The routes are suitably signed; 
v. There are appropriate facilities to either limit the ingress of smoke to the escape 
routes or to restrict the fire and remove smokes; and 
vi. There is sufficient means of giving early warning of fire for persons in the 
building. 
The basic principles for the design of means of escape are: 
i. They should have an alternative means of escape from most situations. 
ii. If direct escape to a place of safety is not possible, it should be possible to reach a 
place of relative safety e.g. a protected stairway, which is on a route to an exit, 
within a reasonable travel distance. 
iii. The ultimate place of safety is the open air clear of the effects of the fire.  
iv. A single direction of escape i.e. a dead end can be designed depending on the use 
of the building and its associated fire risk, the size and height of the building, the 
extent of the dead end, and the numbers of persons accommodated within the 
dead end. 
Provision for Fire door 
Fire door shall be either 20 minutes or 30 minutes minimum fire resistance. 20 minutes 
fire resistance is only applicable to the following conditions i.e. forming part of the 
enclosures of protected corridor except a protected lobby approach to a stairway, sub-
dividing of corridor and dead-end portion of corridor, any door forming part of the 
enclosures to a protected stairway in a single family dwelling house, forming part of the 
enclosure to a protected entrance hall or protected landing in an apartment or within any 
other fire-resisting construction in a dwelling not described elsewhere in table B1 in 
appendix B of Building Regulation 2006. In any other compartment wall, protected 
stairway, protected lobby, and compartment floor, 30 minutes fire resistance is required. 
The door should be readily openable and should not be fitted with a lock, latch or bolt 
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fastening and should be opened in the direction of escape if the number of persons that 
might be expected to use the door at the time of fire is more than 60. It should be hung to 
open not less than 900 and with a swing that is clear of any change of floor level, other 
than threshold or single step on the line of the doorway as stated in clause 4.11 to 4.17. 
All doors giving access to the escape stairs should be fitted with a self-closing device and 
appropriately signed to be kept closed always except for fire doors for cupboards, service 
ducts, and fire doors within a dwelling and as mentioned in appendix B of the Building 
Regulation. 
Provision for fire door in protected corridor 
 
Figure 2.8: Fire resistant of areas adjacent to external stairs example A (BR, 2006: 
Approved Document B) 
A self-closing fire door shall be installed to sub-divide any two or more storey exit 
connected to a common corridor. The door should be positioned so that smoke will not 
affect access to more than one stairway. It is applicable to the dead-end portion of a 
common corridor as well which should be sub-divided by a self-closing fire door as 
mentioned in clause 3.27 and 3.28 of the Building Regulation. 
Provision for protected staircase 
All common staircases should be sited in a protected enclosure in order to reduce the risk 
of smoke and heat ingress obstructing the evacuation process. The appropriate level of 
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fire resistance can be referred to Table A1 and A2 of Building Regulation 2006. The 
provision of protected staircase is as stated in clause 3.35 and 3.36. It is mentioned in 
clause 4.2 that generally 30 minutes fire resistant is sufficient for the protection of means 
of escape.  
Figure 2.8 shows an example of a staircase design for a two storey building in which the 
maximum height of the staircase is not more than 6m. 30 minutes self-closing fire doors 
are required in this construction to be the enclosure wall separates the occupancy areas 
and the staircases are required of fire resisting construction of not less than 30 minutes as 
a fire barrier. 
Figure 2.9: Fire resistant of areas adjacent to external stairs example B (BR, 2006: 
Approved Document B) 
Figure 2.9 shows another example of external open-air staircase design for a building not 
more than two storeys in height. The Staircase has to be separated from occupancy area 
by fire barrier and fire door of 30 minutes fire resistant period. Those areas below the 
staircase should be constructed with fire resistant materials bearing no opening and smoke 
tight. It essential to have any opening, it should be fitted with fire doors of 30 minutes 
FRP.  
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Figure 2.10: External protections to protected stairways (BR, 2006: Approved Document 
B) 
Figure 2.10 shows configurations of external wall of the staircase if it is built in between 
the accommodations. 1800mm minimum projection wall of fire barrier bearing 30 
minutes fire resistant period is necessary from any nearest opening e.g. windows or doors 
of the accommodation sharing the same separated wall of the staircase. However the 
staircase configurations remain the same as previously described. 
Provision for common escape routes (Corridor) 
There are limitations on the distance of travel in common areas of apartment buildings 
that is the maximum travel distance from dwelling entrance door to common stair, or stair 
lobby i.e. 7.5m if escape is only in one direction and 30m if escape is in more than one 
direction. In the case of the building provided with an indoor car park, the maximum 
travel distance to the storey exit is 25m if escape is only in one direction and 45m if 
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escape is more than one direction as stated in clause 3.22. Escape stairs designed should 
be parted so that people do not have to pass through one stairway enclosure to reach 
another, but it is possible to move through the same protected lobby of one stairway in 
order to reach another. 
There no limitation of width of common staircase for everyday use, but it should be 
sufficient for escape. If the same staircase is also use by the fire brigade, it should be at 
least 1100mm wide according to clause 3.32. 
 
Figure 2.11: Apartment served by one common stair (BR, 2006: Approved Document B) 
There is provision for a protected corridor in order to reduce the risk of a fire in a 
dwelling affecting the means of escape. The common corridor should be design with a 
compartment floor and the wall between each apartment and the corridor should be a 
compartment wall. It means that the wall should be constructed with materials having a 
fire resistance of not less than 30 minutes. In order to restrict the ingress of smoke from 
any apartment fire to the common corridor, installation of means of ventilation is essential 
either by natural or mechanical ventilation as requested in clause 3.24. 
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Common corridors and common stairs 
 
Figure 2.12: Apartment served by more than one common stairs (BR, 2006: Approved 
Document B) 
Figure 2.11 shows the orientation of a common corridor and common stair with the 
location of any dwelling i.e. within a minimum limit of travel distance i.e. 7.5m if only 
one escape staircase provided. If lobby access is provided (see figure 2.11 b), the 
minimum limit of travel distance from the most remote area i.e. dwelling entrance door 
must be not more than 7.5m. 
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Figure 2.13: Measurement of door width (BR, 2006: Approved Document B) 
If there is an alternative escape stair provided for the common corridor and the design has 
not got any dead-ends, those escape stairs must be separated with a 20 minutes FRP fire 
door. The limit travel of distance from the separated fire door is 30m. If the corridor 
access is designed with dead-ends, the specification and location of fire doors should be 
provided as in figure 2.12b. If the common corridor is designed having a ‘T’ junction with 
other main corridors, the design specification and provision for fire doors are as in figure 
2.12c. 
Number of escape routes 
Every dwelling should have access to alternative escape routes so that a person 
confronted by the effects of an outbreak of fire in another dwelling can turn away from it 
and make a safe escape. However a single escape route from the dwelling entrance door is 
acceptable if either: 
(a) the dwelling is situated in a story served by a single common stair and: 
 i.  every dwelling is separated from the common stair by a protected lobby or 
common corridor (see figure 2.11) and 
 ii. the travel distance limitations in table 1 (i.e. in table 1 Building Regulation Part B –  
Fire Safety England and Wales) on escape in one direction only, are observed; or 
(b) alternatively the dwelling is situated in a dead end part of a common corridor served 
by two (or more) common stairs, and the travel distance complies with the limitations 
in table 1 (i.e. in table 1 Building Regulation Part B –  Fire Safety England and 
Wales) on escape in one direction only (see figure 2.12). 
Measurement of width of doors, escape routes and stairs. 
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• A door is the clear width when the door is open see figure 2.13. 
• An escape route is the width at 1500mm above floor level when defined by walls 
or, elsewhere, the minimum width of passage available between any fixed 
obstructions. 
• A stair is the clear width between the walls or balustrades. 
2.6 Building evacuation simulation package 
In view of the complexity of modern buildings, it is difficult to determine the escape 
pattern of occupants by simple calculations. With the advancement of digital computers, 
many computer-based evacuation models have recently been developed. According to 
Gwynne et al (1999) more than 22 evacuation models have been developed or are under 
development. Some of the models can describe and visualise the individual’s patterns of 
movement, such as EXODUS. EXODUS is a prototype egress model designed to 
simulate the evacuation of large numbers of individuals from an enclosure. The model 
tracks the trajectory of individuals as they make their way out of the enclosure, or are 
overcome by fire hazards such as heat and toxic gases. The software is expert based 
system, the progressive motion and behaviour of each individual being determined by a 
set of heuristics or rules. EXODUS is intended, primarily, for use in mass-transport 
vehicles such as aircraft, but it also has application to cinema, theatres and lecture halls 
(Galea and Galparsoro, 1994, Owen et al, 1996). 
The EGRESS evacuation model is designed to evaluate the hazards of fire growing in a 
building to the people by using integrated assessment tools with the description of the 
building elements or the structures and the ways of fire and smoke spread as an input. 
Generally the building design and provision of escape routes in the building will 
influence the movement of people evacuating. EGRESS uses a simple calculation to 
estimate the time taken by evacuees to egress from the building to the safe place (Ketchell 
et al., 1993 & 1995). Sim, (1995) developed the VEGAS programme to evaluate 
information for fire specialists in performing fire safety engineering studies. Another 
evacuation model called spatial-grid evacuation model (SGEM), includes a pre-
processing engine to assist in the transformation of the spatial information from 
computer-aided design (CAD) based architectural plans and performs a simulation to 
generate the escape patterns in many complex buildings. This model resolves the setting 
of a building into a network with a series of nodes (Lo et al, 2004) 
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Fahy presented EXIT89 model to study the evacuation process in high-rise buildings 
which tracks the travel paths of each individual occupant to predict the effects of fire 
spread on evacuation. EXIT89 also requires a network description of the building in the 
form of nodes and arcs (Fahy, 1994). Kisko and Francis presented a computer programme 
EVACNET+, in a user-friendly interactive mode to model evacuation plans for user 
defined buildings. EVACNET+ uses a network of nodes and arcs to represent a building 
and utilises a capacitated network flow transshipment algorithm (Kisko & Francis, 1985). 
Stahl, presented a dynamic stochastic computer model to simulate the emergency egress 
behaviours of building occupants during fires. The model, BFIRES, as it is known, is 
based upon the perceptual and behavioural responses of the building occupants involved 
in fire emergencies and suggests that the occupants act in accordance with their 
perceptions of a constantly changing environment (Stahl, 1982). 
Berlin et al presented a methodology for estimating the evacuation time from a building. 
Network descriptions of the building together with a simulation model of occupant 
movement are used to simulate alternative egress and rescue plans from group houses. A 
technique for calculating the available number of direct routes from any room to any 
location of safety also has been suggested (Berlin et al., 1982). Gupta et al presented a 
mathematical model called SAFE-R to analyse the building evacuation problem. SAFE-R 
uses a graphical theoretical approach to identify various routes that are available to the 
occupants for movement. Travel time of each route is determined on the basis of the 
travel distance as well as the walking speed. This has been done to make sure that the 
escaping-time is minimal (Gupta & Yadaz, 2004). 
Thompson and Marchant developed SIMULEX to evaluate the potential evacuation 
process of a complex building with a high degree of accuracy. In the development of 
SIMULEX, the authors have attempted to minimise user inputs while increasing the 
complexity of the algorithm in the program. The program incorporates route-finding 
techniques so that travel distance can be calculated automatically (Thompson et al, 
1995a,b,c,). I have chosen SIMULEX to be used in my experimentation of people 
evacuation the building in selected high-rise residential buildings. This programme as 
well will be used to further analyse the effects of staircase, corridor and fire door 
changing specifications on the time taken to evacuate pre-developed study models. 
SIMULEX is a software package that has capabilities to models occupant evacuation 
from any building structure. The user is able to view real-time playback of people 
overtaking, side-stepping, shuffling and queuing during the evacuation. Furthermore, 
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different floors and staircases can all be viewed simultaneously, for an in-depth analysis 
of the total building evacuation. It also is able to calibrate the longest distance within the 
building design from the most remote location to the nearest escape stair available in 
building.  
Simulex validation 
Simulex was originally developed at Edinburgh University. According to the information 
gathered from www.crowddynamics.com, simulex has been validated through validation 
test carried out by staffs at Edinburgh University, Lund University, Ove Arup (Australia) 
and University of Ulster. Tests have been carried out on a number of different types of 
building such as department stores, office buildings, lecture theatres, sports stadium 
egress areas, university buildings, mock-up building geometries for student tests, etc. The 
test results conformed that simulex is able to accurately models individual movement and 
produce a realistic result when the performance of group tests are analysed. 
2.7 Fire safety in building background study 
Fire safety in buildings is an important issue but it has not been addressed sufficiently. 
People are only talking about the fire safety in the buildings, particularly in dwellings, 
when a fire tragedy occurs and it has caused devastation. Kendik (1986) mentioned that 
over a decade ago there was considerable activity in research of modelling egress from 
buildings. The behavioural models developed are mainly divided into two types, i.e. 
conceptual models which attempted to include the observation, empirical and reported 
actions from collective interview or questionnaire studies, and computer models that 
simulated the behaviour of individual in the fire incident. The conceptual models attempt 
to model the theoretical design or heuristic which try to provide some logical explanation 
for the decision making process, and alternative choice of process of the individual 
involved with the fire. 
2.7.1 Defining fire safety 
Defining fire safety is difficult and often results in a listing of factors that together 
comprise the intent. These factors tend to be of different sorts. Fire safety may be defined 
as goals and aims such as fire prevention, fire control, occupant protection, and so forth 
which normally can be found in the introductory sections of building codes and other fire 
safety legislation (Rasbash, et. al. 2004). According to Howarth, (1999), quoted by Derek 
& Chakib. (1999) fire safety management can be defined as the application by a manager 
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of policy, standards, tools, information and practices to the task of analyzing, evaluating 
and controlling fire safety.  
The National Building Code of Canada (NRC, 1995) defines fire safety as “an objective 
to reduce the probability that a person in or adjacent to a building will be exposed to an 
unacceptable fire hazard as a result of the design and construction of the building.” 
According to Ramachandran (1999), safety is the complement or antithesis of risk. Safety 
will be increased if the risk is reduced. There is no such thing as absolute safety. Some 
level of risk is virtually unavoidable. A building may be considered to be ‘very safe’ from 
fire if a sufficiently ‘low fire risk’ is associated with its structure, contents and 
occupants’. Occupants play a vital role in lowering the fire risk if their behaviour during 
evacuation exactly follows the theoretical frame work. But people’s behaviour is 
sometime unpredictable and very complex. 
CWC, (2000), stated that fire safety is the reduction of potential for harm to life as a 
result of fire in buildings. Although the potential for being killed or injured in a fire 
cannot be completely eliminated, fire safety in a building can be achieved through proven 
building design features intended to minimise the risk of harm to people from fire to the 
greatest extent possible. According to Canadian experience, the number of deaths in 
building fires has significantly dropped for the last two decades mainly due to: 
• Increased used of smoke detectors, 
• Improvements in electrical and heating systems, 
• Changing in life-style habits of habitants i.e. non-smoking, reduced alcohol 
consumption and dining out, 
• Public awareness i.e. education programs. 
Failure to manage safety adequately is often results in death or injury, chronic ill health 
and damage to property and/or the environment. Such results have a significant impact on 
the physical and economic well-being of society (Furness and Muckett, 2007). 
2.7.2 Assessing the adequacy of escape routes 
At present there is no quantitative method of assessing the adequacy of any escape route 
provided in a building other than by empirical means. The current method of providing 
means of escape from buildings is by specification and rules, i.e. rules that have evolved 
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through time and are deemed to provide a satisfactory escape route (Shields & Silcock, 
1989). In Malaysia Uniform Building By-Laws 1984 (LRB, 1993) is currently in use by 
the relevant authority to provide a satisfactory specification and guideline to building 
designers for their duty of work.  
In United Kingdom, the legal requirement for means of escape can be found in Building 
Regulation 2005, England and welsh.  In Building Regulation 2005, document B1: Means 
of warning and escape, it is stated that ‘The building shall be designed and constructed so 
that there are appropriate provisions for the early warning of fire, and appropriate means 
of escape in case of fire from the building to a place of safety outside the building capable 
of being safely and effectively used at all material times’ (ODPM, 2005). This is a 
philosophical statements of requirement of needs, i.e. appropriate provisions, appropriate 
means of escape, capable of being safely and effectively, without giving any detail of how 
its can be achieved. This functional requirement needs to be read together with the other 
parts, i.e. B2 – B5 of schedule 1 of the Building Regulations. B2 is about the fire spread 
over the internal linings of buildings, B3 is to ensure the stability of buildings in the event 
of fire; to ensure that there is a sufficient degree of fire separation within buildings and 
between adjoining buildings; and to inhibit the unseen spread of fire and smoke in 
concealed spaces in buildings, B4 is the external walls and roofs should have adequate 
resistance to the spread of fire over the external envelope, and that spread from one 
building to another is restricted, and B5 is to ensure satisfactory access for fire appliances 
to buildings and the provision of facilities in buildings to assist firefighters in the saving 
of life of people in and around buildings. 
Daimantes, (2003), stressed that accessible means of egress meant the exit access, exit, 
and exit discharge that can be entered and used by a person with severe disability using a 
wheelchair and also safe and useable for people with other disabilities. The installation of 
those elements from the building code, are the responsibility of the building authorities 
and responsibility for the maintenance of all means of egress, accessible or non-
accessible, are under the fire authorities. These requirements are new to some of fire 
authorities and introduce some totally new concepts in occupant protection. It means that 
the enforcement of the maintenance as stated in the building code is a liability to the fire 
authorities.  
There are numbers of issues raised by Meacham, (2004), regarding the building codes and 
how have things changed. Among the issues raised are the efficacy of passive and active 
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fire protection systems in extreme event conditions, the effectiveness of emergency egress 
systems, the impact on life safety and structural response if these systems are unavailable 
when needed, and who understanding of human behaviour and risk perception and risk 
tolerance have remained weak. He says that better understanding the performance of 
materials, systems, buildings and people will undoubtedly lead to better performing 
buildings. However, the question of who should set the performance objectives, how 
should performance objectives and criteria be set, and how should performance be 
defined, measured, calculated, assured and monitored after buildings are occupied remain 
unanswered in many cases.  
Bukowski, (2004), defined extreme event condition as any event or load that exceeds the 
design event which is usually the worst likely over the life of the building. An extreme 
condition should not be a limitation for further improvement of a safety in building 
designs to achieve the main and widely accepted fire safety objectives in buildings i.e. life 
safety and structural protection.  
2.7.3  Research on evacuation from the building  
Jones and Hewitt (1986) studied a group formation and leadership during evacuation of a 
high-rise office building due to fire. They focus on the social context and organisation 
characteristics of occupancy within which were decisions about evacuation strategy, 
group formation and questions of leadership. Horiuchi et al (1986) studied the effects of 
fire and evacuation from a multi-purpose office building in Osaka, Japan. Sekizawa et al 
(2001) studied the feasibility of evacuation by elevators in high-rise building.  
Benthorn and Frantzich (1998) studied how people evaluate the information and choose 
the evacuation exit when fire alarm goes off in a public building. Kagawa et al (1986) 
studied the movement of people on stairs in high-rise office building in Japan. Shields 
and Boyce (2000), studied the evacuation from a large retail store and among the findings 
that 50.1% choose the nearest exit to evacuate from the building and 19.5% choose a 
familiar exit to evacuate from the building. Shields et al (1998) studied behaviour and 
characteristics of people on unannounced fire drill on large retail stores. 
Purser (1986) studied the effect of fire products on escape capability using primates and 
human fire victims. Beller and Watts, (1998), studied human behaviour approach to 
occupancy classification. They suggested that there are four categories of occupants’ data 
that are necessary to implement a performance approach to life safety i.e. location of 
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occupants with regards the allowable minimum travel distance, occupants response to 
fire, number of occupants, and staff training. Galina and Mutani (1998) studied fire safety 
aspects in historical buildings reused as libraries on people evacuation in Italy.  
Proulx (2001) studied the possibility of adopting stay-in-place procedure during high-rise 
building fire. She suggested that stay-in-place is appropriate for high rise residential, 
hotel, and dormitory building based on the analysis of evacuation behaviour in high-rise 
apartment building fire at Ambleside, Ottawa and Forest Laneway, North York. She 
proposed the stay-in-place is only appropriate if the building was constructed of non-
combustible material, equipped with self-closers on all main doors, has a central alarm 
system to warn occupants and voice communication system to inform occupants of the 
evolution of the incident and the protect-in-place activities should be applied.  
Sekizawa et al (1998) studies the occupant’s behaviour in response to high-rise 
apartment’s fire occurred in October 1996 in Hiroshima City where 20 storey apartments 
building built in 1972 was caught with fire. Fire first started at the 9th floor and quickly 
spread up to 20th floor through balconies. His concluded that (1) many respondents who 
start their evacuation are not motivated by the fire cues but others. (2) In terms of exit 
choices, the possibility of occupants to use elevator for the evacuation is dependent on 
which level they stay and not an age of the occupants. (3) Occupants are likely to choose 
the route that they are familiar with or they think is safe instead of the route closer to 
them. (4) It is very common in every high-rise apartment buildings provided with 
horizontal route for evacuation on its floor. It is hard to say whether occupants have used 
this route, therefore education or directive to the occupants are necessary to make them 
understand and appreciate the advantages of the existence of horizontal route for 
evacuation in building fire.  
Proulx (1998) studied the impact of voice communication messages during a residential 
high-rise fire in a 25-storey apartment building located in Ottawa, Ontario Canada. This 
building was mainly occupied by senior citizens the majority of whom were over the age 
of 65. She used two methodologies to gather the data i.e. face-to-face interviews with the 
occupants of the floor where fire started and the floor above, and a questionnaire survey 
to the rest of the occupants in that building. The intention of the study was to gather the 
information on the behaviour of occupants who were in the building at the time of the fire 
incident. The study concluded that most occupants treat the sounding of a fire alarm as a 
warning and wait for further information over the voice communication system, or other 
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sources, before starting to evacuate. It is consider a very risky approach where occupants 
delay to start their evacuation unless the exit routes are very well protected from smoke 
entry and no one opens doors on the fire floor that could allow smoke into other location 
such as the stairwell. 
2.8 Fire safety management background study 
There are very limited resources concerning fire safety management in high-rise 
residential buildings. However there are a number of publications regarding the fire safety 
management in a workplace. Furness and Muckett, (2007), gave definitions of the 
terminology which is normally used in the fire safety discipline, for example:  
• Safety i.e. the freedom from unacceptable risk from harm;  
• Hazard i.e. a source or situation with the potential to cause harm (death, injury, ill 
health, damage to property or environment). A source or situation that could cause 
harm such as chemicals, electricity, working at height, hot work processes and in 
case of emergency an inability to respond and escape to a place of safety;  
• Harm i.e. includes the effects relation to human injury and ill health, damage to 
the environment or loss to an organisation;  
• Risk i.e. the combination of the likelihood and severity (consequence) of a 
specified event occurring and should it to do so, the severity of the outcome;  
• Risk assessment i.e. the process of identifying hazards and evaluating the level of 
risk (including to whom and how many are affected) arising from the hazards, 
taking into account and existing risk control measures; and  
• Risk controls i.e. workplace precautions, for example a guard on a dangerous part 
of machinery, sprinkler systems within a building, safe systems of work 
(procedure), personal protected equipment (PPE), safety signs.  
The law regarding fire safety in the United Kingdom has changed i.e. on the 1st October 
2006 fire certificates will no longer be issued and replaced with the need for a fire risk 
assessment for all workplaces or premises which employ more than five people. All 
existing fire legislation is repealed including The Fire Precautions Act 1971, Fire 
Precautions (Workplace) Regulations Act 1997/99, Management of Health and Safety in 
the Workplace Regulation 1999 and so on with the introduction of the Regulatory Reform 
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(Fire Safety) Order (FRS, 3/2008). However this order is not applicable to domestic 
buildings. In Malaysia fire risk assessment is totally new and appropriate measures should 
be taken to introduce this into current legislation. The application should be extended not 
only to the workplaces but the high-rise residential buildings managed by private or 
public sectors. It may not practical to apply to low rise building, but high-rise residential 
buildings i.e. apartments, condominiums, and etc, which are fully or partly owned by the 
state governments or private sectors who are responsible to manage and maintain the 
building should be accountable as well to ensure fire safety in the buildings are 
adequately installed.  
2.8.1 Fire safety design framework 
FPA, (2003) gives a basic fire safety design framework as in figure 2.14. A fire safe 
building should be consider as one that provides adequate means of escape, adequate 
facilities for fighting fire i.e. including adequate water supplies and access for fire 
fighting and brigade vehicles, and adequate property and business protection. 
Figure 2.14: Basic fire safety design framework (FPA, 2003) 
FPA, (2003) also proposed guidance framework for designing buildings for life safety 
and property protection as in figure 2.15. Designing a building for life safety should 
follow the statutory requirements and fire safety engineering approach and for property 
protection should following fire safety engineering and Loss Prevention Council (LPC) 
design guide for fire protection of buildings. It should be noted that both the life safety 
and property-and-business starting point allow for a fire safety engineering (FSE) 
approach as an alternative approach (perhaps to deal with a specific issue) to the 
appropriate guidance document. It is the responsibility of the designer or his fire safety 
consultant to justify that the FSE approach provides as adequate level of safety in respect 
to the protection of business. There are twelve designs principle proposed by FPA (2003) 
to achieve fire safety objective i.e. life safety and property protection as in appendix 2.1. 
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2.8.2 Fire safety risk analysis 
 
Figure 2.15: Life safety and property protection guidance framework (FPA, 2003) 
There are a number of methods for evaluating risk. The method applied for any particular 
risk will depend on a number of factors, such as the complexity of the activities carried 
out and type and nature of the workplace. That are three common methods usually used 
i.e. Qualitative analysis – describes the quality of risk using words, quantitative analysis – 
quantifies the risk with numerical data and Semi-Quantitative analysis – uses numbers to 
quantify qualitative data (Furness and Muckett, 2007). 
Qualitative analysis describes a quality of the risk. Typical of the qualities most often 
described is that of quantum, i.e. size or magnitude. For example, when assessing the 
means of escape in the event of a fire, fire risk has historically been rated as high, normal 
or low. Example of a simple risk matrix using the two aspects of risk to determine the 
magnitude of risk is as in figure 2.16 (Furness and Muckett, 2007). 
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Quantitative analysis evaluates factors not by subjective judgement, but by numerical 
data. Quantitative evaluation of risk is more demanding than qualitative approach but 
provides a more rigorous evaluation.  
 Major injuries may 
occur 
Serous injury may 
occur 
Slight injury may 
occur 
High chance of an 
event 
High Risk Medium Risk Low Risk 
Medium chance of 
an event 
Medium Risk Medium Risk Low Risk 
Low chance of an 
event 
Low Risk Low Risk Insignificant Risk 
Figure 2.16: Qualitative risk analysis matrix (Furness and Muckett, 2007). 
Semi-Quantitative analysis techniques for risk assessment are widespread and it is often 
referred to as a quantitative method, however, it is easily seen that although risk is 
expressed as a numerical value, the estimation of the magnitude of the risk is in fact 
subjective and therefore qualitative. Semi-Quantitative evaluation of risk allows 
numerical values to be assigned to both severity and likelihood in the absence of data 
(Furness and Muckett, 2007). At present there is no quantitative method of assessing the 
adequacy of any escape route provided in a building other than by empirical means. The 
current method of providing means of escape from buildings is by specification and rules, 
i.e. rules that have evolved through time and are deemed to provide a satisfactory escape 
route (Shields & Silcock, 1989). 
Coelho, (2004), introduced a conceptual model for fire safety risk analysis in building 
proposed by The Laboratorio Nacional de Enginharia, Portugal, as in figure 2.17, which 
consist of 12 sub-models interlinked each other centred into data information 
management model for fire risk analysis. 
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Figure 2.17: Conceptual model for fire safety risk analysis in building (Coelho, 2004) 
Figure 2.18: Fire Safety Concept Tree (NFPA, 2000) 
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA, 2000) has developed a basic approach 
to minimise fire risk called The Fire Safety Concepts Tree (FSCT) (see figure 2.18). 
FSCT was derived to achieve the fire safety objectives, first for life safety and second for 
structure protection. There are two fundamental principles of the FSCT, Prevention of 
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Fire Ignition, and Managing Fire Impact. Prevention of fire ignition can be done in the 
early stages of the building design process by eliminating fire sources but to completely 
eliminate fire sources is impossible. No matter how much effort we put in to prevent 
ignition, fires continue to start. Once a fire has started, we have to manage the fire to 
minimize the impact on the people and structures. FSCT emphasizes fire suppression, 
control of combustion and containment of fire by construction. To manage the impact, 
FSCT emphasizes safeguarding the exposure and limiting the amount exposed. Among 
measures that can be applied to achieve the fire objectives are prevention of fire ignition, 
providing the means of detection, equipping with fire extinguishing equipment, 
controlling fire from spreading to the other parts of building and allowing time for people 
to evacuate from the building. 
2.8.3 Fire safety risk assessment in buildings 
The purpose of risk assessment is to assist an employer and/or a ‘responsible person’ to 
identify the preventive and proactive measures required to comply with the law and in 
doing so, ensure, as far as reasonably practical, the safety of their workforce, premises 
and those around them who could be affected by their activities (Furness and Muckett, 
2007). 
Risk management explained in NFPA 1500 consists of four components i.e. (Angle, 
2005): 
i. Risk Identification;  
ii. Risk Evaluation;  
iii. Risk Control; and  
iv. Risk Management Monitoring  
According to Douglas (2002), besides the four components of risk management proposed 
by NFPA, there is one more component i.e. Audit, Review and Feedback.  
Information from the fire risk solutions web site, (FRS, 3/2008), suggests general 
requirements of fire risk assessment are: 
i. Fire fighting equipment measures, 
ii. Signage, 
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iii. Adequate training of personnel, 
iv. Escape routes and exits,  
v. Maintenance, and 
vi. Records 
Figure 2.19:General approaches to probabilistic fire risk assessment (BSi, 2003) 
According to FPA (3/2008), fire risk assessment involves identifying the potential sources 
of ignition in the workplace, the combustible materials that are present as part of the 
business operations, the furnishings and the structure in which the business is carried out. 
The people who use the premises must also be considered. These include staff, customers, 
visitors, or members of public. The means of escape, equipment for detection and giving 
warning in case of fire and fire-fighting apparatus are appropriate for the premises and 
numbers of people present also must be considered. Primary fire risk assessment is to 
ensure a satisfactory escape route, suitable arrangements are made to detect and give 
warning of a fire, and that appropriate fire-fighting equipment is strategically located 
around the workplace. FPA provides online self assessment by answering 51 questions to 
fulfil minimum requirements for fire risk assessment. Those 51 questions are as in 
appendix 2.1. Example of a fire risk assessment report is as in appendix 2.2.  
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British Standard Institution (BSi, 2003) in document PD-7974-7:2003: Application of fire 
safety engineering principles to the design of buildings, gives a general approach for 
probabilistic of fire risk assessment process as in figure 2.19. After hazards have been 
identified, frequency analysis or consequence analysis should be carried out before 
evaluation of risk can be done. There are two outcomes i.e. either risk is acceptable or 
unacceptable. If the risk is acceptable, it means that fire safety is adequately installed, the 
building is safe to be occupied. If the risk in unacceptable, it means fire safety is 
inadequately installed and the building is very risky to live in. Therefore the risks 
identified should be reduced. Appropriate measures should be taken to ensure all 
instruction, recommendations and suggestions from the fire safety personnel who carried 
out a fire risk assessment are seriously being considered to ensure all identified risks are 
eliminated or reduced at acceptable level. 
According to the guideline produced by HMSO (HMG, 2006) on how to do a fire risk 
assessment, there are fire steps for fire risk assessment. Different premises have different 
guidelines but the steps in fire risk assessment are all the same. Those guidelines, 
unfortunately, all of them are intended to be used for non-domestic premises. There is no 
guideline for domestic houses or for high-rise residential buildings because there is no 
compulsion for domestic buildings to have a fire risk assessment. There is a web site, i.e. 
www.firesmart4home.co.uk, which offers a free online assessment for domestic fire risk 
assessment for those interested to do so. Meanwhile, FPA (3/2008) offers free online fire 
risk assessment for a workplace. Safeandhealthyworking.com gives an example of a fire 
risk assessment form as in appendix 2.3. So far the guidelines produced by HMSO which 
is close to the residential building occupancy is fire safety risk assessment for residential 
care premises as follows: 
Step 1: Identify fire hazards 
Step 2: Identify people at risk 
Step 3: Evaluate, remove, reduce and protect from risk 
Step 4: Record, plan, inform, instruct and train 
Step 5: Review. 
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Figure 2.20: Five steps to carry out a fire safety risk assessment (HMG, 2006) 
Figure 2.20 shows the five steps and components need to carry out when exercising a fire 
safety risk assessment in premises.  
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Step1: Identify fire hazard 
Identify source of ignition, e.g. smoking material i.e. cigarettes, matches and lighters; 
naked flame i.e. candles or gas or liquid-fuelled open flame equipment; electrical, gas or 
oil-fired heaters; cooking equipment; faulty or misused electrical equipment; lighting 
equipment; hot surface; hot processes e.g. welding by contractors; arson, deliberate 
ignition, vandalism and so on. 
Identify source of fuel i.e. anything that burns is fuel for a fire e.g. toiletries, aerosols, 
plastics and rubber, wood and wood based furniture, flammable products e.g. petrol, 
white spirit, methylated spirit , cooking oils and so on. 
Identify source of oxygen i.e. the main source of oxygen for a fire is in the air around us. 
In an enclosed building this is provided by the ventilation system in use. Additional 
source of oxygen can sometime be found in materials used or stored at premises e.g. some 
chemicals i.e. oxidising materials which can provide a fire with additional oxygen and so 
help it burn; oxygen supplies from cylinder storage and so on. 
Step2: Identify People at Risk 
Identify people at risk means that all people who may present in the premises either on 
the permanent or occasional visitors i.e. the location they may present either regular or at 
specific times, person or persons who may need special assistance e.g. disable, elderly, 
children. Identify who they are, why they are at risk and where to find them in the event 
of fire 
Step3: Evaluate, remove, reduce and protect from risk 
Evaluate means examining critically the possibly of the risk of fire occurring and the risk 
to people, and try to identify the accidents waiting to happen and any acts or omissions 
which might allow a fire to start. Evaluate the actual risk to those people, listed out in step 
two, should a fire start and spread from various locations that have been identified earlier. 
Evaluate the risk of fire occurring: In general, fires start in one of three ways i.e. 
accidentally e.g. smoking materials are not properly extinguished or when bedside lights 
are knocked over, by act of omission e.g. electrical equipment is not properly maintained 
or waste is allowed to accumulate near to a heat source or deliberately e.g. arson attack 
involving setting fire to external rubbish bins place too near to the building.  
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Evaluate the risk to people: Need to understand the way fire can spread. Since smoke is a 
major threat to the people, it is essential to evaluate the possibility of smoke spread within 
the building. It is essential that the means of escape and other fire precautions are 
adequate to ensure that everyone can make their escape to a place of totally safe before 
the fire and its effects can trap them in the building. 
Remove or reduce the hazards that may cause a fire: Upon identifying the possible hazard 
that may cause fire, recommendations should be made to remove or reduce it instantly. 
There are various ways that it can be reduced, for example: 
• Replace the possible high hazard by a safer alternative. 
• Operate a safe smoking policy and ensuring sufficient ashtrays are provided and 
always keep it clean appropriately. 
• Ensure all electrical, mechanical and gas equipment is installed, used, maintained 
and protected in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions. 
• Ensure that all electrical fuses and circuit breakers are of the correct rating and 
suitable for the purpose and that electrical sockets are not overloaded. 
Remove or reduce sources of fuel: All sources of fuel are needed to be reduced or stored 
in a very secure place. There are many ways its can be done, for example: 
• Reduce the amount of combustible materials. 
• Ensure all combustible materials especially highly combustible materials are 
separated from potential ignition sources. 
• Do not keep flammable solids, liquids, and gasses together. 
• Take appropriate action to ensure all premises particularly storage areas being 
vulnerable to arson or vandalism, and so on are secured. 
Other aspects that need be closely looked are: 
To remove or reduce the risk to people i.e. by providing a flexibility of fire protection 
measures, providing fire detection and warning systems, ensure escape routes are safe and 
ready to be used at all material times, all occupants are aware of the evacuation strategies, 
the number of escape routes and exits, management of escape routes, emergency 
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evacuation of people with mobility impairment, emergency escape lighting, escape signs 
and notices, maintaining safety equipment, and so on. 
Step 4: Record, plan, inform, instruct and train 
Record the significant findings and action taken for further reference. Significant findings 
may include details of; fire hazards that have been identified, actions that have been taken 
or will be taken to remove or reduce the chance of fire occurring, persons who may at risk 
particularly for those who required a special needs, actions that have been taken, or will 
be, taken to reduce the risk to people from the spread of fire and smoke, and so on. 
Plan: need to have an emergency plan and record all detail if necessary, ensure that the 
emergency plan takes into account other emergency plans which may applicable to the 
same building, the plan should be readily available to all occupants, and emergency plan 
available to the enforcing authority. 
Inform: There should be clear information, instruction, and what to do in the event of fire 
or if somebody discovers a fire in the building. It should be available to all people in the 
building, occasional visitors or persons who are working in the building. The information 
and instruction that should be given is based on the emergency plan and must be include: 
the significant findings from a fire risk assessment, the measures that have been put in 
place to reduce the risk, who responsible for what if there is a fire, identification of people 
who will be responsible for the fire safety, the importance of closed doors, and any 
special arrangements for serious and imminent danger to persons from fire. 
Training: The type of training should be based on the particular features of the premises 
or building and it should takes into account the emergency procedures, work activities 
take place during normal occupancy, and test by fire drill. 
Step 5: Review 
Fire risk assessment should constantly monitor and review. If there is any reason to 
suspect that there are significant changes in certain circumstances and the previous fire 
risk assessment is no longer valid, it should be reviewed or if necessary revised. Reasons 
for review could include: change in works activities, alteration to the building, substantial 
changes to furniture and fixings, increases in storage of hazardous substances, significant 
problem reported by residents or staff, significant increase in the number of people, and 
so on. Example of fire risk assessment checklist is as in appendix 2.4 which can be 
downloaded at www.communities.gov.uk/fire. 
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BRE, (3/2008), using the same format as in the guideline proposed by HMSO i.e. five 
steps fire risk assessment process. Fire Risk Assessment Online, (FRAO, 3/2008), state 
that a fire risk assessment should identify fuel sources, ignition sources, means of escape, 
fire fighting equipment, arson prevention, fire warning systems, emergency signage and 
lighting, and so on.  
2.9 Human Behaviour study 
Behavioural analysis – generally used in psychology study but lately its application has 
been extended including area of social concern, is a scientific approach to human 
psychology derived initially from the work of Skinner. There are four main parameters 
which mainly influence the behavioural analysis (Leslie, 2001): 
i. Behaviour must be understood and analysed at the level of the individual person, 
ii. Behaviour of the individual is situation-specific, 
iii. Behaviour in a situation is a function of previous experience in that and similar 
situations, 
iv. Situation and historical factors largely account for observed behaviour i.e. 
historical of interaction the individual has in relevant situations. 
Leslie mentioned that how we behave in a particular situation is largely determined by 
what we have done on the previous occasions in that and similar situations. There are two 
types of experiences ‘hands-on experience’ and ‘knowledgeable experience’. Hands-on 
experience is an experience where persons have been involved personally in any 
occasions and knowledgeable experience is where persons get information and 
understood how it had happened mainly based on literature and discussion. The main 
focus of behavioural analysis is intervention in behavioural assessment by asking 
questions i.e. when and where did the behaviour occur? What action do the people 
concerned take? And why do they do it?  
Functional analysis – generally is assessing the motivation of behaviour of people action 
in an emergency event. It has to be dealt with on an individual basis and practical for a 
small research sample. However, in a real situation when fire breaks out, human 
behaviour is unpredictable and can be very strange.  Chandrakantan (2004) has cited that 
Sime (1990) has discussed the panic behaviour of some people in emergencies, and 
Wood (1990) has analyzed the way people react to fires. For example in findings reported 
by Wood, some people went only short distances through the smoke, but many of them 
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advanced farther than they could see. Knowing the fact that people navigate through 
smoke, it is a responsibility to provide evacuation systems that are visible in smoke, 
wherever feasible. Exit signs are essential components of evacuation systems (Ouellette, 
1993). Clintock et al (2001) studied a behavioural solution to the “learned irrelevance” of 
emergency exit signage and concluded that people recognise the current emergency exit 
signage and associate it with safety in an emergency. However, people for the main part 
do not notice emergency exit signage when they are involved in everyday activities, e.g. 
shopping. Part of the reason people have underused emergency exit signage is because 
they have acquired learned irrelevance to it. However there are a number of factors 
affecting the perception of risk and their impact on human behaviour in fire and it varies 
between individuals and groups for various psychological, social, and cultural reasons. 
For some individuals, fire may be dreaded, while for others, it is something that will 
never occur.  There are many reasons for these, which is known as part of the 
psychometric paradigm of risk, among them are (Meacham, 2001): 
i. Perceived voluntariness of the exposure, 
ii. Perceived level of protection affordable, 
iii. Familiarity of the risk, 
iv. Catastrophic potential, 
v. Immediacy of the effects, 
vi. Distribution of risks, 
vii. Judgements about who or what is perceived as causing the hazardous situation, 
viii. Controllability, 
ix. Degree of technical knowledge available, and  
x. Exposure pattern. 
Success in a building evacuation depends on many factors including (Livesey et al, 
2001): 
i. Floor plan of the building i.e. building-specific constraint which has multiple 
sub-attributes e.g. signage, corridor width, staircase width, floor finishing, and 
alarm system. 
ii. Occupants profile i.e. people-specific constraint with multiple sub-attributes e.g. 
age, mobility impairment, panic behaviour and number of occupants or density.  
iii. Potential visual and sensory capabilities i.e. wayfinding depends on lighting and 
architectural layout as more significant design criteria then travel distance in 
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modelling evacuation. 
They suggested that more extensive study on the occupants profile, relationship between 
evacuation times and the structural measures of building complexity, depth and measure 
of integration are needed.  
To enable people to evacuate a building quickly and safely in an emergency it is 
important that they can navigate around parts of a building that are new to them, no 
matter what the conditions are. One aspect that should be investigated is how effective 
various emergency lighting systems or low mounted wayguidance systems are when the 
air contains smoke (Wright et al, 2001). 
Research in the field of fire engineering into human behaviour in fire is largely directed 
by the needs of the models of response that are currently accepted. Primary areas of 
research are those that provide data to first profile the occupants and then to predict; cue 
recognition by occupants or occupant groups, their subsequent actions, their times for 
starting to respond, their movement times and their sensitivity to fire product. The 
outcome of occupants experiencing a fire is the product of their responsiveness to fire 
cues and some behaviour is generally occupants react to fire rather than interact with fire 
(Brennan and Thomas, 2001).  
2.10  Chapter conclusion 
Fire safety in high-rise buildings is a very important issue but it has not been given proper 
intention by many parties, especially for residential buildings. Economy factor is claimed 
to be the main factor in providing fire safety measures in residential buildings. The 
building cost will increase if all aspects of fire safety measures are installed in residential 
buildings and it will significantly increase the total price of property and pose 
unnecessary burden to the purchaser. However, the importance of fire safety measures in 
high-rise residential buildings should not be viewed from the prospective of economics 
factor but equally important is to view them from the perspective of fire safety as well. 
The occupants of high-rise residential buildings as well deserve high safety measures 
equal to that of workplace buildings. Therefore, the provision of escape routes design and 
specification in high-rise residential buildings need to be given appropriate attention by 
the relevant authority. 
 - 69 - 
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Introduction 
Generally research falls into two categories i.e. library research or experimental research 
(Thomson, 2003). Library research mainly involves searching activities on secondary data 
i.e. information limited to books and other published materials normally available in the 
library, whilst experimental research mainly involves experiment and/or observation, 
questionnaire study and validation of the questionnaire feedback by carefully selected 
sampling. Research can broadly be categorised into two groups, theoretical and empirical. 
Theoretical research is focused on the development and refinement of a body of abstract 
knowledge, whilst empirical research observes events in context and seeks to make sense 
of those observations (Owarish, 2000). Development of research needs a basic skill in 
research design and research knowledge. Richey and Klein (2007) defined design and 
development research as “the systematic study of design, development and evaluation 
processes with the aim of establishing an empirical basis for the creation of instruction 
and non-instruction products and tools and new or enhanced models that govern their 
development. Commonly used data collection tools such as work logs, surveys, 
questionnaires, interviews, observations and the use of technology i.e. testing, simulation, 
for data collection are among the key factors of design and development research. 
3.2  Research methodology overviews 
Davis (1992) stated that in most cases research can be conducted in a variety of ways and 
suggested a strategy to investigate a given area:  
• Conduct a literature review to give a good understanding of the existing state of 
knowledge in the field. 
• Conduct a case study in an organization or have a period of observation which 
will allow the researcher to observe the phenomenon under study in a real setting, 
and allow an appreciation of the validity of the research in terms of its relevance 
and potential contribution to knowledge and interest. 
• Conduct a field survey or experiment to obtain confirmation and validation of the 
ideas explored in the case study. 
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Research methodology in fire safety and human behaviour began as early as 1900s. The 
earliest documented human behaviour study was in 1909 and involved studying the 
velocity of the pedestrians walking in New York by counting the number of people 
walking in that city. This was the first methodology used in human behaviour study and is 
known as “observation”. The second methodology was “Interviews”. This method was 
used to interview selected occupants of building fires and was used in 1956 following the 
fire incident at Arundel Park, in the United States. In the 1970s and early 1980s two 
critical studies were conducted at the University of Maryland. Both studies replicated the 
methodology of Peter Wood’s study in Great Britain using a “Structured Questionnaire”. 
Peter Wood assisted in the development of the questionnaire for the University of 
Maryland study to assure the compatibility of study data for comparative purposes 
(Bryan, 2002). The first study involving fire service personal interviewed 2,193 occupants 
from 952 fires using a structured questionnaire. The second study involved 584 
participants in 335 fire incidents in Washington D.C., and Baltimore, Md. area. The 
outcome of the studies confirmed the Reentry Behaviour where members of the primary 
group were involved. Occupants as well have tendencies to move through smoke and to 
fight the fire. 
Schneider (2001) used computer simulation ASERI to study the individual-based 
evacuation model in designing safety concept in his research. According to Schneider, to 
use a simulation tool in designing safety concepts, required detailed knowledge of its 
predictive power. Certain features of behavioural response are modelled in a probabilistic 
rather than a deterministic way. This probabilistic approach allows for more profound 
evaluation of the evacuation process by performing Monte-Carlo simulations. 
Observation is among the methods used to collect research data. This technique can be in 
the form of critical observation or forensic-like analysis of any event either by real 
exercise or through recorded material. Galea and Gwynne (2001) used response-base 
analysis techniques to observe human behaviour exhibited during rail crash accidents. 
They also used full-scale tests to estimate the flow rate capacity of an overturned rail 
carriage end exit. Response-base technique normally includes interviewing the 
respondents or serving the respondents with structured question and answer 
questionnaires. Shields and Boyce, (2000) used video tape of unannounced evacuation 
processes of large retail stores to evaluate the total evacuation times and pre-movement 
times of evacuees in four Marks and Spencer retail stores. Forensic-like techniques in 
many cases are used in analyzing the building structures or process of any activities 
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involved in any event or to trace the root of the problem. The data and findings using this 
technique can be either in qualitative or quantitative in form. In this research, this 
technique will be used to verify the compliance of escape route design in selected high-
rise residential buildings and to identify the actual problems encountered regarding the 
provision of escape routes in high-rise residential buildings. 
Questionnaires are one of the most popular research tools to collect data. They can be 
used to collect either qualitative or quantitative data. Sekizawa et.al. (2001) used a 
questionnaire survey to study the behaviour of people in selecting the type of escape route 
to evacuate from building fire. The outcome of his study was that 47% used elevators for 
their evacuation, while 42% used stairs and 7% used both elevator and stairs. Proulx 
(2001) used a questionnaire to study the occupant’s behaviour during the Ambleside Fire 
in Ottawa on 31st January 1997. During the fire, although initially the majority of 
occupants decided to stay-in-place in accordance with the Fire Safety Plan for that 
building, many of them immediately complied with the evacuation order delivered 
through the voice communication system. Only 17% decided to stay in their apartments. 
The findings of the research using questionnaire methodology are normally demonstrated 
in percentage form. However sometimes it can be in qualitative form such as questioning 
individual responses. 
One more method, but not a very common one is Heuristic Research. The root meaning 
of heuristic comes from the Greek word ‘hueriskein’, meaning to discover or to find. It 
refers to internal search through which one discovers the nature and meaning of 
experience and developed methods and procedures for future investigation and analysis 
(Moustakas, 1990). 
Many research projects adopt more than one method. A combination of several methods 
of data collection and analysis techniques can make the research more interesting and 
significant. Starting from establishing the problems, develop a heuristic research 
framework for further study, build-up research data collection tools and gather data for 
analysis. The research findings will be more significant if several methods of testing and 
analysis are used. However those methods used should not to be limited to and must be 
well defined of its processes and procedures to work with. There are three forms of 
research methodologies i.e. quantitative, qualitative and mixed. Table 3.1 below gives the 
differences between qualitative and quantitative research. 
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Mixed methodology is defined by incorporating the collecting and analysing of both 
quantitative and qualitative data in a single study. Mixing as well might be within one 
study or among several studies in a programme of enquiry (Creswell, 2003) and is among 
the most popular methods of research adopted recently. This research will be in this 
category.  
Difference with respect to: Quantitative research Qualitative research 
Underpinning Philosophy Rationalism: “That human 
beings achieve knowledge 
because of their capacity to 
reason”. 
Empiricism: “The only 
knowledge that human beings 
acquire is from sensory 
experience” 
Approach to inquiry Structured/rigid/predetermined 
methodology 
Unstructured/flexible/open 
methodology 
Main Purpose of Investigation To quantify extent of variation 
in a phenomenon, situation, 
issue etc. 
To describe variation in a 
phenomenon, situation, issue 
etc. 
Measurement of variables Emphasis on some form of 
either measurement or 
classification of variables 
Emphasis on description of 
variables. 
Sample size Emphasis on greater sample 
size 
Fewer cases 
Focus of inquiry Narrows focus in terms of 
extent of inquiry, but 
assembles required 
information from a greater 
number of respondents. 
Covers multiple issues but 
assembles required 
information from fewer 
respondents. 
Dominant research value Reliability and objective 
(Value-free) 
Authenticity but does not 
claim to be value-free 
Dominant research topic Explains prevalence, 
incidence, extent, nature of 
issues, opinions and attitude; 
discovers regularities and 
formulate theories 
Explores experiences, 
meanings, perceptions and 
feelings 
Analysis of data Subjects variables to 
frequency distributions, cross-
tabulation or other statistical 
procedures 
Subjects responses, narratives 
or observation data to 
identification of themes and 
describes these 
Communication of findings Organisation more analytical 
in nature, drawing inferences 
and conclusions and testing 
magnitude and strength of a 
relationship 
Organisation more descriptive 
and narrative in nature. 
Table 3.1: Differences between qualitative and quantitative research methodologies 
(Ranjit Kumar, 2005) 
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3.3  Research Outline and Process 
Figure 3.1 below shows the research outline and process to be carried out.  
 
Figure 3.1: Research outline and process 
3.4  Research steps 
There are six steps to this research as follows: 
i. Literature review 
ii. Pilot study to develop and enhance the research tools 
iii. Observation and analysis of problems encountered in high-rise residential 
buildings. 
iv. Computer simulation and analysis of designed parameters 
v. Questionnaire and analysis of variances 
vi. Model development 
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3.4.1 Pilot study 
Figure 3.2 shows the framework for the pilot study. The purpose of the pilot study is to 
establish data collection tools before the main data collection can be carried out. 
 
Figure 3.2: Pilot study and field works model 
Data collection tools or instruments are the keys factors in research which, without it, 
there will be no research data. These tools have to be developed and tested before the 
main research data can be collected. Referring to figure 3.1, i.e. research outline and 
process, primary data for this research will be gathered by three methods i.e. observation, 
simulation and questionnaire. The case study focuses on the development of the data 
collection tools for observation, and data from this exercise will be used for the computer 
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simulations. Computer simulation and questionnaire will be discussed later on in the 
relevant sections. 
Basically there are three research tools used in the pilot study i.e. Checklist Form 
(Appendix 3.3), Assessment Form and Equipment. Two of them i.e. Checklist and 
Assessment forms are derived from Building Regulation: Approved Document Part B1 
(fire safety) 2000 and Uniform Building By-Laws 1984 for the case study in the UK and 
Malaysia respectively. The purpose of the checklist is to observe the compliance of 
escape route in the existing building to the current building regulation and mainly 
regarding with the provision of facilities for fire safety and escape routes provided in the 
building as in figure 3.4. 
The Assessment Form is purposely to examine the detailed specifications of escape route 
in terms of design, construction and dimensions of those elements constructed in the real 
world. It includes the dimension, size, number of stairs, types of lobby, fire doors, 
protected areas, corridors, handrails, platform etc. To do so, some basic equipment 
needed i.e. digital camera, measuring tape etc. 
Pilot study process (Pilot study was conducted in the UK) 
• Identify the building to study and obtain permission from the building authority 
before and to carry out assessment. 
• The researcher entered the building and went to the top floor by lift. Upon 
reaching the top floor, the researcher then walked down using the escape stairs 
provided. In the case where two or more escape stairs were provided the 
researcher change the escape stair in every alternate floor. For example if there 
two escape stairs from the top floor, the researcher walked down through one 
escape stair and upon reaching the below floor, the researcher walked through the 
corridor to reach the other staircase. From there the researcher walked down to the 
next floor and so on. 
• Whilst the researcher walked through the escape stair and corridor, those elements 
in figure 3.2 i.e. facilities for fire safety and building elements, were examined. 
Staircase width, riser height, tread dimension, fire door width and height, handrail 
height, corridor width and so on were measured. All evidence was then 
photographed for further analysis. All facilities for fire safety in the building were 
inspected regarding its physical appearance and working condition accept for the 
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fire alarm systems and fire fighting systems for which no testing was completed. It 
was assumed that all fire alarms and fire fighting equipments were in a good 
working condition if their physical appearance was good. This is because the 
researcher was not allowed to do the test without being accompanied by a 
professional fire engineer. 
From this exercise, the researcher was able to enhance the checklist and assessment forms 
to be used for the main data collection in Malaysia. The following section discusses the 
process of building observation carried out in high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia.  
3.4.2 Building observation and analysis of problem encountered 
Twelve high-rise residential buildings have been observed, five in Kuala Lumpur, six in 
Penang and one in Edinburgh. The building in Edinburgh was used as a pilot study to 
assist in the formulation of the data collection tools and analysis method. There were four 
purposes of building observation: 
i. To identify the problems encountered in escape routes;  
ii. To examine the design and orientation of corridor, fire door, staircase layout and 
traffic flows to assist in developing of study models. 260 study models have been 
developed (see chapter 4) as a result of these exercises to be further analysed in 
computer simulation;  
iii. To observe the detailed specifications of staircases, corridors and fire doors i.e. 
staircase width, intermediate floor width and depth,  step numbers, riser and tread 
dimensions, handrail height, fire door width, corridor width, and  
iv. To evaluate the condition of services equipment provided in escape routes i.e. 
lighting systems, emergency lighting systems, ventilation systems, lift, and so on. 
Observation method: The observation processes as described in the pilot study i.e. pilot 
study process are applied here. Hundreds of photos were taken for qualitative analysis and 
all escape routes elements were measured for quantitative analysis. 
Counting and measuring the escape stairs: The number of escape stairs is counted by the 
number of staircase shafts provided. For example if building A has two storey exits on 
each floor where each storey exit leads straight to the staircase shaft, (see figure 4.29), the 
number of escape stairs is two.  
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Counting and measuring of staircases: The staircase connecting the landing floor and 
intermediate floor is counted as one. It is very common that two staircases are designed 
for connecting the floor level. In figure 4.30 (a) between ground floor and 1st floor, there 
are two staircases with an intermediate floor between them. Figure 7.4 shows a common 
staircases schematic drawing for high-rise residential buildings. There are two staircases 
between floor levels. The number of staircases is calculated by counting each of the 
staircases from the top floor until the ground floor. 
Counting and measuring tread and steps riser: There are four elements measured in 
staircase i.e. staircase width, tread depth, step riser and handrail height. Staircase width is 
measured by measuring the width of tread. Tread depth and step riser are measured by 
randomly selecting three or four staircase steps of every staircase inspected. The tread 
depth and riser height are then measured and some photos are taken for further analysis. 
Measuring fire doors: Fire doors width is measured by measuring the exact width of the 
doors and clear width opening of the doors. 
Measuring handrail height: Handrail height is measured by measuring from top level of 
the handrail to the tread level. 
Measuring corridor width: Corridor width is measured by measuring the distance across 
the corridor. 
3.4.3 Computer Simulation and analysis of design parameters 
The purpose of the computer simulations is to analyse floor clearance time and total 
evacuation time on different floor layouts of some of the high-rise residential buildings 
observed, the optimum specifications of staircase, corridor and fire door and the effect of 
staircase designed with and without an intermediate floor by measuring the total 
evacuation time recorded by number of people placed in study models. For this purpose, 
computer simulation package i.e. Simulex was used. 
3.4.3.1 Overview of SIMULEX applications 
SIMULEX is an evacuation tool which specialises in modelling the physical aspects of 
evacuation movement, and is widely used as a consultancy and analysis tool around the 
world. Simulex enable the user to simulate occupant behaviour in the event of a building 
evacuation, identify potential problems and find solutions. It uses a series of 2D floor 
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plans, with exits and staircases linked together. Each floor plan and staircase is displayed 
in its own simulation window so that every event in Simulex environment can be viewed 
simultaneously (Thompson, iesve, 02/2008). 
After defining a ‘distance map’, the building population can be defined by age and 
gender, and take into consideration different walking speed, body shapes and time to 
respond to a fire alarm. Occupants can be placed in space inside the room, building or in 
walkways, corridors, or lobbies by placing individuals or groups of people (IES, 
03/2008). Further application of the Simulex programme can be found in Thompson and 
Marchant (1995a, 1995b, 1996) and validation references can be referred to Olsson and 
Regan (1998) and Thompson and Marchant (1995c). Generally, Simulex features can be 
summarised as follows (IES, 03/2008): 
Model building 
• Simulex uses 2D DXF file drew in CAD system or from the ‘Virtual 
Environment’ i.e. simulex integrated programme to create and define floor plan. 
• Allows users to create staircases to connect floor plans together for a multi-storey 
building analysis. Staircase width and length can be added or edited. 
• Users define and position ‘Final Exit’, either outside or inside the building. 
• ‘Links’ are used to connect each doorway from a floor plan into staircase. 
• Users can place people on each floor or staircase individually, or as groups over 
defined areas. 
Building analysis 
• Define the building fabric with exactly the same accuracy as the DXF files. 
• Automatically generates a 0.2m x 0.2m spatial mesh, overlaid onto the DXF plans. 
• Can generate a ‘distance map’ which calculates the total distance-to-exit for every 
point on the spatial mesh. 
• Distance maps can be displayed graphically as distance ‘contours’ – in similar 
way to height contours on a geographic map. 
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• Route analysis can be carried out by ‘dropping’ test people into the model and 
observing their escape route, based on the distance maps. The total distance 
travelled is displayed while movement occurs. 
Populations (occupants) 
• Different ‘population groups’ are defined. Each population group contains 
combinations of following features:  
 Body shape and size 
 Walking speed 
 Time to respond to alarm 
• Any combination of individuals with specific characteristics can be combined in 
one model, in any part of the building. 
• All aspects of the population demographic can be changed, allowing the user to 
customise body size, walking speed, stairs ascent and descent speeds. This enables 
any range of occupant disability to be tested. 
Analysis of evacuation simulation 
• The user initialises the evacuation when the model has been built and populated. 
• Live on-screen display on the plan views of any part of the building, which can be 
zoomed in or out. 
• Each person is shown, and movement animated every 0.1 seconds. 
• Still shots of this movement can be captured at any time and pasted into a graphics 
or word processing package. 
• All queuing, congestion, overtaking etc. is viewed by user as it happens. 
• The user can change views of any of the building as the simulation progresses. 
• The evacuation proceeds until all occupants have escaped from the building. 
Simulation procedure on the study model can be found in section 7.4, chapter 7 – An 
evaluation of the provision of escape routes in high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia. 
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3.4.3.2 Example of applications of SIMULEX 
In this research, applications of Simulex are used in three circumstances, to investigate 
the optimum escape route specifications, to investigate the correlation of escape routes 
and evacuation time, and to investigate the people movement patterns and behaviours in 
high-rise residential buildings with different internal layouts. 
 
Figure 3.3: Example of investigation of the effects of staircase, corridor and fire door 
width simulation on occupants from a study model. 
Figure 3.3 shows an example screen-image of Simulex modelling occupants’ evacuating 
one of the study models. This simulation is to investigate the optimum width of staircase 
against the fire door width. Staircase, fire door and corridor widths as in table 4.9 are used 
in this investigation. For example, to test the effects of fire door width against the 
staircase width, study models are designed with the fire door width e.g. 762mm with the 
staircase width of 914mm i.e. the smallest until 1524mm i.e. the widest and so forth. The 
same design principles are applied to the other fire doors width and for corridor too.  
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Figure 3.4 shows the information window of a simulation which shows a number of 
people evacuating the building and simulation time. There are eight scenarios of models, 
as described in chapter 4, section 4.6.1, with 260 study models developed to be studied 
for the optimum specification of staircase width, fire door width and corridor width by 
comparing the evacuation time taken by 200 evacuees evacuating the building. All 
analysis graphs are plotted using Microsoft Excel worksheet. 
 
Figure 3.4: Information of the number of people evacuating the study model and 
simulation time. 
Analysis of floor clearance time and total evacuation time in high-rise residential 
buildings in relation to the building characteristics (i.e. space orientation of the internal 
circulation, location of escape stairs, and location of final exit) were investigated based on 
four selected high-rise residential buildings mentioned in chapter 4 i.e. building A, C, D, 
and F. These buildings were chosen because of the internal layout differences. Examples 
of Simulex screen-image captures are as in figures 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 below. 
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Figure 3.5: Occupants started to evacuate their flat after fire alarms go off 
 
Figure 3.6: Occupants move forward to the nearest escape stairs and are scattered at the 
front of the storey exits. 
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(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Figure 3.7:  (a) Occupants have chosen the staircase which is nearest to their flats,  
(b) Occupants from the four flats have chosen one staircase and the other 
two have chosen another staircase,  
(c) One exit was abandoned because occupants had exited by the nearest 
final exit to the staircase. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 3.8: (a) Occupants approaching the staircase, (b) Occupants are on the staircase 
3.4.4 Questionnaires and analysis of variances  
Another methodology used in this research is questionnaire survey to the occupants of 
high-rise residential buildings and professional opinions on fire safety aspects in high-rise 
residential buildings. Two sets of questionnaires were sent out i.e. Human Behaviour 
Questionnaire (HBQ) (Appendix 3.1) and Building Audit Questionnaire (BAQ) 
(Appendix 3.2). HBQ was served to the occupants of five high-rise residential buildings 
in Kuala Lumpur. It consists of two parts e.g. Part one – Respondent’s General 
Information and part two – Respondent’s perception. In part 1, questions are asked about 
the respondents’ gender, education level, age, occupation, knowledge on fire safety and 
fire safety equipment, experience in any building fire or fire drill, and where they stay in 
residential flats. In part 2, questions are asked about their perceptions i.e. what they are 
going to do if they see or hear any fire cues, what is their perception if they hear the fire 
alarm, what are the factors that will motivate them to evacuate, what are the factors that 
describe their characteristics during evacuation processes, and what are the factors that 
highly influence their behaviour during evacuation process. There were 360 
questionnaires sent out to the five selected high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia and 
115 were returned with answer. All questionnaires were distributed through the post box 
and date and time were set to collect them back. 360 questionnaires sent out are based on 
the number of flats in those five buildings. The out come of this study is in chapter 6 i.e. 
 - 85 - 
Human behaviour response issues in high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia. Figure 
6.6 shows a human behaviour model of fire safety in building. 
BAQ consisted of five parts i.e. Part 1 – General Information, Part 2 – Fire Safety 
Management, Part 3 – Risks of Fire In The Buildings, Part 4 – Risks of Casualty, Part 5 – 
Evacuation Risk Elements. This questionnaire was sent out to professionals e.g. 
Architects, engineers, fire brigade offices, etc. The responses from them was rather low, 
out of 100 questionnaires sent out, 25 were returned. Those professionals are chosen 
based on the average numbers of them dealing with the fire brigade department in 
submitting proposals for new building plans for checking and approval of the fire safety 
features. Their valuable comments and responses were used to develop a fire safety audit 
form for fire safety audit in high-rise residential buildings as in Appendix 8.1. SPSS was 
used to analyse all the questionnaires using “frequency analysis” of variables and 
“comparison of means” analysis.   
3.4.5 Models Development 
The model of the fire safety that will be developed is based primarily on the concept of a 
multiattribute evaluation model, point system, the Edinburgh model (Rasbash et. al, 2004) 
and fire safety concept tree (NFPA, 2000). This conceptual model designed to achieve 
fire safety standards in high-rise residential buildings (as in figure 8.4) resulted from the 
combination of mixed research methodologies and analysis as in figure 1.1.  Details can 
be read in chapter eight. 
3.5  Chapter conclusion 
A mixed methodology is used throughout the research i.e. a combination of both 
quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. There are three mains 
components of research carried out i.e. observation, computer simulation and 
questionnaire survey. 
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CHAPTER 4  
OBSERVATION OF ESCAPE ROUTES IN HIGH-RISE 
RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STUDY 
MODELS  
4.1  Introduction 
Observation is one method that can be used to collect research data. This technique can be 
in the form of critical observation or analysis of any event, through recorded material or 
observation and photographic evidence for further analysis in the laboratory. Forensic 
analysis is a technique that analyses identified problems by putting all information or raw 
data together, step by step. This technique is widely used and known as ‘Techniques of 
Crime Scene Investigation’ i.e. gathering and analysis of evidence by visiting the place to 
identify what the problems are actually. In this work, this approach was adopted by 
visiting buildings and taking pictures of the building layout, staircase orientation, 
staircase step, corridor and fire door. By applying logical analysis, i.e. asking the question 
to the problem arising by using the notation ‘IF’ to the questions, we should be able to 
attract two possible answers, ‘YES’ or ‘NO’. E.g. of this skill is ‘If there is only one 
staircase provided in this building, would occupants be trapped when fire broke out?’ The 
answer could be YES or could be NO. Both answers need justification which will trigger 
other questions and this begins the forensic effect that analyses in detail all the data 
available. There are basic tools needed in observation techniques, e.g. abstract of building 
regulations, checklist form, digital camera, and measuring tape.  
4.2  High-rise residential buildings in Kuala Lumpur 
Five buildings were selected for observation as case studies in this research. The building 
selection was based on the criteria set in research scope (see chapter 1 - research scope). 
For the purpose of confidentiality, the buildings observed are referred to as Building A, 
B, C, D, and E.  
4.2.1 Building A 
The building observed is shown in the circle in Figure 4.1 (a. There are three blocks all 
together and only block 3 (Figure 4.1 (b)) was observed because it is the biggest and has 
the highest occupancy among them. It has 15 storeys, but only 14 storeys are occupied, 
and there are 6 residential units on each storey. Floor 15 is used as utility floors i.e. water 
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tanks for domestic and for hose reels systems. It is provided with two lifts for use as main 
access by the occupants and two staircases to be used in case of emergency. Figure 4.1 (c) 
shows the floor plan and staircase location of building A. Figure 4.1 (a) shows the general 
location of building A, which is located in a densely populated urban area. The building is 
surrounded by other low rise residential buildings and is very near to the main road at the 
north and oxidation pond at the south. Access to the building is via the access road off the 
main road to the southeast. Because the building is in a dense urban area, limited land 
area did not allow for a proper safe assembly area to be designated to be used in the case 
of fire. The only possible areas that can be used by occupants are along the main road at 
the north of the building or at the access road off the main road. 
 
 
(a) (b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 4.1: (a) Location of Building A, (b) Site view, (c) Floor plan 
4.2.2 Building B 
There are two blocks of U-Shape design in this catchment area, Block 1 and 2. Block 1 
has been chosen for the study case because both blocks have similar characteristics and 
design layout. Figure 4.4 (a) shows the blocks surrounded by other low-rise residential 
buildings. The building was chosen because of its shape and layout. This block comprises 
21 storeys with 7 residential units on each floor. There are four staircases provided to be 
used in case of emergency and two lifts for occupants’ daily use. The middle area in a ‘U’ 
block is used as common area for social and other events. Figure 4.4 (a) and (b) shows the 
location and façade of the block 1 respectively. Figure 4.5 shows the floor plan and the 
location of emergency escape stairs provided in this building. From the fire safety point 
of view, the middle area in a ‘U’ block is inappropriate to be used as a safe assembly area 
if fire breaks out at this building because it is too near to the building. Two staircases at 
the end of the building (Figure 4.5) are smaller than the other two. These are steel 
 
- 88 -
staircases which are purposely for use in emergency only, and occupants of the building 
seem never to use this staircase for daily use. The other two staircases made from RC 
(Reinforced Concrete) here become an alternative access way for occupants in case the 
lift is out of service. For occupants who live at the first or second floors, these staircases 
are common access ways to their flats. 
(a) (b) 
 
Figure 4.4: (a) Location of Building B, (b) Façade view of building B 
 
Figure 4.5:        Floor Plan of Building B 
The building was designed with open sided corridors therefore no fire doors are fitted at 
any staircases. Detailed analysis of occupants’ behaviour in this regard will be discussed 
further in chapter six. 
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4.2.3 Building C 
There are four blocks, block 1,2,3,4 clustered together with shared parking facilities and a 
common area. All buildings are provided with the same facilities and have the same 
building layout. Figure 4.6 shows a satellite picture of building C. Because the buildings 
are equal design and specification, Building 3 was chosen as a study case. However, for 
the purpose of evacuation analysis, the external layout of the buildings is taken into 
consideration too. There are two lifts located at the centre of the building and eight 
residential units at each floor. 
The building is 15 storeys and can be accessed through an access road off the main road. 
Figure 4.7 is a floor plan showing the floor layout and location of emergency staircases 
and lifts. Other than the covered parking facility, a limited open space parking facility for 
the visitor’s use is also provided and located at the west part of the catchment area of the 
building. The building has been chosen for study because of its design and floor 
orientation, i.e. central floor lobby surrounded by flats. There are two staircases provided 
for emergency use and located at opposite angles. Fire doors are fitted to each of the 
staircase and at every floor.  
 
 
Figure 4.6:    Satellite picture of building C 
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Figure 4.7:      Floor plan for building C 
4.2.5 Building D. 
 
(a) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 4.8: (a) Font view of building D,  (b) Main entrance for building D 
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Building D is 15 storey building with eight residential units for each floor. The main 
entrance (Figure 4.8 (a)) is located at the middle of the building. To reach the lift lobby, 
occupants have to enter under the staircase which looks like a tunnel entrance (figure 4.8 
(b)). In the author’s experience no other building has a main entrance like this. Occupants 
have to climb up five steps of staircase before they can reach the lift lobby.  
 
Figure 4.9:   Floor plan of building D 
However, it has an alternative entrance which is located at the both ends of the building. 
Occupants have to pass through on enclosed corridor to reach the lift lobby located at the 
centre of the building. There are two lifts provided and working in moderate condition. 
The escape route design in this building required occupants to move along the enclosed 
corridor to reach the escape stairs located at either end or at the middle of the building. 
Detailed analysis of the problems encountered in studying this building will be discussed 
further under the appropriate sub-topic in this chapter. Figure 4.9 shows the floor plan of 
building D. Escape stairs are separated from the lift lobby with a fire door which becomes 
a fire barrier to prevent smoke from entering the escape stair if fire breaks out in this 
building. There is no mechanical smoke control system installed in any escape stairs but 
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there are natural smoke control systems by means of wide openings at every level of the 
staircases.  
4.2.6 Building E. 
Building E as in figure 4.10 is somewhat 
similar in terms of building layout to 
building C, but there is a difference in terms 
of the staircase provided for emergency 
evacuation. Fire doors fitted to the staircases 
create a “Staircase Cabinet”. Access to the 
staircase is at the side of the “Staircase 
Cabinet” while in building C access to the 
staircase is direct. This is why this building 
has been chosen, because of the difference in 
occupants’ directions approach to the 
staircase. The intention is to analyse the 
effect of the occupants’ moving direction on the evacuation time. 
 
 
Figure 4.11:     Floor plan for building E 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Satellite picture of building E 
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There are four buildings clustered together but no inter-relation in terms of access into 
those buildings. Each of the buildings has its own entrance and lift service to go to the 
upper floors. There are two lifts, lift 1 and 2 as in figure 4.11 provided side-by-side, but 
not located at the centre of the building. The reason for this location is unknown. The 
buildings share a common place and parking facilities built at the middle of the buildings. 
Parking facilities are very limited and can not cater for the whole population. Therefore, 
most of the occupants park their vehicles along the roadside near to the building. 
Observation of the surroundings of the building shows that there does not seem to be any 
safe place for assembly in case of fire rather than along the road side located near to the 
building.  
These five buildings were chosen to participate in a detailed human behaviour study. The 
occupants of buildings A, B, C, D, and E were served with a structured questionnaire to 
be answered. Details of the questionnaire study will be discussed in chapter 6. 
Besides these five buildings observed, six more buildings located in Penang, Malaysia 
were observed.  
4.3  Observation of High-Rise Residential Buildings in Penang 
Penang is a tourist island located at the north of the Malaysian peninsular, where recently 
there has been much development in the construction of high-rise residential buildings to 
cater for the high demand from local and foreign purchasers. High land prices and 
property values in the centre of the island have caused the development to the nearby area 
to be extended as far as the Balik Pulau which is a Malay dominancy area. Many high-
rise residential buildings have been built along the costal area facing the sea, which has 
become very popular among property investors. It can be expected that the value of 
properties in this area will be increased about 20 % – 30 % annually in the near future. 
Besides the newly constructed buildings, some of the existing high-rise residential 
buildings have undergone rapid renovation and upgrading of the internal and external 
appearance of the building. This process, when completed, will enhance the value and the 
prices of the respective properties slightly above the current market. The existing 
buildings which were built about 10 to 15 years ago are still in use and most of them are 
located in highly populated areas with mixed occupancies. Observation of these buildings 
has given useful information about the internal layout and escape route design for 
emergency evacuation. The following buildings marked as P1, P2, P3, and so on are used 
for confidentiality. Those buildings together with the buildings observed in Kuala 
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Lumpur have been used to develop the study models to be tested in computer simulation. 
The outcome of the test results can be found in chapter 8 of this thesis. 
 
Figure 4.13: View of location of bridge corridor, air bridge, staircases and lift for 
building P1. There are two blocks connected with a Bridge Corridor and Air 
Bridge to access to occupants’ flats. 
Figure 4.13 shows building P1 with residential flats housed in two separate buildings 
connected to each other by a Bridge Corridor (see figure 4.14a). It is called a Bridge 
Corridor because it is used as a corridor but has been built in the form of a bridge parallel 
to the residential block and located between the two residential blocks. This bridge is 
attached to the residential block by connecting the bridge to the residential block using a 
component called an Air Bridge (see figure 4.14b). The building internal layout has been 
designed in such a way that there is only one bridge corridor built detached from the 
building. Occupants are only able to access their flats through the air bridge from the 
bridge corridor. Each air bridge serves two flats (figure 4.14c) and there are six flats on 
each side to total twelve flats all together on each floor i.e. six flats on each building. 
Escape stairs are located at both ends of the bridge corridor with only one lift provided 
opposite staircase 1 (see figure 4.13). This is a main access to all residents’ flats above 
floor two. Staircase 1 and 2 will be only used by occupants in an emergency situation 
except those who are staying at floor 1 or 2 who sometimes use them as a main means of 
access to their flats.  
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Figure 4.14:  (a)  Top floor of building P1 shows roof of two separate buildings with one 
corridor used as passageway to access to residential flats.  
 (b) Corridor at intermediate floor with air bridges for the above floor to 
residential flats. 
 (c) Air bridge to access the residential flats. 
The escape route is designed in such a way that occupants have to travel somewhat 
further to arrive at the safe designated area. Furthermore, the only alternative that the 
occupants have is evacuating the building using the main door in emergency cases. They 
are not able to use the windows as an alternative means of escape because the corridor is 
designed like a bridge detached from the building, which restricts the use of windows for 
escape, except to those who stay at ground floor level. 
 
- 96 -
The corridor width from c/c of balustrade of corridor is 60 inches (5 ft). The staircase 
width is 3 ft. 6 inches with 9 treads to each staircase. There are two staircases per flight 
connected to each floor having tread size of between 9 inches to 10 inches and rise 
between 7 to 8 inches without any fire door fitted to the staircase.  
 
Figure 4.15:  (a) View of building P2. Main entrance through passageway at ground floor 
besides the staircase shaft. 
                       (b) Corridor designed with access to both staircases and lifts. 
                       (c) Staircase designed parallel with corridor and having a wide opening for 
natural ventilation. 
                       (d) Staircase designed with access from both corridors 
                       (e) View the location of one of the lifts provided in this building. Another 
lift was located opposite the lift shown in this picture. 
The intermediate floor for the staircases was semicircular which, allows the occupants to 
move smoothly downwards, but rescue personnel could be faced with difficulties in 
moving up using the same staircase whilst occupants are moving down the staircase. The 
half round platform on the intermediate floor is only able to allow occupants to move in 
the same direction, because on the 3 ft 6 inches radius of half round intermediate floor it 
is very difficult for two people to walk side-by-side. 
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Figure 4.15 shows the main entrance, internal layout, staircase and lift for building P2. A 
common problem encountered for the people trying to evacuate the building is 
obstructions in the middle of the escape route. Every flat in this building is fitted with an 
iron grill on the main door. Some occupants put their belongings e.g. flower pots and 
unwanted furniture, bicycles etc, in the corridor near to the escape stairs. This will impede 
the evacuation process and could slowdown the occupants. 
This building has 4 storeys parking facilities shared with the building P3 which is built 
between them. There two corridors are attached to the residential blocks with a staircase 
and lift located between them (see figure 4.15d and e). There are two staircases and two 
lifts provided for the occupants for access to their flats. Internal circulation designed for 
this building as in figure 4.16. The staircase can be accessed from the both sides of 
corridors. It is a common design that the corridors are attached to the residential block. 
There are two blocks with four residential flats per floor of each block and in total there 
are eight residential flats for each floor of the building. 
 
Figure 4.16:  Parking facilities for building P2 and P3  
The main access into the residential flats of this building is either via the access from the 
parking facilities or from the ground floor (see figure 4.16). Occupants who park their 
vehicle in the car park provided will normally use the access door at the level where they 
park their car to the lift lobby. From there they can use either the lift or staircase to go to 
their respective flat. Whether they use the lift or staircase depends on where their flat is 
located. If their flat is one level above or below the level where they parked the car, 
 
- 98 -
normally they will use the staircase, but if their flat is located more than two levels above 
or below the level where they parked the car, they normally will use lift. 
 
Figure 4.17:  A floor plan of building P2 which have eight residential flats and occupants 
moving at opposite direction if they have to evacuate the building. 
In emergency situations e.g. fire in the building, occupants can use the same route by 
which they entered the building. There is an alternative route to evacuate from this 
building. Referring to figure 4.17, if they want to use staircases, occupants will move to 
the staircase in the opposite direction. It means that occupants from both corridors will 
move toward each other to the staircase. If a number of occupants are moving at the same 
time it could cause traffic congestion. Detailed analysis of this possibility will be tested in 
computer simulation and the results are discussed in chapter 7. 
Staircase specification and design for building P2 and P3 are similar with staircase width 
3 ft 3 inches without fire door, with opening 2 ft 10 inches to access staircase. Staircase 
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tread is between 10 to 11 inches and rise between 5 to 7 inches. There are two openings at 
left and right of the staircase in building P2, whilst in building P3, there is only one 
opening on the right of the staircase for the occupants to access the staircase (see figure 
4.18). 
 
Figure 4.18: Floor plan for building P3 showing the direction of possibility of occupants 
moving direction in an emergency situation. 
The reason the staircases in building P3 were designed in such a way is unknown, but it 
could be to limit the number of people using the staircase in an emergency situation, to 
reduce the possibility of congestion at the staircase. This scenario will be tested in 
simulation software to compare with the scenario in building P2. Test results will be 
discussed in the respective chapter. The advantage to those who stayed at flat 6 at every 
floor level is due to the ability of them to evacuate using both staircases provided because 
both staircases are located about the same distance from flat 6 (see figure 4.18). 
The disadvantage is for those who at flat 1 at every floor because they are furthest distant 
from the nearest staircase compared with the other people in the same level. They have to 
 
- 100 -
walk longer to reach either staircase 1 or 2. The risk is slightly higher compared with 
other people if fire starts at flat 2 or in their own flat. For this category of design, it is 
consider as dead end design, where occupants staying in this flat have only one access to 
escape in emergency situation. 
To compare with the building P2 which the building orientation and internal layout 
design is much better than building P3 because every flat at every floor level in building 
P2 is able to access to the both of the staircases provided. If fire starts at any of the flats in 
the same level, the occupants in the other flats have a better chance of evacuating the 
building safely because there is an alternative escape route provided and no dead end 
design at the floor level. 
Figure 4.19d shows the connection of the air bridges and figure 4.20 and 4.22 shows the 
location of the air bridges in both buildings. Figure 4.19b shows the staircase where the 
intermediate floors are in half round form with the intention to smooth the flow of traffic 
going down the building. However it may create another difficulty that in case of 
emergency, rescuers would have a problem entering the building using the same 
staircases, particularly, if they brought together with them heavy and bulky rescue gear. It 
is very common that fire fighters are equipped with such gear e.g. oxygen cylinder, first 
aid, portable extinguisher, etc. The main access for both buildings is at both ends of the 
building where the staircases and lifts are located. Observing those buildings, it was 
found that the occupants commonly use the access near to the car park because it is 
nearest to the place where they parked their car. Parking facilities are located around the 
building with the majority of parking lots being near to staircase 2. Every flat was 
provided with one parking lot, and occupants have to pay extra on a monthly basis if they 
require more than one parking lot. Visitors parking facilities are very limited and located 
near to the rubbish collection centre. Those buildings are fenced with security guards on 
duty at the main gate. All visitors have to get an entrance pass before they can be 
permitted to enter any of the buildings in this compound. 
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Building P4 and P5 are similar in terms of internal circulation design but different in the 
orientation of staircases and lift location. Figure 4.19a shows building P4 and P5, building 
P5 being taller than building P4. Staircase and lift orientation is twisted by 900. Staircase 
and lift in building P4 are parallel with the corridor, whilst in building P5, they are at 
right angles (see figure 4.20 and 4.22). 
Internal layout: Floor plans for both building P4 and P5 are as in figure 4.20 and 4.22 
respectively. Figure 4.19c shows the internal design of those buildings with air bridges 
designed to connect both corridors of two residential blocks in buildings P4 and P5. There 
 
Figure 4.19:  (a) View of building P4 and P5 with staircase orientation parallel with 
corridor (P4) and cross with corridor (P5). 
 (b) View of the staircase design for both buildings 
 (c) View of the air bridges connected both side of corridors 
 (d) View of the connection of air bridges to the corridor. 
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are two air bridges designed which occupants in the other block of the building can use to 
access to the corridor opposite their block. 
 
 
Figure 4.20:  Floor plan for building P4 with staircases and lift located at both end of
corridors and showing the possibility of occupants moving direction in an
emergency situation. Occupants can use the Air Bridge to cross to the
other side of corridor to evacuate the building. 
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There are quite a number of public parking facilities at a nearby commercial centre under 
the management of the municipal council. The surrounding area is quite congested with 
shop units with housing above, low-rise houses i.e. double storey and single storey terrace 
houses, built scattered around these buildings. Those houses and commercial buildings 
are privately owned properties as well as high-rise residential buildings (see figure 4.21 
(a), (b)). 
Assembly Area: Parking spaces are assumed to be used as safe assembly area in an 
emergency case for the occupants to congregate. However, there is no signage to direct 
them to this place in emergency. Even though there is exit signage in the buildings to lead 
the occupants to the emergency staircases, once the occupants are out of the buildings, 
they may be scattered and separated everywhere because there is no sign to lead them to 
the place of assembly. Some of the occupants, when asked about where to congregate if 
they have to evacuate the building, state that they have no idea. It could be at the parking 
space or outside of the main gate. Some occupants assumed they had to assemble 
somewhere outside the building, without knowing of any particular location. 
        
    (a)    (b) 
Figure 4.21: (a) Facade view of building P4 and  (b) Façade view of building P5
shows the staircase design and orientation. 
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Figure 4.22: Floor plan for building P5 which the staircases and lifts are located at the 
both end of corridors 
Staircase specification: Every staircase in both of the buildings is designed with nine 
steps and step rise range between 7 inches to 8 inches. Steps rise norm are at 7 inches, 
while steps tread designed in range between 9 inches to 10 inches with the tread norm is 9 
½ inches. Fair quality cement rendered staircases designed with one side handrail fitted to 
the left and solid wall to the right, the width of the staircase is between 3 ft 2 inches to 3 ft 
4 inches and without fire door but it has an opening 2 ft 3 inches for the occupants to 
access to the staircase.  
Meanwhile, 4 ft 6 ½ inches corridors measuring from c/c of corridor balustrades of this 
building are attached to each of the residential blocks respectively. These corridors link 
each other by two air bridges having the same width as the corridors and having a 
balustrade the same height as the corridors as well. The idea of linking both residential 
blocks with air bridges is a brilliant idea which is enables the occupants to cross to the 
other block either when they are in emergency situation or for social visits. 
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Figure 4.23: Views of the corridor designed of building P6 
Building P6 in figure 4.23 shows the pictures of corridor and staircase designed to be 
used in case of emergency. As with previous buildings, this building consists of two 
residential blocks to form a high-rise residential building. This 12 storey building has a 
unique corridor design  in which only one corridor is provided at one block and the other 
block is linked by means of individual access bridges called air bridges (see figure 4.23 
(a) and (b)). Each air bridge is designed to serve two flats connected to the shared space 
designed to look like a veranda in front of the flats’ main door. 
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Figure 4.24: Floor plan for building P6 showing the location of staircases, corridor and 
air bridges. Arrows indicate the possibility of occupants to evacuate the 
building in emergency situation. 
There are two lifts and two staircases provided for the occupants to use to get access to 
the flats. Both staircases are located at the each end of one block (see figure 4.24) as well 
as the lifts which are located at the each end of the building. Figure 4.24 shows the typical 
floor plan of this building having 16 flats on each floor with 8 flats on each side of the 
residential block. The occupants’ expected moving direction as marked on the floor plan 
shows that there is an advantage to those who stay in the block with the corridor attached 
to their flats. This is because in an emergency situation i.e. if a fire starts in their own flat, 
they have an alternative means of escape i.e. they can use the window to get out from 
their flat. The disadvantage is for those who stay in the opposite block because there is no 
way that they can use the window to evacuate from their flat because there is no platform 
for them to step on. The only accessible way for them to evacuate is through the main 
door which is attached to the veranda and the air bridge connected to the opposite 
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corridor. From a fire safety point of view, this design could  create a higher risks of being 
trapped for those living in flats 1 to 8 in the same block as marked on figure 4.24. 
Staircase 1 and 2 as in figure 4.23 (c) are designed with square intermediate floors and 
square openings for natural ventilation. There are 8 steps with cement rendered finishing 
with metal vertical straight square bars handrail fitted on the left side of the staircase and 
solid wall at the right. Staircase measured from the wall to the handrail was 3ft 3inches 
with step tread in between 8 inches and 10 inches and step rise between 5 ¾ inches and 7 
¾ inches. The outcome of these observations will be discussed in section 4.5 below and in 
chapter 5. 
4.4  Analysis of the Escape Routes Design and Specification 
The staircase analysis has the purpose of obtaining several parameters for the simulation 
processes. The parameters sought are the step tread and riser, which will be obtained by 
calculating the common staircase parameter length and height. Staircase parameter length 
and height in high-rise residential buildings varies and mostly depends on the staircase 
slope angle. The main reference for this is Uniform Building By-Laws 1984, (Malaysia), 
Building Regulation (Approved Document B), UK, and research data. Research data was 
gathered from observing a number of selected high-rise residential buildings in Kuala 
Lumpur and Penang. Observing and measuring escape routes in existing high-rise 
residential buildings have driven the development of a number of study models for further 
analysis. In this regards, photographic data has been analysed to look for the significant 
evidence and a statistical analysis technique has been adopted. The findings of this 
exercise can be found in tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.  
4.5  Analysis of Staircases in Buildings Observed 
Observation findings discussed here will be generalised, in that specific buildings are not 
referred to. From the research point of view, generalising research findings using this 
approach will not decrease the validity and credibility of the research finding because the 
data analysed was real data from the field work study. Detailed staircase analyses are 
made based on the six main buildings observed but an appropriate consideration was 
given to the other buildings when discussing the study models developed. From the 
twelve buildings observed, it can be concluded that there are at least eight scenarios of 
internal building circulation designs used as escape routes in high-rise residential 
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buildings in Malaysia. Those scenarios will be discussed in section 4.7 of this chapter. In 
this section, analysis of staircases in detail will be discussed. 
4.5.1 Staircase steps analysis 
Table 4.1 shows staircase steps analysed in the observed buildings. Five buildings in 
Kuala Lumpur have been identified to participate in this study. The detailed design and 
construction of staircases will be prudently analysed to help in the development of the 
study models. The purpose of this study is (1) to calculate the equivalence (equivalent?) 
length of staircase to be used in the simulation process, (2) to compare the actual 
construction detail to the specification given in Uniform Building By-Laws.  
Staircase Equivalence Length (SEL) is known as travel distance on escape stairs 
calculated from storey exit to final exit. Storey exit means a fire rated door to a protected 
staircase or a corridor protected with a fire resisting structure in accordance with the 
Ninth schedule of By-laws, and in the case of ground floor accommodation, storey exit 
means a door leading direct to a place of safety outside the building. Final exit means a 
point of discharge for the escape route from a building providing direct access to the 
street, passage-way or open steps sited to enable the evacuation of persons from the 
vicinity of a building so that they are safe from fire or smoke. Escape stairs means any 
staircase which persons in any storey of a building may use to evacuate the building to 
reach a place of safety. This forms part of the escape route which is also known  as Exit 
Route. Exit route means a route by which persons in any storey of a building may reach a 
place of safety outside the building and may include a room, doorway corridor, stairway 
or other means of passage not being a revolving door, lift or escalator. Calculating SEL 
does not take into account the measurement of travel distance within the building. Travel 
Distance means the distance required to be traversed from any point in a storey of a 
building to either (1) the fire-resisting door in the staircase enclosure; or (2) if there is no 
such door, the first stair tread of the staircase. It means the distance from any point in the 
rooms or storey or flat to the exit door or exit discharge. Exit Door or Exit Discharge 
means a door from a storey, flat, or room which gives access from such storey, flat or 
room on to an exit route. By providing alternative escape stairs, we can avoid the building 
from having a design known as a dead-end design. Dead-End means an area from which 
escape is possible in one direction only and in an open plan includes any point from 
which the direct routes to alternative exits subtend an angle of less than 45º. 
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From all buildings studied, there were 81 floor levels, 13 escape stairs, 438 staircases, and 
3,774 staircase steps. Overall, 38.84% i.e. 1,466 staircase steps have been prudently 
analysed by measuring step treads, risers, steps width, and taking photographs of those 
steps measured for further analysis. On average 3 or 4 staircase steps were analysed for 
each of the escape stairs in those buildings studied.  
Building A B C D E Total 
No. of Floor 15 21 15 15 15 81 
No. of escape stair 2 4 2 2 3 13 
No. of Staircase 60 168 60 60 90 438 
No. of Steps 600 1,344 540 480 810 3,774 
Steps Analysed 168 750 165 165 218 1,466 
Percentage (%) 28.00 55.80 30.56 34.37 26.91 38.84 
Table 4.1: Staircase steps analysis in observed building 
When examining the number of staircase steps on escape stairs in buildings studied, a 
variation in the number of steps were found. They fall in the range of 5 steps to 12 steps 
and both numbers are included per escape stairs. However the vast majority of escape 
stairs were designed with 9 steps per staircase. When analysing the step average per 
staircase by dividing the number of overall steps with the number of staircases from those 
six buildings studied, i.e. 3,774/438 = 8.6, it can be concluded that the average steps per 
escape stair is 9. Therefore, 9 steps will be used to calculate the staircase equivalence 
length. Furthermore, it is still in a number permitted by the By-law which does not exceed 
16 steps per flight of staircase. 
4.5.2 Staircase tread dimension analysis 
Tread analysis is essential to determine the actual tread dimension compared with the 
specification given in UBBL. In UBBL all staircase treads shall be not less than 255 mm. 
From early observations, it was found that the staircase treads widths are variety in 
dimension and ranging from the minimum 228 mm (9 inches) to the maximum of 298 
mm (11 ¾ inches). For analysis purposes, tread dimensions have been grouped as in table 
4.2. Table 4.2 is the outcome of the staircase tread analysis for the five selected buildings 
mentioned earlier. Minimum group is set at 235 mm because from observation, the vast 
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majority of staircase treads designed are above 255 mm. There were 375 cases (25.58%) 
where staircase treads fell below 234 and no such cases where any treads fell between 
235 mm and 244 mm. The cases falling below 375 were in building B with two metal 
escape stairs designed for emergency purposes (see figure 4.27). Treads are then grouped 
in a range of 10 mm until the maximum 300 mm. There are no such cases where treads 
are designed over 300 mm. The biggest dimension of treads found in the five buildings 
studied is 298 mm.  
Treads(mm) < 235 235-244 245-254 255-264 265-274 275-284 285-294 295-300 
Bldg: A 0 0 0 17 108 38 5 0 
B 375 0 0 0 216 159 0 0 
C 0 0 12 0 6 124 23 0 
D 0 0 0 0 12 176 30 0 
E 0 0 0 0 0 21 46 98 
Total 375 0 12 17 342 518 104 98 
Percentage 25.58% 0% 0.82% 1.16% 23.33% 35.33% 7.09% 6.68% 
Table 4.2: No. of treads and percentage analysis 
Overall, staircase treads designed in high-rise residential buildings are complied with the 
Uniform Building Regulation By-Laws 84 i.e. 73.6% staircase treads were designed 
wider than 255 mm as required by the By-law. Out of those that complied with the By-
law, 1.16% complied at the minimum requirement of 255 mm. However, 26.4% do not 
comply with the By-law. Out of 26.4%, 25.58% fall below 235 mm as mentioned earlier. 
Analysis shows that the majority of cases i.e. 35.33% were in the range of 275 mm to 284 
mm with the treads mode being 280 mm (11 inches). There is significant evidence to say 
that in term of staircase tread design, most of the high-rise residential buildings complied 
with the By-law and the most popular dimension was 280 mm or 11 inches. For that 
reason, dimension 280 mm will be used as design criteria to calculate the SEL. 
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                     (a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 4.27: (a) Emergency metal staircase, (b) Close view of staircase, (c) Tread 
measurement 234 mm 
4.5.3 Step risers Analysis 
Another aspect that needs to be analysed is the step riser. The purpose of this analysis is 
to inspect whether the step riser in staircase design in high-rise residential buildings 
complies or not with the By-law. If they comply, at what dimension are the majority of 
them designed. The By-law requires all step risers to be not more than 180 mm. However, 
the By-law does not state a minimum size. From the examination of five high-rise 
residential buildings, there is significant evidence that step risers are being designed 
between 131 mm to 180 mm (5 1/8 inches to 7 1/8 inches). There were only two cases i.e. 
0.001% step risers designed over 180 mm and 43 cases i.e. 2.93% step rises designed 
between 131 to 140 mm out of 1466 staircase steps analysed. Figure 4.28 shows examples 
of those step risers in both categories as mentioned. It can be said to be an isolated case 
because the number is small.  
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Riser (mm) <130 131 - 140 141-150 151-160 161-170 171-180 181-190 >191 
Bldg A 0 14 64 85 5 0 0 0 
B 0 29 274 321 126 0 0 0 
C 0 0 26 82 55 0 0 2 
D 0 0 0 62 137 19 0 0 
E 0 0 0 25 93 47 0 0 
Total 0 43 364 575 416 66 0 2 
% 0.00 2.93 24.83 39.22 28.38 4.5 0.00 0.001 
Table 4.3: Step risers’ analysis  
 
       
                        (a)                                                                     (b) 
Figure 4.28: (a) Step riser designed at 198 mm, (b) Step riser design at 140 mm. 
Table 4.3 shows the outcome of step riser analysis of the six buildings’ studied. The vast 
majority of the step risers, i.e. 39.22%, designed were between 151 mm and 160 mm (6 
inches to 6 5/16 inches). 28.38% were designed between 161 mm and 170 mm (6 3/8 
inches to 6 11/16 inches).  
From the study, there is strong evidence to say that all high-rise residential buildings, in 
term of step riser design, comply with the By-law. This is because 99.99% complied with 
the By-law. Among the most popular dimensions used in step risers design is between 
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151 mm to 160 mm with the riser mode being 153 mm (6 inches). For this reason, 
dimension 153mm is chosen to be used as design criteria to calculate SEL. 
4.5.4 Travel distance on escape stairs 
Travel distance on escape stairs is measured from the storey exit until the final exit. There 
are two possibilities of storey exit in high-rise buildings, the storey exit staircase approach 
or storey exit balcony approach.  
 
                           (a) 
 
                                  (b) 
 
Figure 4.29:  (a) Diagramme for storey exit (staircase) and (b) balcony approach  
Figure 4.29 (a) shows the diagram of storey exit staircase approach, that is, escape stairs 
attached immediately to the resident’s flat without any corridor. Occupants can access 
their flat immediately from the staircase landing floor. Figure 4.29 (b) shows the diagram 
of the storey exit balcony approach. It means that occupants have to go through the 
corridor before they can reach the escape stairs. Storey exits in this case are the fire door 
of the escape stairs, or if there is no fire door, the first tread of the staircase if the corridor 
is not an enclosed fire rating corridor. For both cases, travel distance on escape stairs is 
measured from storey exit to the final exit. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.30: (a) Cross section view of the most common of staircase designed,  
                     (b) Picture one of staircase in the building studied. 
Figure 4.30 (a) shows a common cross section of escape stair in high-rise residential 
buildings and (b) shows a picture of a staircase with the occupants possible moving 
direction down the staircase. This is a part of the travel distance that occupants might 
have to travel in case of an emergency. There are two segments in staircase evacuation, 
(1) moving down on the staircases, (2) moving on landing floors or intermediate floors. 
Landing floors and intermediate floor dimensions are designed according to the 
dimension of the staircase. The depths of landings shall be not less than the width of the 
staircase. This specification is applied to the intermediate floors and landing floors 
between the staircases as well. Therefore, the width of landing floors and the width of 
intermediate floors will be the double of the width of the staircase. 
Staircase Equivalence Length (SEL) or Staircase Total Length (St) can be calculated 
using the following formula: i.e. 
∑∑
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                                                                                                (4.1) 
Where, 
 Si = (Nsi.Lsi)                                                       (4.2) 
 Pi = (Npi.2Wsi)                                                                            (4.3) 
By put in equation (4.2) and (4.3) into equation (4.1), equation (4.1) becomes; 
 - 115 - 
( ) ( )∑∑
−−
+=
i
n
i
n
WsiNpiLsiNsiSt
11
2..                                                                       (4.4) 
Where;  
Ns is the number of staircases. 
 Ls is the length of one of the staircases. 
 Ws is the width of the staircase  
 Np is the number of platforms. 
Referring to figure 4.30 (a), analysis of two storeys staircases can be done. Where A i.e. 
Staircase A (Sa), B i.e. Staircase B (Sb), C i.e. Staircase C (Sc), and D i.e. Staircase D (Sd) 
which have the same length, therefore (Sa) = (Sb), = (Sc), = (Sd) = (Ls). Staircase 
Equivalence Length can be calculated using equation (4.4). 
( ) ( )∑∑
−−
+=
i
n
i
n
WsiNpiLsiNsiSt
11
2..  
 = Ns.Ls + 2Ws.Np 
 
Figure 4.31:  Staircase diagramme. 
Based on the above analysis, SEL for staircase in figure 4.30 can be calculated. Design 
data are as follow; (1) Riser dimension is 153 mm, (2) Tread dimension is 280 mm, and 
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(3) Step number is 9 steps per staircase. The diagram below represents one staircase. 
Parameter Z is the travel distance on the escape stair with length of staircase (Ls). 
Referring to figure 4.31, by using trigonometry formula, parameter Z i.e. Ls can be 
calculated if parameters X and Y are known.  
X =  No. of steps x Riser dimension 
9 x Riser dimension 
 9 x 153 
 1377 mm 
Y = No. of steps x Tread dimension. 
9 x Tread dimension 
 9 x 280 
 2,520 mm 
Tan θ  = 
Y
X  
 = 
2520
1377  
Tan θ = 0.5464 
       θ = 28.650 
The parameter Z which is the staircase effective length can be calculated by using the sine 
formula i.e. Sin θ = 
Z
X  
Z  = θsin
X  
 = 
4795.0
1377  
 = 2,872 mm 
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Z = Ls = 2,872mm 
Referring to figure 4.30 (a), 
Ns = 4 and Np = 5 
Therefore Total Staircase Length  
(St)  = Ns.Ls + Np 2Ws. 
= 4(Ls) + Np 2Ws. 
= 4(2,872) + 5(2Ws) 
=11,488 + 10Ws 
Staircase Width (Ws) mm 914 1067 1220 1372 1524 
Staircase Length (St) mm 20,628 22,158 23,688 25,208 26,728 
Table 4.4: Calculated equivalence length of the staircase to the staircase width. 
If only one no. of staircase and one no. of intermediate floor, staircase length can be 
calculated as follows: 
(St)  = Ns.Ls + Np 2Ws. 
= 1(Ls) + 1(2Ws) 
= 2872 + 2Ws 
= 2872 + 2Ws 
Staircase Width (Ws) mm 914 1067 1220 1372 1524 
Staircase Length (St) mm 4,700 5,006 5,312 5,616 5,920 
Table 4.5: Equivalence length of the staircase to the staircase width 
4.6  Models of Building Evacuation Scenario 
Evacuation from building fire is essential and has to be done as soon as the fire alarm is 
sounded or fire cues have been detected, the sooner the better, because it could save lives. 
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The issue of how safe is safe enough in escape route design and construction is yet to be 
answered. This is because “to evacuate or not to evacuate” high-rise residential buildings 
has been hotly debated in all sectors of the fire protection industry (MacLennan, 2001). 
According to MacDonald, (1985) and Proulx (2001), non-evacuation or “stay-in-place” 
procedure is proposed as an appropriate behaviour during high-rise building fires for 
high-rise residential, hotel and dormitory buildings. According to Proulx, over the past 
decades, a number of people have died in the process of evacuation from high-rise 
buildings during fire and many of them have been found in corridors and stairwells which 
are often far away from the place of origin of fire. 
After the September 11, 2001 tragedy, the idea of not evacuating from a high-rise 
building seems to be inappropriate any more. The theory of buildings being built with fire 
resistant materials sufficient to withstand fire, so that residents can stay in their own flats 
or flats of their neighbour until the fire is put out, seem now to be inappropriate. The risk 
that a high rise building could completely collapse if fire breaks out as at the World Trade 
Centre is still high, especially if it is a steel structure building. However it is not ruled out 
that a building design with sufficient fire resistance material in place will increase fire 
safety in buildings. The Canadian Wood Council (2000) note that fire safety in a building 
can be achieved through proven building design features intended to minimize the risk of 
harm to people from fire to the greatest extent possible. We also cannot rule out the fact 
that in the real world many combustible materials may be brought in to flats by residents 
after the building is completed. The intensity of fire, especially if highly flammable 
material stored in a flat catches fires, will cause devastation and could cause the building 
to collapse. The critical aspect is to ensure that all occupants are evacuated from the 
affected building before its collapse. The evacuation time is also influenced by the 
building design, specification, and the location and layout of escape routes provided in 
the building. Even though the occupants’ behaviour plays a vital role, escape routes 
provided in the building will have a large influence on the people’s behaviour. People 
have a tendency to become tense and will behave in an irrational way if they become 
stuck in traffic congestion during the evacuation process. There are cases where 
occupants have jumped through a window to their death during a fire in a high rise 
building. To study the effect of escape route design on evacuation processes, study 
models for the evacuation scenario have been developed as in figure 4.32 to figure 4.39. 
These models were developed after prudent appraisal of the observed data. To investigate 
the specification of escape stairs, corridors and fire doors, the numbers of study models 
were then expanded to 260 models as in table 4.6. To do so, computer simulation 
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software called SIMULEX was used as a research tool to analyse the models. In this 
regard, the parameters considered in the investigations are as in table 4.7. 
Study Models Number of Staircases 
Number of 
Fire doors 
Number of 
Corridors 
Number of cases 
investigated 
Model 1 5 8 1 = 2 m 40 
Model 2 5 - 5 25 
Model 3 5 5* 5 25 
Model 4 5 5* 5 25 
Model 5 5 8 1 = 2 m 40 
Model 6 5 - 5 25 
Model 7 5 8 1 = 2 m 40 
Model 8 5 8 - 40 
Total cases investigated 260 Cases 
*Note: Fire door width is equal to corridor width. Therefore, only corridor width is 
considered in this study. 
Table 4.6: Number of cases studied 
4.6.1 Evacuation Models 
There were 260 evacuation models investigated. Model scenarios were set according to 
the different cases of escape route design and construction, orientation of the escape stairs 
and the possible direction in which occupants can move to evacuate from high-rise 
residential buildings. There are eight scenarios altogether and the description of each of 
the scenarios is in table 4.8; details of the eight cases of staircase layout investigated are 
as shown in figure 4.32 to figure 4.39 below. Eight scenarios were selected because in the 
high-rise residential buildings observed, the escape stairs constructed were, parallel, 
vertical, straight, L-Shape, or staircase built to serve clustered flats, are with or without 
fire door.  
Meanwhile, escape route design and construction in high-rise residential buildings either 
permitted the occupants to move in one direction or both directions. The direction in 
which occupants can move is mainly influenced by the type of corridor design in the 
internal layout of the building. Different types of internal layout can be found in section 
4.3 and 4.4. The decision on the development of study models was based on the 
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observations of the existing high-rise residential buildings in Kuala Lumpur and Penang 
as described in section 4.3 and 4.4 above. Table 4.7 shows the relationship between the 
buildings observed and type of model developed. 
Model 
Building 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
A ? ?       
B ? ? ?      
C        ?
D        ?
E ? ?  ?     
P1   ?      
P2     ? ?   
P3       ?  
P4 ? ?       
P5     ? ?   
P6   ?      
Table 4.7: Relationship between buildings observed with the model scenarios. 
Model Description 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Opposite directions with fire door. 
Opposite directions without fire door. 
L-Shape direction with fire door. 
Straight direction with fire door. 
Opposite direction horizontal staircase with fire door. 
Opposite direction horizontal staircase without fire door. 
One direction horizontal staircase with fire door. 
Cluster types with one staircase. 
Table 4.8: Model description 
 
Figure 4.32: Study model scenario 1 
 
Figure 4.33: Study model scenario 2 
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Figure 4.34: Study model scenario 3 
 
 
Figure 4.35: Study model scenario 4 
Figure 4.36: Study model scenario 5 
 
Figure 4.37: Study model scenario 6. 
 
Figure 4.38: Study model scenario 7 
 
Figure 4.39: Study model scenario 8 
4.6.2 Parameters considered in analysis 
There are seven main parameters considered in this regard i.e. (i) Escape route 
specifications, (ii) Occupant characteristics, (iii) Number of occupants, (iv) Occupants 
velocity or walking speeds, (v) Distance of flats to the nearest escape stairs, and (vi) 
Evacuation patterns. 
i. Escape route specification 
The components in the escape route consist of corridors, escape stair, fire door, lobbies, 
and internal circulation. In this regard internal circulation and lobbies are assumed to be 
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the corridor because the nature of the design is not much different, except the lobby is 
slightly larger than the corridor. It is common in designs for the corridor and lift lobby to 
be attached because escape stairs are normally located near to the lift. Therefore only 
corridors are considered in the analysis. There are two types of corridor, open sided and 
closed sided. In analysis of people’s movement, those designs do not have any effect 
except when smoke starts to enter the corridor. In an open sided corridor, smoke is free to 
move upward and in close-sided smoke will fill up the corridor and could impede 
people’s movement. For the purposes of analysis, the assumption has been made that 
people start evacuation immediately after the fire alarm goes off. At that time smoke is 
still contained in the place where the fire started. The specifications measured here are the 
width of staircases, fire doors, and corridors. Further detail of fire doors, staircases and 
corridors specification will be discussed under sub-topic model determination. 
ii. Occupants Characteristics 
Occupants’ characteristics measured are the physical aspect and not the behaviour of the 
occupants. Occupants’ behaviour will be measured using the questionnaire distributed to 
the high-rise building residents and will be discussed in the relevant analysis chapter. The 
physical aspects that have been measured are body types, i.e. elderly, male, female, or 
children. This is because body types influence the walking speed and the response time. 
The response time is the time taken by the occupants to react after the fire alarm goes off. 
This time varies depending on the occupants’ physical characteristics and is a very 
significant contribution to the total evacuation time.  
 
 
iii. Numbers of occupants 
In theory, the number of occupants has a significant effect on the evacuation time. To 
increase the number of people will increase the time taken to evacuate from the building. 
Analysis of the number of people occupying the building will give us clues as to what is 
the optimum number of people that can safely occupy the high-rise building. This figure 
then can be used in deciding the maximum occupant density design factors for fire safety. 
Analysis of the number of occupants is based on the number of rooms available in the 
buildings studied. Minimum occupancies are calculated on the assumption that one room 
is occupied by one person. Maximum occupancies are calculated on the assumption that 
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one room is occupied by four persons. This assumption was made by doubling the normal 
occupancy that two persons occupy one room. There will be three cases to analyse; low 
occupancy, 1 person per room; normal occupancy, 2 persons per room and high 
occupancy; 4 persons per room. (is there justification for these numbers based on the 
observations? 
iv. Occupants’ velocity or walking speed 
In theory if occupants’ velocity increases the time taken will be reduced. Analysis will 
look for the correlation between the evacuation time and the numbers of people 
occupying the building. There are five scenarios of walking speed chosen here, a random 
mixture of people with various walking speeds, walking speed set for all males, all 
female, all elderly, or all children. In theory, increasing the number of the building 
residents has a tendency to create congestion in the escape stair. 
v. Distance of flats to the nearest escape stairs 
The distance of flats or residents’ units from the escape stair will be analysed to 
determine whether there is any significant evidence that the distance and location of the 
flats or residential units contributes to the congestion occurring in the escape stair. Is 
there any significant evidence of the residential flats layout design, i.e. scattered compare 
with the designed side-by-side, with the corridor joint to the escape stairs contribute to 
traffic congestion during evacuation process. If there is an alternative staircase provided, 
is there any significant evidence that occupants will choose the most visible staircase 
instead of the nearest staircase to them? Analysis of this part will be discussed when 
discussing the results of the questionnaire. At this point the analysis will only look at the 
significant evidence by using the evacuation time as a measurement gathered from the 
different building design and orientation. 
vii. Evacuation pattern 
The evacuation pattern in a building fire needs to be analysed to determine how people 
are going to react in the case of emergency. In this analysis, the occupants’ evacuation 
pattern will be analysed when the fire alarm sounds to identify the safest design of escape 
route to be used. Analysis is done by adopting the philosophy that ‘Any design which does 
not cause traffic congestion at any level, and allows people to be smoothly evacuated 
from the building with the minimum time taken, is the safest’. (is this a quote? Is so ,ref 
needed)At the end of the analysis, suggestions should be able to be made regarding which 
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design is the safest one to use in a high-rise residential building. In this regard for the 
simulation purposes, the number of occupants to test in evacuation model is 180, 360 and 
720 for low, normal and high density respectively. The number of occupants is calculated 
using the following formula that Od = Pr x Rf x Ff x Nf 
Where: 
Od = Occupants Density 
Pr = Numbers of person / Room 
Rf = Numbers of Room / Flat 
Ff = Numbers of Flat / Floor 
Nf = Numbers of Floor in the Building. 
An example calculation of low occupants’ density for ten storeys building with six, three 
bedrooms flats per floor as follow: 
For low occupancy, that is one person occupant per room, the number occupancy is: 
Od = Pr x Rf x Ff x Nf 
 = 1 x 3 x 6 x 10 
 = 180 persons. 
4.6.3 Model Determination  
The study models used are based on the analysis of observation data of the existing high-
rise residential buildings which was carried out earlier. There are five main components 
in the study models developed i.e. (i) Room / Chamber, (ii) Corridor, (iii) Staircase, (iv) 
Fire Door, and (v) People. 
 
Figure 4.40: Detail of one of the study model 
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i. Room/chamber 
There are three types of room, single room, double rooms and four rooms. A room is used 
to place people for simulation purposes. The number of people to be placed in the room / 
rooms is the numbers of Occupants Density calculated, i.e. 180, 360 and 720 for low, 
normal and high density respectively. If the models are double chambers, the number of 
people to be placed in each chamber will be divided equally. For example for 180 
occupants, each chamber will have 90 people. The same principle applies to the four 
room type model. The number of rooms designed is based on the traffic flow analysis of 
high-rise residential buildings, single room when traffic flows are only one direction, 
double rooms when traffic flows are in two opposite directions and four rooms when 
traffic flows are from multiple directions. Figure 4.40 shows an example of a study model 
with double chambers. Other types of evacuation models for different staircase layout 
scenarios can be found in Figure 4.32, until 4.39. 
ii. Corridor 
The corridor is an important component in an escape route which people have to go 
through before they are able to reach the escape stair. There are two types of corridor, 
open sided corridor and close sided corridor (see figure 4.41).  
In this regard both types of corridor are equally important and therefore in evacuation 
model corridor both corridor types are represented. For analysis purposes, the corridor 
width is selected to be in the range of 1220mm (4ft) to 2440mm (8ft) with  305mm (1f t) 
intervalsin each category. Therefore, design of corridor size will be 1220mm (4ft), 
1524mm (5ft), 1828mm (6ft), 2134mm (7ft) and 2440mm (8ft). A corridor width less 
than 1220mm (4ft) has not been selected because it seems to be not a realistic design for 
two persons to walk in opposite directions. A widthof more than 2440mm (8ft) has not 
been chosen because in the buildings observed there was no such case of a corridor more 
than 2440mm (8ft). From observation the most common sizes of corridor for residential 
buildings are between 1828mm (6ft) and 2134mm (7ft). Table 4.9 shows the various sizes 
of corridors used in the evacuation model together with the staircases and fire door sizes. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
 
(e) 
Figure 4.41: (a), (c) and (e) Open sided corridors, (b) and (d) Closed-side corridors 
iii. Staircase 
The staircase is another important component in the escape route. It is widely known as 
escape stair which is purposely used not only during emergency situation but can be used 
as a means of access to resident’s flats especially for those who are staying at level three 
and below of high-rise residential buildings. During an emergency evacuation such as a 
building fire, all occupants are advised to use the staircase to evacuate tall buildings in a 
fire emergency. Even though recent research shows that some people are keen to use 
elevators to get out quickly from tall buildings,(reference) a majority still choose to use 
the staircase for emergency evacuation. Portsmouth’s Spinnaker Tower is 170m high (two 
and a half times the height of Nelson’s Column in Trafalgar Square) and it is estimated 
that 60% of the occupants could be evacuated using the staircase and the remaining 40% 
would use the passenger lift for evacuation (Tarada, 2005). Furthermore, current 
regulations recognise that lifts may be used to evacuate disabled people who normally use 
wheel-chairs.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
 
(e) 
Figure 4.42: (a) Metal staircase, (b) Staircase with square opening, (c) Closed staircase, 
(d) Staircase with halve round floor, (e) staircase with windows 
For analysis purposes, staircase widths of 914mm (3 ft), 1067mm (3.5 ft), 1220mm (4 ft), 
1372mm (4.6 ft), and 1524mm (5 ft) were chosen for the evacuation model. Staircase 
widths of less than 914mm and greater than 1524mm have not been chosen because in the 
observations no building was found with that size of staircase. The most common 
staircase designed for emergency use is 1067mm (3.5 ft) for one person per flight. 
Staircase design for two persons per flight is 1372mm (4.5 ft). This size is to enable the 
occupants to walk comfortably side-by-side or to walk in different directions. Unlike 
commercial buildings where the staircase could be wider than 1372mm, in high-rise 
residential buildings no case of a staircase wider than 1372mm was observed. Therefore, 
for analysis purposes, staircases between 914mm and 1524mm inclusive ware chosen. In 
order to analyse the optimum size of staircase, 153mm (6 in) was added to the model 
design until it reached the maximum size of 1524mm. From the construction point of 
view, adding sizes smaller than 153mm is impractical. Figure 4.42 is an example of a 
staircase observed in a residential building. 
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iv. Fire door 
The minimum width of the fire doors is 2 ft 6 inches (762 mm) and the maximum size of 
the door is 5 ft (1524 mm) with a difference of 3 inches (76 mm) assumed as the optimum 
size of door to analyse. In the vast majority of flats, fire door analysis showed that there 
were no such cases of fire doors smaller than 2ft or greater than 5ft. This is not taking into 
account fire doors fitted in corridors. Fire door fitted to corridors can be up to 8 feet. 
Therefore, for analysis purposes, door sizes as in table 4.9 are chosen. 
 
 
Table 4.10: Conversion Table 
 
Table 4.9: Staircases, door & corridor sizes 
Table 4.10 shows the conversion size of fire doors in imperial (inches) and metric (mm) 
which is commonly used in residential buildings. There are either one or two door leaves 
used as fire door and they vary and are not always symmetrical. In many cases a 
combination of two different sizes of door leafs are commonly used. However, if the size 
of the second door is smaller than 1ft 6 inches, only one door, the larger one is fitted with 
a door knob.  
4.7 Model design environment 
Models were designed using CAD software and saved as dxf files. If there was more than 
one floor to be analysed, dxf files have to be uploaded as many times as desired and the 
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floor plan then named accordingly. All floors uploaded into the SIMULEX have to be 
connected to each other by a staircase which needs to be designed in the SIMULEX 
environment. Apparently, only one staircase is needed to every escape stairs and links to 
each floor at the storey exit at one side and to the staircase designed at the other side. 
Link sizes must be the same as the door width. After links have been made, the final exit 
has to be assigned to enable the assigned occupants in the designed chamber/room to 
leave the building. The exit assigned is an end destination for the occupants to evacuate 
from the building. It must be the final exit of the study model. However, the final exit still 
can be assigned anywhere in the SIMULEX environment. The purpose of the study will 
mainly determine where to put the final exit. People then have to be put in before we can 
start the simulation. People’s characteristics should be determined and can be selected 
from the choices given in the SIMULEX environment. It, however, can be changed later 
on and can be done at any time if required. 
4.8 Chapter conclusion 
In the observation exercises, 462 staircases in six high-rise residential buildings were 
investigated. In addition, another six buildings were visited to study their internal layout 
and circulation patterns. From the investigation, 74.8% of steps tread in six high-rise 
residential buildings complied with the By-laws. 
According to the By-laws the minimum depth dimension requirement for the step treads 
is 255 mm, and the vast majority of staircases are designed with 280 mm treads depth. 
Similarly, for the step risers, the maximum height set in By-laws is 180 mm, but the vast 
majority of the staircases are designed with step risers at 153 mm. 
The number of steps per staircase was designed within the permitted number in By-laws 
which say that they shall not exceed 16 steps per flight, i.e. the average of being nine 
steps per flight. 
Eight scenarios of study model have been developed as a result of the observation 
exercises on the buildings studied for further investigation in simulation software. 
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CHAPTER 5 
AN EVALUATION OF THE CONDITION OF ESCAPE ROUTE IN 
HIGH-RISE RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS 
5.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in Chapter 4, observations approach was adopted, to investigate the issues 
and problems encountered in high-rise residential buildings. A number of high-rise 
residential buildings located in Kuala Lumpur and Penang discussed in chapter 4 were 
observed. In this chapter, discussions focus on the evaluation of the condition of escape 
routes and internal circulation areas in the high-rise residential buildings. 
In this chapter, discussions focus on the actual condition and problems encountered in 
escape routes in high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia. Some photos provide 
evidence to support the arguments of the research finding. However, discussion will be 
focused on the categorised issues which were highlighted during the research exploration, 
without mentioning a particular building where the problem was encountered. This is to 
avoid some degree of sensitivity in certain aspects especially when the rules and 
legislations are involved. Uniform Building By-Laws were used to consider the aspects of 
the requirements as they relate to escape route design and fire safety in buildings.  
If we can understand the fire safety aspects, and we know what are the actual problems 
encountered in those buildings, appropriate measures can be taken to enhance fire safety 
standards. 
5.2 Brief methodology used in research and analysis 
The basic principles of the observation method are applied, where selected buildings are 
identified prior to observation being carried out as described in chapter 3.4. Chapter 4.2 
and 4.3 are parts of the observation outcome on the same buildings. There are some basic 
research tools needed i.e. checklist form formulated earlier based on the Uniform 
Building By-Laws 1984 – Malaysia and The Building Regulation: Approved Document 
Part B – Fire Safety United Kingdom as a benchmark. Other tools are a digital camera, 
measuring tape and laptop computer used to take evidence such as photographs, measure 
the escape routes dimensions, and to store this data respectively. Observation took place 
by walking through all internal circulation areas at every floor beginning from the top 
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floor to the ground floor. The researcher used the lift to reach the top floor and walked 
down through the corridors and escape stairs.  
At present there is no quantitative method of assessing the adequacy of any escape route 
provided in buildings other than by empirical means. The current method of providing 
means of escape from buildings is by specification and rules, i.e. rules that have evolved 
through time and are deemed to provide a satisfactory escape route (Shields & Silcock, 
1989). Therefore a qualitative method of assessing the adequacy of provision and 
condition of escape routes in high-rise residential buildings has been chosen. In this 
regard, a number of tasks are involved i.e. taking evidence such as photos, measuring 
structure dimensions, examining the condition of the building elements, checking the 
compliance against the specifications, etc. All data were then analysed, i.e. all photos, 
measured escape routes dimensions i.e. corridors, fire doors, staircases, and information 
from the checklist form. The outcome is then categorised based on the issues 
encountered. Categorization of the problems encountered is made based on the principle 
of similarity behaviour analysis i.e. the actual problems are grouped together if they are 
similar in its nature, e.g.: 
(1)  Problem occurs on escape routes structure, for instance, treads constructed shorter 
than the minimum specification, risers exceeded the maximum height permitted, 
corridor designed detached from the occupant flats and so forth. Because those 
problems are mainly related to the building elements, then they are categorised as 
problems regarding the Structural Design and Construction.  
(2)  Problem occurs related to the provision of services to the occupants e.g. no artificial 
lightings, no emergency lighting, ventilation insufficient and so forth. They then are 
categorised as a problem related to Facilities for Fire Safety in Buildings.  
The same analysis techniques are applied to the rest of the problems by listing them out in 
a table and rearranged to form a problem encountered as in table 5.1 which can be found 
at the end of this chapter. 
5.3 Categorisation of issues encountered 
Fire safety issues in residential buildings have not been given appropriate attention even 
though statistics show a large number of fires occur in residential buildings compared to 
the other types of buildings (Bomba, 2001). From the observations, among the issues 
encountered is the trend in Malaysia of installing extra safety precautions in the form of 
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an iron grill, which, besides providing security against intruders, created an additional 
obstacle for occupants in the event of fire. Escape stairs were blocked with unwanted 
material dumped by irresponsible tenants. Some staircases did not comply with the 
minimum requirement. Illumination systems and ventilation systems were insufficiently 
installed or maintained. Fire doors were insufficiently maintained. Fire doors were locked 
from the other side by irresponsible tenants. Fire suppression systems were insufficiently 
maintained, etc. Using similarity analysis behaviour, i.e. all the problems encountered are 
grouped together if they are similar in nature, those problem can be summarised into five 
categories as follows: 
i. Structural designs and constructions 
ii. Facilities for fire safety in buildings 
iii. Maintenance 
iv. Attitudes 
v. Management 
However, there are several others factors that are equally important which would be able 
to impede the evacuation process. Those factors not only potentially impede the 
evacuation processes, but could increase the risk of casualty or could severely jeopardise 
the occupants’ life in building fires. Those factors are: 
i. Lack of facilities for disabled people to evacuate from the building. 
ii. No alternative escape route provided in the building. 
iii. No fire-fighting lift provided. 
iv. Difficulty to identify the location of egress due to unfamiliarity with the building 
environment, this factor is applicable to particularly new tenants. 
v. The size and shape of escape route. 
vi. The numbers of people occupying the building at one particular time exceeding 
the maximum number permitted. 
vii. Difficulty in finding the exact location of escape stairs due to unclear or no exit 
signage. 
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It is very important to address that in order to achieve one of the fire safety objectives in 
building i.e. human protection or life safety in the event of fire, those encountered factors 
should be immediately rectified once discovered. An appropriate measure needs to be put 
in place, such as regular checking, enforcement by the relevant authority, proper 
maintenance, etc.  
5.4 Some important issues in evacuation processes 
The cause of fire cannot be completely eliminated (Mehaffey, 1987a). Even though the 
potential for being killed or injured in a building fire cannot be completely eliminated, if 
the design of the building from the early stage was seriously considered, the 
consequences of fire threat would be minimised by optimising the resources available. 
However, fire safety in a building can be achieved through proven building design 
features intended to minimize the risk of harm to people from fire to the greatest extent 
possible (CWC, 2000). If sufficient data is available and analysis has been made to 
identify the top most risks associated with people in residential buildings during 
evacuation processes, probably the casualties and death of people in building fire can be 
eliminated. So what we should stress here is the ability of people to evacuate from the 
building in a case of fire. Time is becoming the determining factor in life safety during 
building fires. The faster occupants are evacuated from the building the greater the chance 
of saving their lives.  
The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA, 2000) has developed a basic approach 
to minimise fire risk called Fire Safety Concepts Tree (FSCT). FSCT was derived to 
achieve the fire safety objectives, first for life safety and second for structural protection. 
Among measures that can be applied to achieve the fire objectives are prevention of fire 
ignition, providing the means of detection, equipping with fire extinguishing equipment, 
preventing fire from spreading to the other parts of building and allowing time for people 
to evacuate from the building. Life safety is also influenced by the knowledge and 
experience that people have about the fire and fire spreading in buildings. With 
understanding of the fire behaviour and fire characteristics, casualties can probably be 
reduced if appropriate measures have been taken when evacuating from the building. In 
the real world do these measures i.e. managing the fire and managing the fire impact as 
suggested by FSCT implied in high-rise residential buildings exist? The following section 
will discuss the findings from the observations. 
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5.5 Problem encountered in high-rise residential buildings. 
The research findings generalised here is not referring to a specific building but rather 
generalise to avoid a certain degree of sensitivity that could arise. From the twelve 
buildings observed, it can be concluded that there are eight scenarios of internal building 
circulation designs used as escape routes in high-rise residential buildings. Those 
scenarios have been discussed in chapter 4. From the research point of view, generalising 
research finding using this approach will not decrease the validity and credibility of the 
research because data analysed was the real data from the field work study. There are a 
number of evacuation issues in high-rise residential buildings pertaining to structural 
designs that could pose a danger to building occupants if fire breaks out. Issues in fire 
safety, particularly issues of fire safety in residential buildings, have not been addressed 
as it supposed which it would able to create a “chain reaction” of residents awareness. 
Unlike the issues of fire safety at the place of work, issues in residential building are only 
discussed if there is a fire tragedy that claimed lives. Many say that to control fire in 
buildings we should control it at the source of fire. Many believe the philosophy that 
prevention is better than cure. I do believe to the same philosophy too, but in fire safety, 
one should take both measures to prevent and cure.  
Difficulties in escaping from building in a fire event are largely due to several factors as 
mentioned in section 5.3 above. Those factors have a potential to increase the risks of 
injury or kill if the problems encountered remain as they are without taking any 
appropriate measures to rectify those problems as soon as possible. The following section 
will discuss the problems encountered in high-rise residential buildings. 
5.5.1 Structural design and construction. 
Structural design and construction regarding the provision of egress route from the 
buildings is one of the key problems categorised. It includes the internal circulation for 
horizontal escape and staircases for vertical escape. There are four components identified 
i.e. (1) no alternative escape stairs provided, (2) staircases specifications do not comply 
with minimum requirement, (4) corridor designed and orientation, and (4) fire doors do 
not fitted at the storey exit. 
i. No alternative escape stairs provided. 
An alternative escape stair and/or alternative egress should be provided in high-rise 
residential buildings. According to the UBBL a single staircase may be permitted in any 
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building, the top most floor of which does not exceed 12 meters in height (clause 194). In 
any other high-rise building means of egress must be via at least two separate staircases 
(clause 168). If windows are provided, the size of escape window situated in an external 
wall should be at least 0.33m2 and at least 450mm high and 450mm wide. The bottom of 
the openable area should be not more than 1100 mm above the floor (BR, UK). However 
in high-rise buildings i.e. building more that ten storeys to use windows as an alternative 
to escape from the building fire is impractical because there is no rescue ladder that can 
reach high enough to save the occupants. It may be practical for low rise buildings i.e. 
one or two storeys building. Therefore, it is important to have an alternative escape 
staircase in high-rise residential buildings. This is to ensure that occupants are provided 
with an alternative to escape if fire or smoke spread into the other staircase. Furthermore, 
we can not just rely on only one staircase to evacuate all occupants out from high 
occupation buildings. If a large number of occupants want to evacuate at the same time 
from a high-rise residential building, it can cause congestion and will increase tension 
among the people. Evacuation time will be longer than expected. 
There are two locations at the staircase where congestion always occurs, (1) at the 
intermediate floor where occupants have to make a ‘U’ turn to enter the next staircase, 
and (2) at the entry point where occupants from the above floor meet with the occupants 
from the lower floor (Figure 5.1). This will slow down the movement of people and 
increase the evacuation time. If too many people want to evacuate at the same time, they 
would cause congestion at the staircase. The worst scenario is if panicking people start 
pushing others, which may result in some people falling down and impeding the 
evacuation process. 
Other factors of equal importance are people characteristics such as age, body size, 
gender, and health condition. These factors apparently will slow down the occupants’ 
walking speed especially if the number of people involved is large. Close relatives 
normally will try to carry down the mobility impeded person e.g. walking disability, old 
people, sick people etc. during emergency situation. These will definitely slowdown the 
occupants walking speed. Therefore either an alternative escape stair is essential for high-
rise residential buildings or they are allowed to use a fire lift (if provided) to evacuate the 
building. This can reduce the risk of congestion at the escape stairs. 
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Figure 5.1: Location where congestion always occurred during evacuation 
ii.  Staircase specifications do not comply with the minimum requirement. 
There are three problems encountered in staircase specifications i.e. tread, riser and 
intermediate floor dimension that did not comply with the requirement of the By-Laws. In 
some staircases observed, the tread dimension was shorter than the minimum 
requirement. Figure 5.2 (a) is an example of the staircase poorly designed and constructed 
whilst not only both tread and riser did not comply with the requirement, but every 
staircase steps itself is not equal, even in terms of tread and riser dimensions. Figure 5.2 
(b) and (c) are examples of tread and riser dimensions that did not comply with the 
requirement. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 5.2: (a) Staircase view; tread and riser dimension is about the same size. (b) Tread 
dimension is only about 7 feet (185mm), whilst minimum requirement is 
225mm at least. (c) Riser dimension is about 200mm, whilst maximum 
dimension should not exceed 180mm. 
Another aspect is staircase width and intermediate floor depth designed and constructed at 
different dimensions. They should be designed and constructed at the same dimension as 
requested by the By-Laws. Clause 168 (4) By-Laws said that the depth of landings shall 
be not less than the width of the staircase. This specification is applied to the intermediate 
floor or landing floor between the staircases as well. In clause 108 (1), for residential 
buildings, a landing of not less than 1800 mm in depth shall be provided in staircases at 
vertical intervals of not more than 4250 mm. In figure 5.3 (a) and (b), the staircase width 
and intermediate floor depth were not equal. Intermediate floor depth was designed and 
constructed at 840 mm whilst staircase width was designed and constructed at 990mm. 
The risk for this design is that traffic flows could be interrupted when occupants want to 
change their direction to the next staircase. This ‘bottle neck’ designed should be avoided. 
It will be worse if a fireman has to access the building using the same staircase and at 
same time occupants are evacuating the building. 
 
- 138 -
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.3: (a) Staircase width from wall to the handrail is about 3 ft 3 inch. (990). (b) 
Intermediate floor depth is about 2 ft 9 inches. Those dimension should be 
uniform i.e. staircase width and intermediate floor depth must be equalled. 
iii. Corridor design and orientation. 
Corridor design and orientation in a high-rise building is very important and should be 
done properly because wrong design could cause the occupants to be trapped in the event 
of fire. It is very common that corridors are designed according to the shape of the 
buildings and the orientation of the flats. Whatever design and orientation of internal 
circulation, it should not encourage the occupants to take unfair advantage of it. Figure 
5.4 is an example of where the flat’s owner misused the public area provided in one of the 
buildings observed. Public areas are illegally occupied by built-up wall and grilled 
beyond the premises boundary.  
There are cases where some of the flat owners completely grilled the area for their private 
use. These scenarios happened because the corridor was designed as an open space (see 
figure 4.11). It has given the owners the chance to abuse the situation. Furthermore, lack 
of enforcement from the relevant authority has caused this misbehavior to remain as it is. 
The risk will be to those who live at the same level with the flats in figure 5.4 (c). They 
are denied access to the escape stair in the event of fire. Furthermore, rescuers will face 
difficulties to access this level due to these circumstances. The flat owners are allowed to 
put on grill at their main door for security purposes, but a built-up iron grill to form a 
private compartment in the public area is obviously trespassing on the public area. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 5.4: (a) The original look of internal 
circulation where fire door 
unobstructed.  
 (b) The flat owner has put up 
wall, grilled and tiled the 
floor as a private space.  
 (c) The flat owner put on a grill 
extended beyond his 
premises. This public area is 
illegally occupied. 
 
 
(c) 
 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.5: (a) Original appearance of corridor to access four flats from the lifts lobby. 
 (b) Shows two flats and another two flats opposite them. 
Another example of the flat owner abusing the public area is shown in figures 5.6 and 5.7. 
The building in figure 5.5 is designed with eight flats, where four flats are located at each 
end of the corridor. The lift lobby is located at the middle of the corridor (see figure 5.5 
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(a)) and both ends of the corridor are designed with two flats located side-by-side and 
another two opposite them (see figure 5.5 (b)). There are three escape stairs provided, one 
at each end of the corridor and another one is beside the lift at the middle of the corridor. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
(c) (d) 
Figure 5.6: (a) Shows the location of escape stair. 
 (b) Corridor views from the other end. 
 (c) Flat owner has put up grill in front of his premises on the public area. 
 (d) Stainless steel compartment grill in front of flat in the same building. 
Figure 5.6 (d) shows the whole corridor view from the other end. This beautiful and 
finely finished building is spoiled by some flat owner who has built up a private 
compartment at the public areas (see figure 5.6 (c) and (d)) for their personal use. Very 
strong and expensive materials used for the grill (stainless steel) reflect a good economic 
status, but demonstrate the selfishness of those who practised this misbehaviour. 
The same situation seems to have occurred in the building in figure 5.7 (a) and (b). The 
only difference is that they put up an iron grill instead of stainless steel. To put up a grill 
at one’s own main door is allowed, but to put up a grill that can restrict access to a public 
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area should be avoided. Furthermore it blocks the only available opening at this level. The 
risk is to those who are unable to use the escape stair due to certain circumstances, i.e. 
smoke and fire spread into the stairwell, escape using this opening, with the help of fire 
brigade ladder from the outside, would face with difficulty. 
Figure 4.5 in chapter 4 page 91 is a good example of corridor design. Space orientation in 
this design is fully utilized by the public and it reduces the possibility of being abused. 
This open-sided corridor design with emergency staircases located at both ends and 
another two staircases located at the angle of the ‘U’ shape are fully utilized by the 
occupants as a main access to their flats. Therefore, there is no way it can be transformed 
to be a private space. On the other hand, with four alternative escape stairs provided, the 
occupants are given more opportunity to choose the way out at their own convenience and 
reduce the probability of being trapped in the event of fire. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.7: (a) and (b) Flat owners put grill in corridor 
An enclosed corridor as in figure 4.11 is good for fire compartmentation, which besides 
effectively restricting the smoke and fire spreading, also limits the occupant’s ability to 
abuse the space provided. Fire compartmentation is good to limit fire and smoke from 
spreading into sensitive areas, but the risk will be for those who stay in the same 
compartment of fire origin i.e. four flats clustered at the left and the right wings of the lift 
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facility. If a fire broke out in one of those flats, and if the main door was not designed 
according to the fire door specifications, smoke could fill up the entire compartment area 
and would pose a danger to other flat’s occupants to rescue themselves.  
Figure 4.7 and 4.9 show an enclosed foyer corridor type of internal circulation design. 
From a fire safety point of view, this type of design is not very good if ventilation systems 
are insufficiently installed. This is because the enclosed foyer could create a smoke trap 
in the event of fire. Smoke is a major cause of fatality in fire. This design may be good 
for a social event, but it might be abused by irresponsible people who might put up a grill 
to form a compartment in front of their main door for private use.  
There are two types of corridor in the buildings observed which in the researcher’s 
opinion are quite unique but risky. Figure 4.13 and 4.14 show the corridor designed as a 
bridge located between two apartment blocks with an air bridge connecting the corridor to 
the flat as a passageway. This design will not allow windows to be used to escape in 
emergency situation. The main door is the only way for the occupants to exit from their 
flats. Risk is high to those whose flat has caught fire and the flat which is sharing the 
same air bridge. Another design is as in figure 4.23 and 4.24 where the corridor is 
attached to one block and the other block is connected with air bridges to serve two flats 
each. High risk is to the flats connected with the air bridge where the only way for them 
to evacuate is using the main door. Windows can not be used as an alternative to evacuate 
because there is no place for them to step-on, unlike those who stay in the block of which 
where the corridor is attached. 
An example of a good corridor and internal circulation area is in figure 4.17, 4.20 and 
4.22. The building in figure 4.17 is designed with two lifts and two escape stairs located 
in the middle between the two residential blocks which has created a fire barrier if fire 
broke out. All occupants can easily access the escape stairs or lifts. The only problem is 
there is no fire door at the staircase shaft. In contrast the building in figure 4.18, has a 
corridor which is designed and constructed at a good location but the escape stairs are 
designed with only one accessible way, i.e. only one side opening without fire door. It 
could pose a difficulty to the occupants to evacuate the building in the event of fire. The 
buildings in figure 4.20 and 4.22 are built with two corridors attached to each of the 
residential block. This open-sided corridor has air bridges connected to those corridors. 
This interlink air bridge is good for the occupants to crossover to the other corridor if they 
have difficulty to reach the escape stairs from their side. Furthermore, there are two 
escape stairs and two passenger lifts provided at ends of the both corridors.  
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iv. No fire doors at the storey exit 
Section VII, clause 162 part (1) By-Laws states that “fire doors of the appropriate Fire 
Resistance Period (FRP)3 shall be provided” and part (2) stated that “openings in 
compartment walls and separating walls shall be protected by a fire door having a FRP in 
accordance with the requirements for that wall specified in the Ninth Schedule to these 
By-laws”. Meanwhile part (3) stated that “Openings in protecting structures shall be 
protected by fire doors having FRP of not less than half the requirement for the 
surrounding wall specified in the Ninth Schedule to these By-laws but in no case less than 
half hour”. It means that fire doors must be at least 30 minutes FRP in most of the cases 
for the buildings provide with an alternative escape stairs. If only a single staircase is 
provided, FRP must be at least one hour and the height of the building must be not more 
than 12 meters as stated in clause 194 in By-Laws. 
Some of the buildings observed do not have any fire door at the storey exit as in figure 
5.8 (a), (b), (c), (d), and (f). This would cause a problem in the event of fire where smoke 
can easily penetrate into the staircase and would impede the evacuation process. 
Therefore fire doors should be properly installed in all escape stairs as requested by the 
By-Laws. From the observations, the researcher found that those staircases that were not 
installed with fire doors are designed with large opening for ventilation and natural 
lighting purposes (see figure 5.8 (b), (c) and (f)). This is probably because of By-Laws 
162 said “openings in compartment walls…”, those staircases are designed with a wide 
opening for natural lighting purposes. However, figure 5.9 (a) and (b) shows the escape 
stairs designed without fire doors and both are located in an enclosed compartment with 
glass windows for daylight purposes. This design can create a problem where smoke can 
enter the stair shaft and jeopardise the occupants during evacuation processes in the event 
of fire. Both staircase shafts are provided with glass windows for natural lighting systems. 
                                                 
3 FRP means fire resistance period as specified in the Nine Schedule of UBBL 1984 that the minimum fire 
resistance for any structure elements which being a part of the ground floor and any storey above then if the 
floor area is not exceeded 3000 m2, 60 minutes FRP is needed for all compartmentation floors and 30 
minutes for non compartmentation floors. 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 5.8: (a), (b), are staircases without fire door. 
 
(c) (d) 
 
(e) (f) 
Figure 5.8: (c), (d), and (f) are staircases without fire door. (e) Type of fire door should 
be fitted to those staircases.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.9: (a) Staircase in ‘compartment wall’ with narrow entrance designed and 
without fire door (b) Wide opening designed for ‘compartment wall’  
5.5.2 Facilities for fire safety in the building. 
i.  Insufficient Smoke Control System. 
Every escape route and escape stair should be installed with a smoke control system to 
ensure the smoke is prevented from entering those places. Smoke control by means of a 
mechanical control system such as a pressurization system or smoke extraction system is 
compulsory by the regulation for the buildings or any compartment wall designed without 
a window. Most of the buildings observed are equipped with natural smoke ventilation 
system by means of permanent opening in stairwell for air circulation as in figure 5.10 
(a), (b), (c) and (d). None of the buildings are equipped with mechanical smoke control 
system by any means.  
Some of the buildings observed used the window as a smoke vent, as in Figure 5.11. 
However, some of them are insufficiently large (when fully open because some of them 
are tied up with a security plat limiting the opening for some reason) to allow smoke to 
pass through them because the size of opening was not as specified in the building 
regulation (see figure 5.11 (b), (c), and (d)). The minimum combined clear cross-sectional 
area of all smoke outlets should not be less than 1/40th of the floor area of the storey they 
served as stated in the Building Regulation (BR (UK), 2000). In the By-Laws (Malaysia) 
clause 200 (a) stated that the opening of not less than 5% of the floor area of the enclosure 
should be provided or mechanical pressurisation system should be installed. In clause 202 
state that ‘all staircases serving buildings of more than 45.75 metres in height where 
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there is no adequate ventilation as required shall be provided with a basic system of 
pressurization’.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5.10: Opening for natural ventilation and day-light designed in staircase shafts.  
Clause 198 stated that ‘all staircases enclosures shall be ventilated at each floor or 
landing level by either permanent opening or openable windows to the open air having a 
free area of not less than 1 square meter per floor were not achieved’. 
Smoke produced by fires can kill in a minute especially if the materials burnt contain 
highly toxic substances. Smoke and toxic gases are involved in about 50% of all fire 
fatalities, and are the primary cause of death in over a third of fire cases (Jerome, 1994). 
Smoke consists of small particles of partly burnt carbonaceous materials, gases, water 
vapours, and hot fumes. About 70 – 75% of fire victims succumbed to smoke inhalation 
and this is the cause of the vast majority of fire deaths (Richard, et. al., 2001). The danger 
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of smoke is toxic potency of the smoke which is mainly due to the toxic gases produced 
during the combustion process. If the smoke control systems are insufficiently installed, 
this will be the main lethal effect to the building occupants in building fires. Besides that 
there are sub-lethal effects that could be caused by smoke. The sub-lethal effects of 
smoke on people e.g. disruption in evacuation process, reduced egress speed due to, e.g. 
sensory irritation on eyes or lung, heat or radiation injury, and visual obscuration, 
tendency to choose a long egress path due to, e.g. decreased mental acuity, visual 
obstruction, etc. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5.11: Window type natural smoke vents 
ii.  Ventilation system insufficiently installed. 
Most of the observed buildings were designed with natural ventilation systems by means 
of permanent opening and some are using either air brick ventilation systems fitted on the 
wall of escape stairs or just using a window for ventilation. Figure 5.10 and 5.11 shows 
permanent opening of air brick ventilation and window type ventilation systems 
respectively. Those stairwells constructed with permanent openings and air brick 
ventilation systems are fine, provided that there are fire doors fitted, because if there are 
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no fire doors, it will pose a danger to the occupants because smoke could enter the escape 
stairs due to pressure created in the staircase shaft caused by the wind.  
(a) 
(b) 
(c)  
(d) 
Figure 5.12:  (a) Enclosed staircase shaft without opening and lighting system. (b) and 
(c) staircase shafts without opening for ventilation, (d) Example of staircase 
shaft with permanent opening at every intermediate floor. 
For window type ventilation, there might be a problem because those windows have not 
installed with automatic window opening devices. In the event of fire, smoke entering the 
staircase shaft would be trapped inside and would pose a deadly risk to the evacuees. 
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Some of the windows are closed and locked from inside. They are probably intended for 
day-lighting and not for the ventilation. Someone has to open it manually for ventilation 
to occur. In the event of fire, everyone is expected to be very busy with the evacuation 
and to save some possessions instead of opening the locked windows for ventilation. 
In all residential buildings observed, it was found that none of them were fitted with a 
mechanical ventilation system in any enclosed escape routes. According to the By-Laws, 
they should be provided with an automatic opening ventilator or ventilators operated by 
smoke control for an enclosed escape stair where the aggregate opening area is at least 1 
m2. Mechanical ventilation needs to be provided if there is no adequate natural ventilation 
in any high-rise building staircase shaft as stated in the By-Laws clause 202. 
iii.  Illumination systems are not properly installed 
In some buildings observed the illumination systems showed a lack of maintenance. 
There are possibilities that vandalism was the cause for these lighting systems being 
broken. Figure 5.13 (a) shows a broken lighting system which needs to be changed for a 
new one. The lighting casing is about to fall down and there is no bulb in it. The reason 
why there is no bulb in it is not known. There are a few possibilities i.e. (1) The bulb has 
been taken away by an irresponsible tenant in the buildings, (2) The management does 
not have enough stock to put it back after the lamp has been removed. (3) There was no 
lamp fitted in the first place. 
Close examination of the picture in figure 5.13 (a) shows a black spot on the ceiling, 
which shows that the lighting system has been used for quite some time. The black spot is 
caused by the heat produced from the ballast while the lamp is on. Therefore the 
possibility number (3) is invalid.  
In another building observed it was found that one of the staircases was not fitted with a 
lighting system. It left the staircase in absolute darkness during the night time. The only 
source of light is a small air vent fitted on the right staircase shaft near to the ceiling. This 
mistake was probably due to the carelessness in lighting design by the electrical engineer 
or during construction by the contractor. The project manager has a responsibility to 
check and issues a variation order to rectify the problem during the construction period on 
behalf of the client. Figure 5.13 (c) shows that this staircase provided with both electric 
lighting and emergency lighting systems. However the bulb cover on the lighting casing 
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is missing. Figure 5.13 (d) shows a complete lighting system with the emergency lighting 
provided in one of the staircases observed. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
(c) (d) 
Figure 5.13 : (a) Broken lamp in one of the staircase shaft. (b) There is no lighting 
system installed in this enclosed staircase. Staircase is completely dark 
during the night time. (c) Both artificial lighting and emergency lighting 
systems provided but lighting cover is missing. (d) Example of complete 
lighting systems which every staircase should have them. 
iv. No Exit Signage. 
In some of the high-rise residential buildings observed, there were no exit signs posted to 
show the way out or to lead the occupants to the escape stairs. In the By-Laws part VII 
clause 172, sub-clause (1) states that “Storey exits and access to such exits shall be 
marked by readily visible signs and shall not be obscured by any decorations, furnishings 
or other equipment” and sub-clause (2) stated that “A sign reading "KELUAR" with an 
arrow indicating the direction shall be placed in every location where the direction of 
travel to reach the nearest exit is not immediately apparent”. There are some posted 
“KELUAR” signages at the storey exit (See figure 5.8 (a) and (b)) but there are still many 
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buildings that did not have any signage to indicate the egress route. There will be 
problems for the person who is not really familiar with the building environment or to the 
first time visitors. In case of emergency, those people might not know the nearest escape 
stairs and this could pose a danger to them. Meanwhile sub-clause (3) states that “Every 
exit sign shall have the word "KELUAR" in plainly legible letters not less than 150 
millimetres high with the principal strokes of the letters not less than 18 millimetres wide. 
The lettering shall be in red against a black background” and sub-clause (4) states “All 
exit signs shall be illuminated continuously during periods of occupancy.”  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c)  
(d) 
Figure 5.14: (a) Exit signage about to fall down, (b) Corridor and staircase without any 
exit signage, (c) No exit signage at staircase, (d) Exit sign in white lettering 
with green background. 
Even though there are exit signs posted at the storey exit, they are not specified as in sub-
clause 3 i.e. the lettering shall be in red against a black background (see figure 5.9 (a) and 
(b), and figure 5.14 (a) and (d)). Those exit signs are white lettering with a green 
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background and not illuminated at all times. Example of Illuminated exit signage is as in 
figure 5.15 (a). However there are buildings which posted exit signage exactly as 
specified in sub-clause (3) as in figure 5.15 (b). However the use of white lettering with 
the green background is stated in Malaysian Standard (MS982) i.e. the specifications for 
fire safety sign, notice and graphic symbols for fire exit or emergency exit must be 
written in white lettering against a green background and shall be illuminated throughout 
the usage of the buildings.  
Figure 5.13 (a) shows KELUAR sign that it is about to fall down from the ceiling though 
lack of maintenance. If it fell down and at the same time as there are people walking 
underneath, it could result in casualty or death. 
Regarding the sign lettering colour and background used is a secondary issue. As long as 
people understand the purpose of it existence, that is sufficient. Therefore the existing By-
Laws should be emended to make it relevant with the current practice or Malaysian 
Standard which is more current than the By-Laws. If not, enforcements by the relevant 
authorities are needed to ensure all rules and regulations are followed. Figure 5.15 (a) and 
(b) comprise both scenarios i.e. KELUAR sign as discussed above. KELUAR sign in 
figure 5.15 (a) is more appropriate to be used because in the event of fire, smoke might 
enter the corridor. If a black background is used for the exit sign, there is not enough 
contrast. However the sign must have pictograms employing the running man, an open 
door, and directional arrows. These pictograms may be augmented by the text signs, but 
text only signs are no longer acceptable on their own. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.15 (a) Illuminated KELUAR sign of white lettering with green background 
 (b) KELUAR sign of red lettering with black background 
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5.5.3 Maintenance 
Regular maintenance is very important. Whatever maintenance systems they want to use 
are a secondary issue. The main issue is maintenance should be done to ensure that all 
building elements and services equipment are in place and ready to be used when needed.  
i. Fire suppression systems insufficiently maintained. 
Regular maintenance is essential to ensure all fire suppression systems are ready to use 
when needed. There are three types of fire suppression system commonly provided in the 
high-rise residential building i.e. portable fire extinguisher, dry riser or wet riser systems. 
From the observations, it is found that fire suppression systems like dry riser, have a 
problem at a component called inlet breaching, used to connect the system to the fire 
engine for water supply to the entire building. The inlet breaching is normally located at 
the ground floor either with two or four water intake valves. The usual problem was either 
this inlet breeching was broken or blocked with something due to vandalism.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 5.16: (a) Fire suppression systems i.e. hose reel, hose cradle, portable fire 
extinguisher and wet riser with landing valve fitted on it.  
 (b) Only dry riser left without landing valve and canvas hose dumped. 
 (c) Compartment to put fire suppression systems has been turned in to a 
cleaner’s cupboard. 
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ii. Lighting system insufficiently maintained. 
The illumination system is a very important feature in escape route (corridors or similar) 
and escape stairs. The escape stair is a part of the escape route by definition, that it is part 
of a vertical evacuation process. Even though there is a lighting system installed in the 
escape route, the location was either on the wall near to the ceiling or on the ceiling. 
Some of the lighting systems are not sufficiently maintained as in figure 5.13 (a) and (b). 
In the building observed, most of the lighting in the corridor was installed on the ceiling. 
When fire breaks out, smoke will fill up the upper part of the corridor and gradually 
spread downwards until the entire area is filled up with smoke. This will restrict the light 
from reaching the floor and poses a difficulty to the evacuees to see during the evacuation 
especially at night. Visual incapability will definitely reduce the walking speed in the 
evacuation process. Therefore sufficient lighting system in the escape routes needs to be 
assured during periods of occupancy. Alternatively an illuminated strip applied on the 
floor along the evacuation path and/or on the wall near to the floor edge will be able to 
provide a sufficient guide to the escape stairs.  
iii. Fire doors insufficiently maintained 
(a) (b) 
Figure 5.17:  (a) Broken fire door lied down on the floor. 
 (b) Missing fire door  
There are a number of cases where fire doors in high-rise residential buildings observed 
were broken. Some of them were left on the floor and others left in the stairwell. Those 
broken doors if not replaced will pose a significantly high risk to the building’s occupants 
in the event of fire. Smoke containing fatal substances which can kill if exposed over 
certain time periods (depending on the degree of toxicity) can penetrate into those escape 
stairs with broken fire doors. The reasons why those fire doors are broken are unknown. 
There are two possibilities that might have caused this to happen i.e. aging or vandalism. 
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Figure 5.17 (a) shows the broken fire door left on the floor. Figure 5.17 (b) shows broken 
fire door laid against the wall with the top cover of the door hanging down. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.18:  (a) and (b) Show fire doors with a broken automatic door closer device 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.19: (a) One of the door hinge screws loose, causing the door to stick on the 
floor. 
 (b) One of the door hinges went missing, causing the door to stick on the 
floor. 
Figure 5.18 (a) and (b) show fire doors with broken automatic door closer devices. It has 
caused these doors to hardly open because the broken door closer devices prevent the 
door from being open. Friction between the door leaf and the broken automatic closer 
(see figure 5.18 (b)) has caused the defect on the door. A certain amount of force is 
needed to push the door open. It defeats the purpose of having an automatic door closer 
when the door is hard to open and when opened remains so.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
(c) 
Figure 5.20:   
(a)  Fire door with missing doorknob. 
(b)  Type of doorknob supposed to be on the 
door. 
(c)  Other door with missing doorknob. 
(d)  Door with missing doorknob too. 
 
 
(d) 
There were a few cases where door hinge screws were loosed and caused the door to stick 
on the floor. Another case is a door hinge missing and the door left hanging on two hinges 
instead of three. It has caused the door to be unbalanced and stick on the floor (see figure 
5.19 (a) and (b)). We need to push the door to open or to close it. This may pose a 
significantly higher risk to the building’s occupants if fire breaks out. The consequences 
of the door being unable to close properly is that smoke can go in into the stairwell, and 
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occupants may be trapped, traffic congestion, etc. A possible result of those consequences 
is fatality or injury to those living in these buildings. 
Another problem related to lack of fire door maintenance is a missing doorknob. The 
reason why a number of fire doors were missing their doorknob is unclear. Observing the 
condition of the doorknob hole, it seems that it has been removed by someone knew how 
to do it because the hole is undamaged. It might have been removed on purpose. Figure 
5.20 (a), (c), and (d) show examples of those fire door with the doorknob missing. Figure 
5.20 (b) shows the type of doorknob supposed to be on it. This type of doorknob is 
similar to the one used in the residential flats in the same building.  
There is significantly high risk associated with having a fire door in this condition where 
it defeats the purpose of the fire door. It is unable to serve as a smoke barrier as it is 
supposed to because smoke can penetrate through the open hole and the door itself can 
not be properly closed, hence, smoke and heat easily enter the escape stairs.  
iv. Staircase insufficiently maintained 
Good condition of escape stairs is very important in evacuation process. Therefore all 
escape stairs need to be maintained in a reasonably good condition and safe to be used at 
all times. There are five main components of staircase design i.e. tread, riser, intermediate 
floor, landing floor and handrail, and it is necessary to keep them in a reasonably good 
condition. If not, risk of casualty is high to those who use them, especially in emergency 
situations where everybody is in a hurry to evacuate the building. Among the casualties or 
fatal accidents that could happen are people falling down from the staircase.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.21:    (a) Staircase with broken tread nose. 
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 (b) Hole on staircase step. 
(c) (d) 
Figure 5.21:  (c) Staircase with broken handrail. 
 (d) Staircase with missing balustrade guards. 
 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Figure 5.22: (a) Uneven staircase tread 
and rise 
 (b) Defect on the emergency 
metal staircase. 
 (c) Broken tread nose. 
 
The most common problem is as in figure 5.21 i.e. tread nose broken, hole on tread, 
broken handrail, balustrade safety guards, etc. There are cases of poor staircase 
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workmanship where the staircase is constructed unevenly as in figure 5.22 (a). 
Furthermore, if it was not built according to the specification ruled out in Building 
Regulation i.e. tread dimension less that 255mm and some steps rise more than 180mm.  
Lack of maintenance on the staircase could result in a significantly higher risk of people 
falling down during the evacuation process, especially when a large number of people are 
evacuating the building at the same time. 
Some of the buildings are provided with metal emergency staircases. The main problem 
with a metal staircase is rust which has caused the staircase to be seriously corroded (see 
figure 5.22 (b)). In the tropical climate, with high moisture, metal is inevitably corroded if 
maintenance is not regularly completed. 
5.5.4 Attitude of people. 
There are two things associated with the people’s attitude i.e. good or bad. Good attitudes 
will normally result in a good outcome. In contrast is a bad attitude. Bad attitudes of 
people, when living in high-rise residential buildings, can create problems and jeopardise 
the safety of others. Among the behaviour that can be considered as bad attitudes are 
selfishness, insensitivity to the environment, abuse, vandalism, etc. This misbehaviour 
can create obstructions in escape route of different sorts. Among the interruptions in the 
evacuation process that may be caused by attitudes of people are obstacles in escape 
route, dumping rubbish in escape stairs, purposely denying access to escape stairs and 
vandalism. 
i. Obstacles in escape route. 
All escape routes should be cleared from any form of obstacles or any obstructions that 
can delay the evacuation process. Escape routes in high-rise residential buildings consist 
of corridors, passageways, staircases, lobbies, internal circulation areas for the occupants 
to access their flats, etc. Those components must be clear from any form of obstruction 
such as iron grills, items stored in passageway or corridors, dumping rubbish, etc. If these 
things happen, it will significantly impede the evacuation process.  
The outcome if evacuation process is interrupted is increased the risk of being trapped if 
fire breaks out. The result could be human casualty or fatal injury. This will be 
catastrophic to those involved in fire tragedy. Figure 5.23 shows one of the residential 
flats fitted with double locks (padlocks) an iron grill at the main door. A very common 
iron grill fitted at the main door of every residential flat is as in figure 5.23 (b). In 
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addition to being an extra security measure, it creates an unnecessary obstacle and 
increase the risk of been trapped in the event of fire. There is a case where five members 
of a family perished in a fire because they were trapped inside their flat in a fire tragedy4. 
Neighbours of the affected family attempted to rescue them but were unable to break 
through because of a securely locked grill fitted at the main door. When the fire brigade 
arrived at the scene, it was too late (NST, 2001).  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5.23: (a) Double lock iron grill, (b) Iron grill fitted at the main doors, (c) Items 
placed in corridor, (d) Iron grill built-up beyond the property limit. 
Obstruction to the evacuation process can happen if occupants put some of their items in 
escape routes. Figure 5.23 (c) shows some occupant’s belongings stored in a corridor 
outside his flat. Figure 5.24 (a) and (b) show a bicycle, a motorcycle and furniture placed 
in a stairwell and corridor respectively.  
                                                 
4 Reported in The News Straits Times 15th January 2001 i.e. five family members perished in a pre-dawn 
fire occurred on Sunday 14th January 2001 at City Hall’s Sri Kelantan Flats in Sentul, Malaysia.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.24: (a) A bicycle placed in stairwell, (b) a motorcycle and furniture placed in 
corridor. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5.25: (a) Flower pots placed in corridor; (b) some flower pots placed in landing 
area of staircase; (c) Some flower pots placed on staircase; (d) Flower 
pots in landing area of staircase. 
Figure 5.25 shows how some of the residents have placed their flower pots in the 
corridor, on the staircase and on a landing floor. To green the earth is good but doing it in 
the wrong place is bad behaviour and uncalled for. Figure 5.26 shows some items left in 
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the stairwell and some stored in the stairwell. Even if this is a temporary measure (i.e. left 
and stored), we can not take for granted that others will never use the staircase because 
lifts have been provided. We do not know when a fire will happen. If it happens, there is a 
significantly high possibility that occupants could be congested in corridors or staircases 
like these. These examples described above can be described as selfish and insensitive to 
the environment.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5.26: (a) Some items left in stairwell; (b), (c) and (d) Occupant’s stored some 
belongings in stairwell.  
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ii. Escape stairs become a rubbish dumping site. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 5.27: (a) Unwanted sofa was dumped in stairwell; (b) Old mattress was dumped in 
stairwell; 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
Figure 5.27: (c) and (d) Rubbish left in stairwell. 
However, there are still cases where unwanted items are dumped in stairwells. Figure 
5.27 shows examples of a few cases which not only embarrassed the whole community of 
the respecting building, but posed a high risk to people of being trapped, injured or a 
fatality if fire breaks out.  
The evacuation process from these buildings is expected to be unnecessarily longer than it 
should be due to the obstructions caused by those items dumped in the escape stairs. 
iii. Access to escape route denied (door locked) 
The worst scenario is when fire doors are locked shut i.e. by padlock, slide-lock or tied-up 
with wire. Figures 5.28 and 5.29 are examples of fire doors fastened with different kinds 
of locking devices from the simplest i.e. tied-up fire door with a wire to the door frame, to 
the strongest i.e. padlock. Some use a slide-lock which can be opened to enter the escape 
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stairs. However, the door can not be opened from the inside of the stairwell. The 
occupants may be able to enter the escape stairs at any time (if it is not fastened with the 
padlock) but rescuers can not access the floor level from the out side unless they are using 
an elevator.  
For the doors fastened with the padlock or permanently tied-up with a wire, access to the 
escape stairs is absolutely denied. There is a significantly high risk to those staying at the 
floor level where those fire doors are fastened with any kind of locking devices. They 
might be trapped in the event of fire because they are facing an unnecessary difficulty to 
evacuate the building because fire doors are locked shut by a selfish person. The clear 
reason why they are locking the fire door is very doubtful because if they want to limit 
accessibility to the floor where they live, people are still able to access by the elevator 
provided in those buildings. 
(a) (b) 
 
(c) (d) 
Figure 5.28: (a) and (c) Fire doors fastened with an unauthorised slide-lock; (b) Fire door 
fastened with a device that can be used to put on a padlock. (d) Fire door is 
firmly tied-up with a wire to the door frame. 
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(a) 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
Figure 5.29: (a) Fire door fastened with a slide-lock; (b) Fire door locked with a padlock; 
(c) Fire door tied-up with a wire to the door frame. 
iv. Vandalism 
New buildings normally are in a very good condition at first, where almost every fire 
safety component and equipment provided is in good working order. Fire doors, active 
fire suppression systems i.e. dry riser or wet riser, portable fire extinguisher, alarm 
systems, etc. are in a very good condition. Over time, once the buildings are occupied and 
a lot of people have moved in, the problems start to arise. Vandalism seems to take place 
where some of the equipment goes missing. Some are deteriorating not because of aging 
but because of vandalism i.e. figure 5.30 where a security metal plate has been removed 
from the door to give way to the locking devices to be illegally installed on the door leaf. 
A door handle i.e. located on the other side of the door, to pull the door to open, has been 
removed too, leaving two empty holes for the screws of the handle. This act of vandalism 
has caused the door to be difficult to pull out from the inside of the stairwell. Furthermore 
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if the door is locked from the outside, any rescue operation i.e. rescuer or fire fighters 
might not be able to access the floor where a fire started.  
 
Figure 5.30: Metal security plate from to avoid any locking devices from been fitted on 
the fire door has been removed by irresponsible person. This vandalism 
action has jeopardised the safety of others. 
Another problem encountered was portable fire extinguishers going missing. Therefore, 
immediate action to put out the fire was not possible. Every floor should have a portable 
fire extinguisher stored near to the storey exit. If there are two storey exits, two portable 
fire extinguishers should be provided.  
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Figure 5.31: Portable fire extinguisher hanging on the wall. 
Normally it will be put together with the other fire suppression system in the same 
cupboard as in figure 5.16 (a). Some may just be hanging on the wall near to the storey 
exit or in the middle of the building (see figure 5.31). Unfortunately, in some of the 
buildings observed, no portable fire extinguisher was provided. According to the 
respective building management, replacements had been made but they went missing 
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again, hence the management had decided to put some portable fire extinguishers in the 
guard room at the main gate. 
 
Figure 5.32: Fire doors have been vandalised by sticking all sorts of advertisements on it. 
Irresponsible persons have turned the fire doors to be a free advertisement 
billboard. 
Figure 5.32 shows advertisement stickers posted on the fire doors. These fire doors have 
been turned into a free billboard for everyone to post their business advertisement and 
turned the fire doors into an ugly surface. Some fire door doorknobs as well have gone 
missing. They probably have been taken out by someone to replace their own and it 
leaves the fire door ineffective to provide a smoke barrier in the event of fire.  
Fire suppression systems as in figure 5.16 (b) and (c) seem to be vandalised and can not 
be used any more. The landing valve for a dry riser system was missing and the hose was 
crumpled on the floor. The building is a high risk if fire breaks out. Existing fire 
suppression systems are not reliable any more and fire fighters have to carry the hose 
connected to a hydrant or fire engine at the ground floor to the place where the fire 
started. 
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5.5.5 Management 
Management issues in managing high-rise residential buildings mainly can be categorised 
into four:  
• Duty and responsibility,  
• Inspection and rectification,  
• Control and enforcement, and 
• Feedback and response.  
Management has a duty and responsibility to ensure the buildings are sound and safe for 
occupant’s at all material times. Therefore they should inspect and rectify all building 
defects, replace or repair every faulty fire safety system and carry out regular 
maintenance as necessary. Control and enforcement needs to be firmly done to ensure that 
no one tries to abuse the situation. However, the management must respond to the 
tenant’s complaints and appropriate measures are been taken upon receiving any feedback 
from the tenants. 
i. Duty and responsibility 
Internal circulation, escape routes i.e. corridors, escape stairs, lifts, lighting, smoke 
control and ventilation systems in circulation area and stairwell and parking facilities, 
public area outside the building and safe assembly area are the responsibility of the 
management to ensure that those are safe to be used at all material times. It becomes a 
duty of the management to maintain those components in relatively good condition and 
satisfy the Director General of Fire Services or the relevant Fire Authority.  
ii. Inspection and rectification 
If inspections have been carried out, any problems which arise can be rectified as soon as 
it been identified. Problems discussed early on the above sub-section could be solved if 
inspection and rectification are carried out. Building defects i.e. holes on tread, tread nose 
broken, handrail and balustrade guard missing, fire door locked, etc. will not be any 
problem any more. An inspection officer needs to be assigned to carry out an inspection 
on all the buildings under the same management. Alternatively, management can appoint 
a building audit firm to carry out an audit and report every year. By doing a building 
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audit, recent data about the building and its condition can be updated, scheduled 
maintenance can be planned, budget can be allocated, building standard quality can be 
achieved, safety of people can be assured, corporate image can be maintained, etc. 
iii. Control and enforcement 
Some of the problems are caused by the people. Appropriate control measures need to be 
firmly taken and put in place. Any unauthorised modification on any building element i.e. 
extended iron grill beyond premises, illegal locking devices on fire doors, using fire 
safety cupboard as a cleaner cupboard, etc. have to be stopped immediately for the safety 
of people. Enforcement and stern action, after reasonable times have been given to the 
respective tenants, need to be taken to ensure all corridors and escape stairs are cleared 
from any kind of obstruction. If the respective tenants ignore the notice given to them, all 
obstructing items should be removed and destroyed. Any cost involved as a result from 
that exercise should be claimed from the respective tenants. Therefore, it can be assured 
that the fire safety objectives can be achieved. 
iv. Response on feedback. 
Management must duly respond to any feedback from the tenants. Any complaints should 
be investigated and appropriate action should be taken to rectify it as soon as possible. 
Feedback from the tenants can save management time and money. Encouraging them to 
lodge any problems arising to the manager’s office can prevent the problem becoming 
serious. An appropriate notice should be give to those involved to let them know when 
these problems reported will be solved.  
5.6 Chapter conclusion 
Fire safety in high-rise residential buildings should be seriously considered to ensure the 
optimum safety of people as the highest priority by various parties such as building 
residents, professionals in the construction industries and relevant government agencies. 
They should play a vital role to ensure all fire safety aspects are maintained at a relatively 
high standard or at least at an acceptable standard set by the relevant authority. This can 
be done by not allowing any risk elements to be placed in the buildings during the 
building’s occupation even though the intention of doing that is as an extra security 
precaution such as double locked iron grill, iron grill fitted beyond the owner’s property, 
some items placed in the escape routes, etc. All obstructions should be removed soon 
after they have been identified. Some sort of enforcement determination should be 
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imposed such as a fine penalty to those committed, removing and destroying all items 
placed beyond their boundary and passing and any cost involved for doing so to the 
respective flat tenant. This sort of ‘Hostile Education’ is effective at educating people 
with a bad attitude to make them understand the risk posed to other members of the 
community. 
By understanding the consequences that residents will have to take if they did something 
that could have caused catastrophe to them and/or to others would help them to be more 
responsible about the fire safety in their own building. Therefore education and lessons 
concerning the impacts of fire, safety measures, necessary action to be taken if fire breaks 
out and the risks that residents of the high-rise residential buildings would have to take 
should be always been done from time to time. 
There are proper places to put out all the unwanted items provided by the local authority. 
Every high-rise residential building has a rubbish collection centre for large items. Chute 
disposal systems are normally provided for domestic waste and regular collection is 
normally scheduled twice a week. 
Table 5.1 gives an outline of the problems and consequences encountered in high-rise 
residential buildings based on the observational outcomes from a number of high-rise 
buildings in Malaysia. 
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Problem Categories Problem Encountered Actual Problems Consequences 
(1)  Structural Design 
and Construction 
No alternative escape routes 
provided. 
Only one staircase provided. Occupants might become trapped. 
Unable to escape through window because corridor 
designed detached from the flats. 
Unable to escape from flats if other routes to the 
main door caught fire. 
Staircase specifications did not 
comply with the requirement. 
Tread shorter than the minimum specification.  • Risk of slipping during the evacuation process. 
• Slows down the evacuation process. 
Step rise dimension exceeded the maximum 
specification. 
Slows down the occupant evacuation speeds. 
Intermediate floor depth narrower than staircase 
width. 
• Slows down the evacuation process.  
• Traffic may be congested. 
Corridor designed and 
orientation. 
Open space or foyer-types corridor. (Tendency for 
tenants to abuse the space)  
• Reduce spaces available for public use. 
• No smoke barrier. 
• Risk of smoke to filling up the entire areas. 
Corridor detached from the flats. No escape through windows. 
No fire doors at the storey exit. No smoke barrier. • Smoke will enter the stairwell. 
• Escape stairs unsafe for use. 
(2)  Facilities for Fire 
Safety in 
Building 
Smoke control systems 
incorrectly installed. 
Smoke vents opening not sufficiently large. • Smoke will fill up the entire enclosed corridor.  
• Smoke will enter the stairwell or escape stairs if 
fire door is broken. 
No smoke vent in the enclosed corridor. 
Ventilation systems incorrectly 
installed. 
Insufficient opening for natural ventilations in 
stairwell. 
Concentration of fume and smoke in the corridor and 
stairwell. 
Illumination systems are not 
properly installed. 
No artificial lighting installed in stairwell. • Limits range of vision. 
• Difficulty in walking. 
• Risk of slipping on staircase. 
No emergency lighting system. No emergency lighting systems in stairwell and 
corridor. 
• Limits range of vision. 
• Will slow down the evacuation process.  
• Risk of casualty. 
Exit signage was not properly 
designed and installed. 
No exit signage in corridor or on the storey exit. Occupants might not know where to go in the event 
of fire. 
No illumination of exit signage. Occupant might not be able to see the exit signage in 
the case of fire.  Uneven illumination of exit signage. 
Table 5.1: Problems and consequences encountered in high-rise residential buildings 
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 (3)  Maintenance Fire suppression systems were 
insufficiently maintained 
No landing valve at riser outlet. System useless. 
Missing canvas or rubber hose.  
Lighting systems were 
insufficiently maintained. 
Non replacement of broken/blown bulbs.  Lighting system useless. 
Dirty Luminaire.  Reduce intensity of light. 
Fire doors were poorly 
maintained 
Broken fire door, automatic closer devices, and 
missing door handle,  
• Door can not be closed properly.  
• Smoke penetrates into stairwell. 
Broken door hinge, door stuck. Door can not be closed properly 
Staircases were insufficiently 
maintained. 
Hole on tread, broken step nose,  Risk of slipping or falling 
Broken handrails, uneven tread and rise. Problems for disabled and elderly people using the 
staircase. 
(4)  People’s attitude Obstacles in escape route. Iron grill fitted at the main entrance.  • Occupants might be trapped inside. 
• Traffic might be congested. 
• Will slow down the evacuation process. 
• Obstructions evacuation of occupants. 
• Reduced corridor and staircase width. 
Furniture, flower pots, etc. left in corridor and 
stairwell. 
Escape route has become a 
rubbish dumping site 
Unwanted items left in stairwell.  
Furniture left in stairwell 
Access to the escape route 
denied. 
Fire door locked • Occupants may be trapped inside. 
• Rescuers will have difficulty rescuing occupants. Fire door hooked at door frame 
Vandalism Broken fire suppression system. System useless or fails to function.  
Broken Fire door. Smoke will enter the stairwell. 
(5)  Management Lack of supervision during the 
construction period 
Artificial lightings are not properly installed. • Staircase dim or dark. 
• Difficulty in walking.  
• Risk of occupants falling. 
No fire doors at the story exit. Smoke might enter the stairwell,   
Poor workmanship; tread and rise uneven. • Risk of occupants to slip or fall down. 
• Traffic might be congested. 
 
Intermediate floor depth not equal to staircase 
width. 
No regular inspection of the 
building. 
Tenants abused public area. • Reduced the available spaces.  
• Risk of trapping others. 
• Reduces corridor and staircase width. 
• Traffic might be congested. 
• Occupants might be trapped. 
Tenants left personal items in corridor or stairwell 
Lack of control and 
enforcement. 
Tenant built up grill beyond their property limit. 
Personal items left in corridors 
Insufficiently response to 
tenants’ complaints. 
No response to tenants’ complaints.  Problems remain unsolved. 
No maintenance on escape route. Risks of casualty to occupants. 
Table 5.1 (Continue)  
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CHAPTER 6 
HUMAN BEHAVIOUR RESPONSE ISSUES IN HIGH-RISE 
RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS IN MALAYSIA 
6.1 Introduction 
Integration of human behaviour and structural design in high-rise residential buildings has 
become an important topic for study, but even though there has been growing research on human 
behaviour and awareness of fire safety in public and commercial buildings using response-based 
techniques, few studies have been carried out on residential buildings. In residential buildings, 
tenants come from various backgrounds and education levels from the lowest to the highest. 
Some may have proper training or may have attended fire safety courses, and some may have 
none. If fire breaks out in their building, what would they do? Do they know where to go and 
which route they should take to evacuate the building? 
Understanding human behaviour in the region where the building is going to be erected for the 
residential purposes is equally important, and it will help in smoothing and shaping the decision 
making process. The reasons decisions are difficult and detailed analysis is necessary before any 
the decisions can be reached are basically influenced by four problem characteristics i.e. (1) Its 
complexity, (2) Level of uncertainties involved, (3) Conflict of interest where trade-off is 
necessary , (4) Parties involved in decision making have different perspectives on the method of 
problem solving (Henrik, 2001). This is particularly so when the decision makers are the 
occupants of a building in a fire situation, because every person has their own opinion and 
perception on everything. This opinion and perception may differ from one to another. Therefore, 
human perception and the actions that they are going to take in an emergency situation, i.e. fire 
emergency and evacuation process, need to be studied to enable the design of internal building 
circulation and escape routes e.g. escape stairs, and to model fire safety evacuation. This 
evacuation model can be formed and added as a sub-model to the main model proposed.  
According to Bryan (2002), the recognition of occupants’ behaviour often identified in 
engineering investigations of major fire incidents had long been documented, but little study and 
analysis had been conducted to identify and determine the causal and principal variables 
involved. The question is what the factors are that most motivate occupants to evacuate if fire 
breaks out in their residential buildings? What are the factors that most influence their behaviour 
in evacuation processes? What is their choice of exit if they want to evacuate from high-rise 
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buildings and what are their perceptions if they have seen fire cues or heard a fire alarm 
sounding?  
Fahy and Proulx (1996), have conducted studies of the occupants’ actions in building fires. They 
then grouped people’s behaviour into the broader categories; (1) investigate, (2) seek 
information, (3) prepare to evacuate, (4) alert others or report incident, (5) assist others, (6) seek 
refuge, and (7) wait. A study by Canter (1990) on the survivors of residential fires in the UK 
revealed similar patterns. 
In this chapter discussions are centred on the perceptions and actions that occupants of high-rise 
residential buildings are likely to take when they see fire cues or hear the fire alarm go off; the 
motivating factors which trigger the evacuation process; the choice of exit and evacuation 
behaviour; and factors that most influence human behaviour during the evacuation process. 
6.2 Brief of research methodology 
In this research structured questionnaires are used to collect data. Among the important points to 
identify and analyse are; the action that the residents will take when they see the fire cue or cues, 
and when they hear a fire alarm sound. What are the factors that most motivate them to evacuate 
the building in a building fire, their choice of exit and evacuation behaviour and factors most 
influencing their behaviour during the evacuation process. 
6.2.1 Data Analysis 
SPSS is used to analyse all the questionnaires using “frequency analysis” of variables and 
“comparison of means” analysis. Frequency analysis is used on the first two questions when 
respondents were asked to rank 1 to 12 the variables that they are likely to do first according to 
priority, 1 being the most likely to do first and 12 the least likely to do. Comparison of means 
analysis is used on the other four questions when respondents are asked to use their best ability 
and knowledge to indicate by circling the appropriate grades 1 to 5 in Likert scale meaning as 
follows: 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Uncertain, 4 = Agree, and 5 = Strongly Agree.  
Respondents are grouped into four groups i.e. respondents having higher education have at least 
diploma until Ph.D., having only a school certificate, having attended a fire safety course,  and 
those who have never attended any fire safety course. 
6.2.2 Frequency Analysis 
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For the first two questions, data was analysed using a matrix analysis technique. All variables are 
listed and percentage frequency score assigned on the ranking number 1 to 12. First priority is 
given to the highest score across the board on horizontal line then followed by vertical line. If the 
highest percentages fall on both line, i.e. horizontal and vertical, it will be the place that 
respondents want it to be. For example, in table 6.1, variable 1 i.e. immediately evacuate from the 
building, percentage among the ranking was the highest at ranking 1, i.e. 44.3% and among the 
variable as well it was the highest i.e. 44.3%, then, this variable will be place at ranking 1. For 
variable 2, i.e. Activate fire alarm e.g. break glass, on horizontal analysis, the highest score was 
at ranking 2 i.e. 24.3% but on vertical analysis at ranking 2, the high score was for variable 3, i.e. 
30.4%. But when analysed horizontally on variable 3, it has the highest score at ranking 3, i.e. 
34.8% and on vertical analysis at ranking 3 as well it has the highest i.e. 34.8%.  
 
Table 6.1: Overall response from respondents when they have seen fire cues. 
It is evident that respondents wanted the variable 3 to be placed either at ranking 2 or 3, but 
strong evidence shows that respondents wanted it to be placed at ranking 3 instead of 2 and 
variable 2 place at ranking 2 then. For variable 5, horizontal analysis shows that the highest score 
was at ranking 3 i.e. 23.5%, but vertical analysis at ranking 3, it was the second highest where the 
highest score was for variable 3. Because priority has been set that horizontal analysis will be the 
first priority, then variable 5 as well place at ranking 3, so in this case there are evident that both 
variables, i.e. 3 and 5, respondents wanted its to be placed at the same ranking. The same method 
of analysis was also used for those four categories of respondents. Because there are scenarios 
where more than one variable occupied the same ranking and there are scenarios where the same 
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variable can be placed at two different rankings, i.e. variable 3 and 9, and there are scenarios 
where ranking has not got any variable on it, i.e. ranking 7, normalisation of data on analysis 
results had to be completed. 
6.2.3 Normalising data 
Because the data analysed has some gaps, normalisation of data is essential in order to reduce 
them. Normalisation is achieved by listing again all ranking positions of the variables analysed 
from all respondents in one table and running frequency analysis again to finalise the most 
popular ranking position of all variables.  
 
Table 6.2: Normalisation variables gap. 
For example, in table 6.2, the variable ‘Immediately evacuate from the building’ is placed at 
ranking 1 because all respondents’ categories placed it in ranking 1. Some variables e.g. ‘I will 
try to put out fire’, some respondents put it in ranking 4, 5, 7, and 8, but the majority of them i.e. 
3/5 or 60 % have put it at ranking 4, then this variable will be placed at ranking 4. The same 
method of normalisation is applied to the rest of variables. 
6.2.4 Variables Priority and Weightage 
Not all fire safety variables are equally important, therefore, priority and weightages are needed 
to express the importance of each attribute compared with the others. It is a key component of 
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fire safety and risk evaluation. In this regard, priorities are set at three levels i.e. High Priority are 
those variables ranked at 1 to 4, Medium Priority are those variables ranked at 5 to 8, and Low 
Priority are those variables ranked at 8 to 12. Weightings are assigned to variables to reflect the 
level of importance of each variable. It is done by measuring the risk involved or the catastrophic 
devastation to the people or building contents if fire breaks out. Using the indication that at the 
bottom line of ‘Risk Zero’, with the assumption that low priority having a potency of possibility 
of at least 10% safe if this variable followed because in the real world, there is no such things as 
‘Zero Risk’.  Not clear Medium priority having a potency of 100 times more importance than low 
priority and high priority having a potency of 100 times more than the medium priority. Table 6.2 
shows the weightings assigned to the variable ranking. 
6.2.5 Analysis of means 
Means analysis is done on the basis that the overall score point calculated and the average is 
taken to indicate the significance level of variables. Using a Likert scale 1 to 5, variables are then 
grouped together in three priority groups i.e. High, Medium and Low. High priority group if 
variables’ means are having a value of 4.0 to 5.0, Medium priority, 3.0 to 3.99 and Low priority, 
0.0 to 2.99. As mentioned above, in the Likert scale, 5 is “Strongly Agreed”, 4 is “Agreed”, 3 is 
“Uncertain”, 2 is “Disagreed” and 1 is “Strongly Disagreed” 
6.3 Buildings studied 
Five high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia were selected to participate in this study. These 
buildings were selected based on the criteria set in the research scope. Among the criteria are; it 
must be at least five storeys or above, at least 80% of residential units are occupied, and located 
in urban or near to the urban area with mixed occupancy i.e. variety in educational background 
expected, and having differences in orientation layout. For reasons of confidentiality, the 
buildings observed are named as Building A, B, C, D, and E. Every residential unit in these 
buildings was served with a questionnaire through their post box with a date and time set to 
collect them back. Out of 360 questionnaires sent out to the five selected high-rise residential 
buildings in Malaysia, 115 were returned. 360 questionnaires were sent out based on the numbers 
of residential units in these five buildings. On average, about 31.9% of the residents in each 
building returned their questionnaires. This figure was achieved after some follow-up had been 
made and some of them answered the questionnaire in person. 
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6.4 Respondents’ Background 
The respondents’ backgrounds were analysed based on four categories i.e. gender, age groups, 
knowledge and experience, and education background. The age groups are divided into four 
groups i.e. young people, aged between 15 and 30 years old, middle aged people between 31 and 
40 years old, upper age people between 41and 50 years old, and old people aged above 50 years 
old. The knowledge and experience means knowledge of fire safety i.e. respondents who had 
attended a fire safety course of at least one day, experience refers to respondents who had 
experience of a fire drill and/or experience of being involved in a building fire. 
 
Table 6.2.1: The number of people per flat in high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia 
The number of people occupying the high-rise residential building in Malaysia ranges from 2 to 
15 people per flat. Majority is 6 people per flat (20.9%), followed by 4 or 8 people per flat 
(17.4%), 5 people per flat (13%), 12 people per flat (9.6%), 3 people per flat (7.8%), 10 people 
per flat (7%), 7 people per flat (3.5%), 2 people per flat (1.7%) and 9 or 15 people per flat 
(0.9%). Table 6.2.1 shows the number of people per flat in high-rise residential buildings in 
Malaysia 
6.4.1 Gender 
From 115 respondents, the majority of respondents who answered the questionnaire are male 
(56.5%), with 34.5% female. Figure 6.0a shows the proportion of each gender who returned the 
questionnaire survey. 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 6.0: (a) Percentage  of gender; (b) Respondents’ age groups 
6.4.2 Age groups 
Among those respondents who answered the questionnaire, the majority of them (48.7%) are in 
the young group i.e. age between 15 to 30 years old followed by the middle age group (33.9%), 
upper age (13.0%) and old age (4.3%) as shown in Figure 6.0b. The research findings will be 
discussed further in section 6.5 and 6.6 below. 
6.4.3 Knowledge and experiences 
Respondents were analysed based on their knowledge of fire safety i.e. those who have or have 
not attended any fire safety course, and who have experience of a fire drill or a building fire. The 
minimum course is at least one day seminar conducted either during school or at work place. The 
majority of them had never attended any fire safety course i.e. 67.8%; only 32.2% of respondents 
had attended a fire safety course. Figure 6.1 (a) shows the percentage of respondents who have or 
have not attended any fire safety course. Further analysis of variables in the questionnaire will be 
based on these groups of respondents. Some of the respondents had experience of a fire drill and 
some never had any experience of a fire drill. Experience in fire drill may help them to react in an 
appropriate manner when in a fire emergency situation.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 6.1: (a) Respondents who Have or Have Not attended fire safety course; (b) 
Respondents fire drill experience. 
Figure 6.1 (b) shows that the majority of respondents i.e. 57.4% had experienced a fire drill and 
42.6% had not. Out of the percentage that have an experience of a fire drill, 41.7% had the fire 
drill at their office, 10.4% during the school day or at college, 5.2% in a public building and none 
of them had an experience of a fire drill at their residential buildings (See figure 6.2).  
Respondents were also asked about their experience of a building fire. The majority of the 
respondents (79.1%) had no experience of being involved in any building fires (see Figure 6.3). 
 
Figure 6.2: Where was fire drill held Figure 6.3:  Respondents experience fire in 
building 
6.4.4 Education background 
There are six categories of respondents grouped according to their education level, from the 
lowest i.e. without any certificate until the highest i.e. doctorate. Figure 6.4(a) shows the 
proportion of respondents at each education level. However for analysis purposes, respondents 
were regrouped again into two groups. Group one is respondents with high education i.e. 
minimum education level is diploma until doctorate, and group two is respondents with lower 
education with maximum only school certificate.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 6.4: (a) Respondents’ education Background, (b) Regrouped Respondents’ education 
background 
In total 115 respondents participated in this study and 53% of the respondents are in group one 
and 47% respondents are in group two. Figure 6.4(b) shows the percentage of respondents in the 
new group. 
6.5  Questionnaire survey results 
6.5.1 What would occupants of high-rise residential building normally do when they hear 
fire alarms or see fire cues? 
Occupants in high-rise residential buildings normally attempt to evacuate the building in a 
building fire, but if the fire and smoke conditions are very bad and it is not possible to do so, then 
they may have no choice but to return to their respective apartments, or seek refuge in other 
apartments, and wait for the fire fighters to rescue them (Yung et. al., 2001). The main problem 
encountered in evacuation processes is when smoke enters into an escape route through a broken 
fire door and/or through the gaps between the door and floor or the door and door frame. Another 
problem is traffic congestion during evacuation processes (Yatim, 1999). Evacuation from a 
building fire could be fully successful if occupants have been given early warning about the fire 
before it becomes uncontrollable.  
From this opinion survey 40.9% of the occupants of a high-rise residential building, when asked 
what they would do first if the fire alarm went off, said that they would immediately evacuate the 
building, 22.6% said that evacuation is the second thing they would do after they had done 
something else (e.g. call 999 or try to put out the fire before evacuation), 8.7 % said evacuation is 
the third thing they would do after they have done two other things, 10.4% ranked the evacuation 
in  fourth place, 7.8% said evacuation would be a fifth place, 3.5% said it would be at the priority 
six and 6.10% ranked it at seventh. i.e. 59.1% of the occupants would do something else before 
evacuating the building. 
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When asked what they would do first if they saw fire cues i.e. smoke, flame, 55.7% said they 
would do something else before evacuating the building and 44.3% said that they would 
immediately evacuate the building (see table 6.3 and 6.4). Therefore, early fire warning is 
essential to help the occupants and to give them ample time to evacuate. 
 
Table 6.3:  Percentage of variables ranking when alarm goes off 
The level of fire safety that is provided to the occupants largely depends on how well the safety 
systems work. For instance if the fire alarm systems and fire suppression systems provided in the 
buildings were not checked or regularly tested for their efficiency and working condition, they 
might not work when needed. If they do not work properly or provide an inefficient service to the 
buildings’ occupants, they might as well not be fitted.  
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Table 6.4:  Percentage of variables ranking upon seeing the fire cues. 
 
Table 6.5:  Means analysis of Legislation and Enforcement of fire suppression and detection 
systems 
Twenty six professionals involved in the construction industry e.g. ten Architects, four 
Engineers, two Quantity Surveyors, four Contractors, one Developers and five fire brigade 
officers, when asked about the importance of all fire suppression systems and fire detection 
systems installed in the high-rise buildings being checked and tested regularly, agreed or strongly 
agreed that legislation and enforcement are very important. The choice of professionals was 
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based on those dealing with the fire brigade department in submitting a proposal for a new 
building plans for checking and approval of a fire safety features. Fire suppression systems and 
fire detection and alarm systems should be regularly checked and tested for working condition 
and ready to be used when needed. They were asked to give a score to every question i.e. 1 to 5, 
where 1 means  strongly disagreed and 5 means strongly agreed. Analysis of means (Table 6.5) 
shows the question of fire suppression and fire alarm systems are 4.27 and 4.15 respectively. 
Proulx, (1999), mentioned in her paper that occupants in public buildings are slow in deciding to 
evacuate and this contrary to what was mentioned by Sime, (1980), Keating, (1982), Donald and 
Canter, (1990) that occupants panic and rush to the nearest exit on hearing the fire alarm. Proulx 
said that in most cases the occupants continue with their activities in public buildings after the 
fire alarms go off. Among the factors that cause this lack of reaction is that there is no standard 
for the sound of fire alarm. The alarm sound would have been interpreted as pulsating, whoop, 
burglar alarm in shops, elevator fault alarms, security door alarms, etc. 
40.90%
59.10%
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
P
er
ce
nt
ag
e
Immediately Evacuate Do Something Else
Action
Evacuation After Fire Alarm Goes Off
 
Figure. 6.5: Respondents’ response when alarm goes off 
This is in line with my survey to the residential building occupants that 59.1 % will do something 
else before evacuating the building and only 40.9% said they will immediately evacuate the 
building when a fire alarm goes off. This result came out after data been recoded i.e. 1 for the 
respondents who rated “immediately evacuate” as first choice and 2 for the respondents who 
rated “immediately evacuate” as second choice onwards (See figure 6.5). Out of 59.1%, 19.1% 
said they will call 999 first before evacuating the building. When asked about the factors that will 
most motivate them to evacuate, the fire alarm is in the third place in the list after announcement 
or command from the relevant authority and fire cues e.g. smoke, flame or heat (see table 1.5.4): 
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As Proulx (1999) said that “They expect that someone will tell them what to do if something 
serious is really happening”.  
In this respect fire safety awareness in high-rise residential buildings needs to be improved by 
means of educational approaches to emphasise the importance of immediately evacuating the 
building after the fire has been detected. Life is more important than saving possessions. A fire 
plan needs to be posted at a place where it is clearly visible and understood by all family 
members. Fire drills need to be carried out in high-rise residential buildings to familiarise the 
occupants with the evacuation process and procedure, to familiarise them with the escape route 
environment and the place to assemble after evacuating the building. Relevant legislation needs 
to be amended by inserting a clause that all high-rise residential buildings need to carry out at 
least one fire drill within three years. 
6.5.2 Occupants’ perception and behaviour during building fire. 
One survivor of the Beverly Hills Supper Club’s5 fire in May 1977, Lise Bahannon, told NOVA6 
that at first she never realised that there was a fire because the alarm was not sounding. She just 
realised when she heard someone somewhat casually say “I don’t know, somebody said it was a 
fire. I think we better get out of here”. She thought it was worth trying and worth nothing to lose, 
and if nothing happened she would go back to continue her work. When she walked out through 
the door there were about 30 people already ahead of her going down to the door to the ground. 
At first she was calm but when smoke started to fill up and there has a huge burst of flame, 
people began to scramble to get out. There was a metal section in the middle of the doorway 
which one individual had his legs trapped around. It was very chaotic at the exit and a lot of 
people could not get out and were jammed in the exit door. She was very calm when she had 
exited the building, but once she began to think of her father, that’s when panic developed and 
she had tried to go back into the building. Her father married and was in the building that day 
with his new bride and was sitting in her station. This fire tragedy has educated her not to ignore 
the fire alarm or tornado siren which she used to ignore by just saying “Ah, it will be over in a 
minute”. She will reacts quickly whenever she hears any sort of alarm and instantly exits the 
building or whatever she has to do after this fire tragedy.  
                                                 
5 Beverly Hills Super Club in Southgate Kentucky, fire broke out in evening 28th of May 1977 killing 164 people and 
many of whom are jammed in the exit doors as they tried to escape. 
6 See reference 
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People who stay in high-rise residential building are varied and there are differences in education 
level. If fire breaks out and they are able to react quickly and in a proper manner, they will have a 
better chance to save their lives. People’s behaviour is unique and very often will be influenced 
by the surroundings where they live or an existing situation. In order to know and understand 
their behaviour, research was conducted by asking them to answer a few questions in a structured 
questionnaire. The following are the outcomes from the survey.  
6.5.2.1 Upon seeing a fire cues 
Item Variables 
Overall Ranking 
from Respondents 
Ranking Priority 
1 Immediately evacuate from the building. 1  
 
High 
2 Call 999/Fire Brigade/Police. 2 
3 Helping others with evacuation. 3 
4 Activate Fire Alarm e.g. Break Glass. 3 
5 I will try to put out fire. 4 
6 Try to save as many as possible of my valuables. 5  
Mediu
m 
7 Shout “FIRE” to alert the others about the fire. 6 
8 Investigate what caused the fire or fire alarm to go off. 8 
9 Curious and asked neighbour about what had happened. 9  
Low 10 Stay in my own unit hoping that other peoples will put out fire. 10 
11 Just Wait, if other people started to evacuate than I will evacuate. 11 
12 Go and stay in my neighbour’s unit. 12 
Table 6.6: Factors that occupants’ going to do first if they have seen fire cues. 
What are the occupants of high-rise residential buildings going to do first if they see fire cues in 
their building? Immediately evacuating the building became the first priority, followed by calling 
the fire brigade. However, calling 999 can be done concurrently especially nowadays when 
almost everyone has a mobile phone to hand. During evacuation they tend to help others with 
evacuation and activate the fire alarm, among the top priorities. Table 6.6 above listed out the 
factors that respondents would be likely to do according to priority. 
6.5.2.2 When Fire Alarm Goes off 
What are high-rise residential buildings’ occupants going to do first if they hear the fire alarm 
activated? Table 6.7 below lists out what the occupants of high-rise residential buildings are 
going to do if they hear the fire alarm go off. Variables 1 to 4 are high priority, 5 to 9 are medium 
priority, and 10 to 12 are low priority. The top priority is to immediately evacuate from the 
building, followed by call 999, helping others with evacuation and trying to save as many as 
possible of their valuables.  
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Rank Variables 
Overall Ranking 
from Respondents 
Ranking Priority 
1 Immediately evacuate from the building. 1 High 
2 Call 999/Fire Brigade/Police. 2 
3 Helping others with evacuation. 3 
4 Try to save as many as possible of my valuables. 4 
5 Activate Fire Alarm e.g. Break Glass. 6  
Medium 6 I will try to put out fire. 7 
7 Shout “FIRE” to alert the others about the fire. 7 
8 Investigate what caused the fire alarm to go off. 8 
9 Curious and asked neighbour about what had happened. 8 
10 Just Wait, if other people started to evacuate than I will evacuate. 10 Low 
11 Stay in my own unit hoping that other peoples will put out fire. 11 
12 Go and stay in my neighbour’s unit. 12 
Table 6.7: Factors that occupants’ going to do first if they have heard fire alarm. 
Meacham (1999) quoted Bryan as saying that the response to fire alarms and sounders tends to be 
less than optimum. Meacham concluded that the possibilities why people delay to response to 
fire alarm i.e. 30s to 24 minute (Proulx, 1994), because after occupants hear the alarm, six basic 
components i.e. recognition, validation, definition, evaluation, commitment, and reassessment 
take place in the decision process to decide what to do next. Some of the processes may occur 
concurrently and within a second. Some may take a few minutes to complete. However, the first 
thing first that they intend to do is immediately evacuating the building after the fire alarm goes 
off, but there is a delay time that called pre-movement time. A study by Proulx (1995), concluded 
that among the actions that had caused the occupants to delay to start their evacuation are; find 
pet, gather valuables, get dressed, find children, have a look at corridor and move to balcony 
(refer to table 7.1). 
6.5.2.3 Perception when fire alarm goes off. 
What are the occupants’ perceptions when they hear a fire alarm go off or someone shout “FIRE” 
in their residential building? They will alert all members in their unit and other people in the 
building to immediately evacuate to the safe area. To them the alarm was genuine. The high 
priority for them is to evacuate the building because they think that the fire may spread into their 
own unit. Investigating what causes the fire is medium priority, and they believe that fire may 
spread into their own units. Table 6.8 shows the respondents’ perception when they hear the fire 
alarm went off or someone shout fire. They do not think that the alarm is just a joke or it was a 
faulty alarm and strongly disagreed when asked about possibility that fire must not spread into 
their own units. Some said that they would like to wait a while if people started to evacuate, then 
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they will follow them, but the vast majority of them strongly agreed that they will immediately 
evacuate from the building if fire alarm sounding. 
Items Perceptions Analysis of Means 
Overall Priority 
1 I will alert all people in my unit to immediately evacuate. 4.42  
High 2 I will immediately evacuate to the safe designated area. 4.26 
3 That was a genuine fire alarm, I must evacuate immediately. 4.05 
4 The fire may spread into my own residential unit. 3.81  
Medium 5 I will investigate before I evacuate from the building. 3.56 
6 The fire must spread into my own residential unit. 3.46 
7 Wait awhile if people start to evacuate, then, I will follow them. 2.71  
Low 8 That was a faulty alarm or some one maybe plays a joke about fire 2.27 
9 The fire must not spread into my own residential unit. 1.84 
10 Fire did not pose any threat to my own unit 1.73 
Table 6.8: Occupants’ perception when they have heard fire alarm or someone yelled “FIRE” 
6.5.2.4 Factors most motivate occupants to evacuate the building in fire. 
What are the factors that will most motivate the building occupants to evacuate if their residential 
buildings have caught fire? There are four factors that most motivate them i.e. Announcement 
from relevant authority such as fire brigade officer, police, building security, etc. second factor is 
fire cues i.e. smoke, flame or heat. The third factor is fire alarm or sounder and fourth factor is 
people moving out from the building. There are two factors which they are uncertain about, i.e. 
detected burning smell and insistence of people in their units. Table 6.9 shows the factors ranking 
based on the overall score of means from all the respondents who participated in this study.  
Item Factors Motivate Evacuation 
Analysis of Means 
Overall  Priority
1 Announcement or command from the relevant authority. 4.63  
 
High 
2 Fire cues e.g. Smoke, Flame, Heat. 4.55 
3 Fire Alarm/Sounder. 4.38 
4 People start moving out from the building. 4.09 
5 Detected burning smell  3.84  
Medium 6 Insistence of the people in my own unit. 3.83 
7 None of the above. 0.66 Low 
Table 6.9: Factors that will most motivate occupants’ evacuation from building fire 
6.5.2.5 Choice of exit and evacuation behaviour 
What are the most popular exits chosen by occupants if they want to evacuate the building during 
fire emergency and what is their evacuation behaviour e.g. immediately evacuate, wait and see, 
attempted to put out fire, stay-in-place, etc. There are three choices that they are most likely to 
make during emergency situation i.e. they will use escape staircase instead of elevator, they will 
follow exactly the exit signage to the safe designated area, and they knew where the alternative 
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escape stair was located. When asked about their familiarity of ways in and out of the building in 
evacuation, the vast majority of them were uncertain about that because in the high-rise 
residential building they normally use the lift to reach their residential unit. They would not use 
the lift even if they are familiar with it or because it is faster. They would not seek refuge or stay 
in place and remain in their unit and hope to be rescued. Table 6.10 shows the ranking factors in 
the evacuation process if the building has caught fire.  
Rank Factors choise of exit 
Analysis of Means 
Overall  Priority 
1 I will use escape staircase to evacuate from the building. 4.59 High 
2 I will follow exactly the exit signage to the safe designated area. 4.54 
3 I knew where the alternative escape stair is located, will use it.  4.36 
4 I knew exactly where the escape route was, will use it. 3.63 Medium 
5 I will used my familiar way in out to evacuate from the building. 3.46 
6 I will choose staircase first, if it is crowded, then I will use elevator  2.95 Low 
7 I will try to put out fire, if unsuccessful, then, I will immediately 
evacuate the building. 
2.83 
8 I will choose elevator first, if it is out of service, I will use staircase. 1.90 
9 I will use elevator because I was familiar with it. 1.71 
10 I will use elevator because it is faster. 1.65 
11 I will refugee into my neighbourhood unit below the fire level. 1.53 
12 I will remain in my unit to be rescued by the fire man. 1.34 
Table 6.10: Ranking factors in evacuation process during building fire 
They would not choose staircase then elevator or vice-versa, even though they are familiar with 
the elevator. The staircase becomes the first choice in all high-rise residential buildings in 
Malaysia. Therefore it is very important to ensure that all staircases in high-rise residential 
buildings are safe and sound to be used at any material time. Studies on staircase specification, 
design and layout are essential especially in the urban area where the density of high-rise 
buildings is overwhelming. Discussion on this aspect can be found in chapter 7. 
6.5.2.6 Factors that highly influence the occupants’ behaviour during evacuation from 
building fire 
What are the factors that most influence the occupants’ behaviour in escaping from building fire? 
Behaviour is defined as: 
i. The state that occupants began to change their character from patient to impatient, calm 
to aggressive, etc.  
ii. The state that people began to be irrational in any of their action like panic, wanted to 
return to their unit to rescue loved one, possessions, pets, etc.  
iii. The state in which occupants start to become angry and so on.  
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From the survey it shows that the differences margin analysed of means are quite close. It can be 
said that there is no significant difference among the variables. However there are four factors 
that highly influence the occupants’ behaviour i.e.:  
i. Traffic congestion or escape stair crowded.  
ii. Havoc cause by panicking occupants during evacuation process.  
iii. Smell of burning materials, smoke or any fire cues.  
iv. Number of people occupying the building.  
Those factors score 4.0 and above and are classified as highly influencing people’s behaviour. 
Table 6.11 shows those factors, as well as those close to the above four factors mentioned with 
average score 3.8 to 3.9 which are methods of fire door operating, size of escape stairs and 
corridors, smoke entering into escape route and people carrying too many and weighty 
possession during evacuation. From the opinion survey, a human behaviour model has been 
developed. Discussion on the human behaviour model’s characteristics is included in the 
following section. Before further discussion about the human behaviour model can be done, a 
brief definition of human behaviour is essential. 
Items Factors in evacuation process during building fire Analysis of Means 
Overall Priority 
1 Traffic congestion or crowded at the escape stairs. 4.31 High 
2 Havoc situation cause by the panicky evacuees.  4.26 
3 Smell burning materials, smoke or seeing smoke or flame.  4.01 
4 Numbers of people occupied the building 4.00 
5 Methods of fire doors operating e.g. door handle, direction of 
door swing, automatic door closer device, etc. 
3.90 Medium 
6 Size of escape stairs and corridors in the building 3.88 
7 Smoke entered into escape route 3.85 
8 People carrying too many and weighty possessions during 
evacuation 
3.83 
9 Portable fire extinguisher does not work. 3.68 
10 Difficult to open the fire door or fire door stuck. 3.65 
Table: 6.11: Factors influence the occupants’ behaviour during evacuation. 
6.6 Human behaviour models 
Human behaviour is defined as the collection of activities performed by human beings and 
influenced by culture, attitudes, emotions, values, ethics, authority, rapport, hypnosis, persuasion, 
coercion and/or genetics. Karl, (1947), mentions that human behaviour is inherited from 
generation to generation and mainly depend on the types of chromosome in their sexuality 
development. 
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Gender differences can cause the behaviour of sociological difference in daily life. This can form 
a physiological distinction and mental differences. Behaviour inherited from father and mother 
depends on the type of chromosome, i.e. X and Y, which besides develop the sex of the child, 
will generate the behavioural factors inside of the child. 
Social class or social status - where the children grow up largely will be able to shape the 
people’s behaviour. In many cases an adopted children behave differently from their biological 
parents. Adoptive parents also appeared to possess some sort of behavioural influence on the 
development of the child under their custody. The degree of influence from the adoptive parent 
and behaviour heritage from the biological parent is not yet known, but there are some links 
between those behavioural factors. However it is strongly believed that the community social 
behaviour where the children grow up has a significant influence on their behaviour. 
Age differences; Maturity level increases as age increases, i.e. increases of age of people through 
interval time will be able to shape the human behaviour apart from those people categorised as 
‘never ever mature’ even though they have grown up. Normally, the maturity level will increase 
as age increases. Increasing maturity level will change’s people behaviour, unless one has been 
categorised as ‘never grown up’ 
The education level; The quantity and quality of level of knowledge acquired are different at the 
different levels of education. The knowledge boundary is normally expanded once the level of 
education increases. Generally, people’s behaviour reflects their level of education. The way of 
people thinking and analysis, and decision made during a fire emergency, largely depends on the 
knowledge and experience they have. However, in certain aspects like evacuation process and 
procedure, people need to have experience of fire drill before they can react efficiently. 
The rules and regulations have a significant influence on the behaviour of people. In everyday 
life, there are rules and regulations to follow. To be effective, all rules and regulations are subject 
to review to ensure effectiveness and suitability for use at any material time.  
Threat or danger situation can somehow or other shape human behaviour in building fires. 
However, sometimes, it is misleading to the perception of many people which resulted in 
assumption of the behavioural aspects in a difference sorts. A popular assumption that people are 
irrational or panic seems to be not true. When people are confronted with a serious building fire, 
they behave in a constructive, rational or even altruistic manner. The myth of people acting in a 
selfish, capricious, oppressive or other hostile manner is quite irrelevant because people seem to 
help each other in emergency cases such as in a fire situation. However, there are probably a few 
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cases i.e. one or two of them could have reacted oppositely for a reason. In general, human 
beings are very cooperative and concerned in case of emergency. They tend to help other people 
with evacuation and even try to fight the fire as best they can. From the survey, it was found that 
among the highly important factors that building occupants are going to do first are immediately 
evacuate the building, call 999, help others with evacuation, attempted to put out fire, and save 
some possessions. 
Figure 6.6 shows the model of human behaviour derived from the outcome of the questionnaires 
study done on a number of Malaysian occupying the high-rise residential buildings in Kuala 
Lumpur. Responses from professionals involved in the construction industry and from fire 
brigade officers are taken into consideration in developing of this model. There are thirteen 
models integrated to form this human behaviour model. Models 1 to 8 are derived from the 
questionnaire survey on the building’s occupants and models 9 to 12 are derived from the expert 
judgement. Model thirteen i.e. Model A1: Action to be taken is the conclusion of the factors that 
occupants of high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia will take if they have seen any fire cue or 
they have heard a fire alarm. Those models are divided into five levels of intensity influencing 
components. 
 
Figure 6.6:  Human behaviour model of fire safety in building 
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However, human beings are naturally unique, which sometimes makes it difficult to predict to a 
high degree of precision their behaviour. Many have a tendency to say that people are unreliable, 
unlike a machine or robot which very reliable and never complains about anything. Human 
beings actually possess unique decision-making capabilities, and when equipped with adequate 
information, knowledge and experience, they can overcome the disadvantages of changing 
conditions, incomplete or inaccurate information and time pressure to make the decisions that 
computers and other technological systems remain incapable of. However, the fact is that, human 
behaviour can influence and be influenced. The intensity of influence and be influenced are 
mainly determined by the magnitude of those factors affecting them directly or indirectly in 
terms of the principle of belief, centre of feeling, amount of information and knowledge they 
have, enforcement of rules in a living system, situation where they live in e.g. threat or reward, 
and etc. 
There are five levels of degree of components what influence human behaviour as described 
earlier that: 
i. Factors that strongly influenced the people’s behaviour. 
ii. Factors that equally influence and influenced the people behaviour and those factor 
itself. 
iii. Factors that will be able to control the people behaviour. 
iv. Factors that should be followed the people behaviour. 
v. Action to be taken by people during emergency situation 
Detailed descriptions of these components and factors involved can be found in sections 6.6.3 to 
6.6.7 below. Components that strongly influence the people’s behaviour are indicated with the 
bold arrows toward the human behaviour and those factors are as in models 1, 2, 3 and 4. Red 
arrows with both directions are indicated as equally influent on the human behaviour and the 
models i.e. models 5, 6, 7, and 8. It means human behaviour is influenced and vice-versa. Arrows 
in indicate that these components (marks as model 9 and 10) are influenced and able to control 
the people’s behaviour. Arrows out indicate that these components (marked as model 11 and 12) 
should follow the people’s behaviour.  
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6.6.1 Human behaviour defined from the fire safety point of view 
Human behaviour within the conceptual framework of evacuation and fire threat in buildings 
would be able to change the attitude and the action taken by the respective persons involved. The 
state-of-the-art of human behaviour is not only concerned with what people should do i.e. 
prescribing the actions they should take in emergency situation, but what they are most likely to 
do i.e. addressing the probable actions they would take in emergency situation.  
In the evacuation process i.e. during a fire emergency, human behaviour is defined as a state 
where people start to evacuate when they have been notified about the existence of fire either by 
mechanical means or by people. The state where people start to change their behaviour from 
normal to abnormal and the state where people start to react e.g. actions taken to save their life 
from any threat of fire. Generally there are two states where people start to change their 
behaviour i.e.; 
i. A state in which people begin to change their character e.g. from patient to impatient, 
calm to aggressive, etc and vice-versa.  
ii. A state in which people begin to be irrational in any of their actions e.g. panic, start to 
take any action that could put themselves in a risky situation which could threaten their 
life or that of another person, and vice-versa. 
However, the state when humans would possibly change their behaviour can be very complex to 
describe, and at this moment there is no any precise tool that can be used to calibrate human 
behaviour, except by means of opinion survey or questionnaire test form. These are the most 
popular methods used at this time. In general there are a few other factors that would affecting 
the human behaviour as described in the following section. 
6.6.2 Factors that equally important in affecting of human behaviour: 
There are four other equally important factors that could affect human behaviour in making any 
decision in any emergency situation, i.e. attitude, social norm, religious/belief/faith and perceived 
behavioural control (Nisbett and Valins (1972), Skinner (1953), Bem (1966, 1972)). 
i. Attitude: – The degree to which the person has a favourable or unfavourable evaluation of 
the behaviour in question. 
ii. Social Norm: - The influence of social pressure that is perceived by the individual 
(normative beliefs) to perform or not to perform a certain behaviour. 
 
- 196 -
iii. Religious/Belief/Faith: - The individual belief concerning the daily practice and performing 
activities according to the divine rule in the daily live. Worship of God, to seek for the 
though guidance, human to human relationship etc.  
iv. Perceived Behavioural Control: - This construct is defined as the individual thinking 
concerning how easy or difficult it is to perform any task. This behaviour will be able to 
control the outcome of any action to be performed. The perception in the mind will result in 
success or failure of action taken. Positive perception, e.g. high confidence, is likely to result 
in a greater chances of success but negative perception, e.g. doubtful, will result in a slim 
chance of success. 
As mentioned earlier, human behaviour can be influenced and have an influence. The intensity of 
be influenced and influences are mainly determine by how much the magnitude of those factors 
are affecting them directly or indirectly. Nevertheless, to obtain data on human cognitive 
performance is extremely difficult pertaining of the nature of these activities. Many approaches 
have been done by many other researchers including protocol analysis (Park, et. at, 2003) field 
experiments (Woods, 1993), expert judgment (Roelen et. al, 2002), etc. Some of them (Nisbett 
and Valins (1972), Skinner (1953), Bem (1966, 1972)) have concluded the finding that mainly 
related to the above attributes mentioned 
6.6.3 Factors that strongly influence and can shape the human behaviour: 
There are four factors that strongly influence and are able to shape the character of human being; 
gender, age groups, knowledge and experience, and education background,. Figure 6.7 shows 
models of strong behavioural factors and possible action to be taken during a fire emergency. 
Human behaviour sub-model A that strongly influenced the people’s behaviour will result in 
Model A1 (Action) to be taken. Those factors are: 
i. Gender: - A degree of emotional and rational is belief to be different in differences of 
gender status because based on the questionnaire survey, the percentage of male and female, 
when tested on the variable ‘immediately evacuate and do something else’ shows a significant 
differences of the percentage margin. Therefore gender status could influence the action to be 
taken in certain situations. However it does not solely influence the behaviour of people by 
gender but the interrelationship between the other factors instead. Table 6.12 shows the 
respondents’ proportion of gender tested on variable ‘immediately evacuate and do something 
else’. 
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Analyses were based on the questionnaire survey and the survey results show that 59.1% (68 
people) of respondents will do something else before evacuating the building and 40.9% (47 
people) will immediately evacuate the building once a fire alarm goes off. The analysis of  
proportion of gender in evacuation behaviour between male and female, when tested on the 
variables of “immediately evacuate” or “do something else” once a fire alarm goes off, 64.6% of 
male would do something else and only 35.4% would immediately evacuate. Meanwhile 52.0% 
of female would do something else and 48.0% would immediately evacuate the building if fire 
alarm goes off. There is significant evidence that gender has an influence on the action to be 
taken in fire emergency. The majority of males have a tendency to do something else, while 
females show no significant differences between ‘immediately evacuate’ and ‘do something else’ 
because there is only 4% difference between the two variables. 
 
Table 6.12: Respondents’ gender proportion. 
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Table 6.13: Respondents’ difference age groups proportion 
ii. Age Groups: - The degree of thought, action, reaction and risk taken upon issues or 
situation arise will be different in different age groups. There are four age groups i.e.: group 1, 
young15 – 30 years old; group 2, middle age, 30 – 40 years old; group 3, upper age, 41 – 50 
years old, and group 4, old people, above 50 years old. Table 6.13 shows the proportion of 
respondents according to the age groups when tested with the variables ‘immediately evacuate’ 
and ‘do something else’; young people are inclined to do something else (57.1%); people at 
middle age are inclined to immediately evacuate (51.3%); but people above 40 years old are very 
keen to do something else if a fire alarm goes off. 
iii. Knowledge and Experiences: - The action will be based on the knowledge and experience 
acquired by any individual when they are faced with any emergency situation. Knowledge refers 
to the specific fire safety courses that one has attended, technique and information about the fire 
suppression systems, the location of escape route and orientation of building environment where 
they live on, etc. Experience refers to the fire drill that one may have taken part in, or having 
been involved in building fires before. Table 6.14 shows the proportion of respondents who had 
attended or not attended any fire safety courses. Among those not attending any fire safety 
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courses 56.4% would do something else and 43.6% would immediately evacuate the building. 
For those who had attended a fire safety course 64.9% would do something else and only 35.1% 
would immediately evacuate after a fire alarm goes off. It seems that the percentage of those 
doing something else has increased after attending fire safety course. 
 
Table 6.14: The proportion of respondents who have attended fire safety courses. 
Table 6.15 shows the proportion of respondents with an experience of fire drill. The majority of 
those without an experience of fire drill i.e. 61.2% would do something else and the percentage 
had decreased for those who had an experience of fire drill. On the-other-hand, the percentage of 
those immediately evacuating had increased from 38.8% to 42.4%. 
 
Table 6.15: The proportion of respondents with a fire drill experience  
The analysis of those who had an experience with a building fire (see table 6.16) shows that the 
percentage of those immediately evacuating the building once a fire alarm goes off had increased 
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by only 1%, so there is no significant difference between those with and without an experience of 
being involved in a building fire. 
 
Table 6.16: Proportion of respondents with an experience being involved in building fire. 
Further analysis on the male and female with and without an experience of a fire drill shows that 
the percentage of males immediately evacuating the building had slightly increased from 32.3% 
to 38.2%%. Meanwhile the percentage of females had slightly decreased from 50.0% to 46.9% 
(see table 6.17). Roughly the same pattern is followed by males who had an experience of being 
involved in a building fire, i.e. the percentage had increased from 33.3% to 42.9% and the 
percentage of the females again decreased from 50.0% to 40.0% (see table 6.18) 
 
Table 6.17: The proportion of male and female had an experience of fire drill 
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Table 6.18: The proportion of male and female had an experience of  building fire. 
In contrast, the majority of them opting to ‘do something else’ if they had an experience of a fire 
drill decreased from 67.7% to 61.8% and the percentage for the female had slightly increased 
from 61.8% to 64.6%. The same pattern is observed when they had an experience of being 
involved in the building fire that the percentage of males ‘doing something else’ had decreased 
from 66.7% to 57.1% and the percentage of females ‘doing something else’ had increased from 
50.0% to 60.0%.  
iv. Education background: - The level of thinking and the ability to make a constructive 
decision are supposedly influenced by the level of education that one has completed. Higher 
education level theoretically should allow better risk calculation, and as a result should be biases 
towards more rational action to be taken in an emergency situation. Table 6.19 shows the 
proportion of respondents with education background shows that percentage of respondents 
opting to immediately evacuate’ had slightly decreased from 42.2% to 38.9% and for them to ‘do 
something else’ had slightly increased from 57.4% to 61.1%. It can be seen that the majority still 
opt to ‘do something else’ after a fire alarm goes off. 
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Table 6.19: Proportion of respondents with difference level of education background. 
6.6.4 Factors which equally influence and follow the human behaviour: 
There are four equally important factors that either will influence or will be influenced by human 
behaviour. Figure 6.8 shows factors for model 5, 6, and 7. Figure 6.9 shows factor for model 8. 
Model 5 is people’s perceptions when a fire alarm goes off. Model 6 is evacuation motivation 
factors. Model 7 is exit chosen for evacuation and model 8 is evacuation behaviour factors. 
Human behaviour could be determined by those factors and will be inter-related either between 
perception and action taken, human and elements, and knowledge and exit choice. Based on the 
results of the questionnaire study, the factors are grouped into three priority groups i.e. high 
priority, medium priority and low priority. 
i. Perception when alarm goes off: - Perception means a level of thought or faculty of 
perceiving the effect or product of observing something in the individual mind. It then stimulates 
the action to be taken by sending a signal to the other organs of the body. In this respect it is what 
people thought when a fire alarm goes off and what action that they might take. The alarm is 
among the elements that would be able to jerk or wake up people from the state of illusion. 
Interpretation of the meaning of the sounder would be different to different people. Some might 
think that it was a false alarm and some might think that it was a service man testing the system 
or just someone played around with the alarm, some ones might have seriously interpreted that it 
is a genuine alarm and evacuation is needed to be carried out immediately, etc. It will influence 
the action to be taken by people in high-rise buildings. Action to be taken is mainly determined 
by the interpretation of the alarm they have heard or any fire cue that they have seen. If it has 
been interpreted as a serious warning of the existence of the danger, the action taken will be 
different. 
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In terms of perception once fire alarms go off, the respondents would tend to believe that it was a 
genuine fire and must evacuate the building immediately. They would not think it was only a 
joke or a faulty alarm. In terms of action to be taken, they will alert other people to evacuate and 
then immediately evacuate the building as a high priority. To wait awhile and if people started to 
evacuate then to follow them is a low priority. 
ii. Evacuation motivation factors: - Motivation is an internal energy stimulating people to 
react accordingly. Some may have defined motivation as a non-specific energizing of all 
behaviour and some said it is a recruiting and directing behaviour, selecting any possible action 
that person might perform such as evacuating the building when the alarm goes off. Motivation 
can come from two different sources, from human or from elements or equipment. Motivation 
from inside the human is called internal motivation and if it comes from elements or from other 
people, it is called external motivation. In this regard external motivation is taken into 
consideration in the evacuation motivation factors studied.  
From the study it was found that there are two high priority motivations from the human factors 
i.e. Command from authority and people evacuating the building. Insist from the other people in 
their unit is medium priority to them. In terms of motivation from element factors, there are also 
two factors i.e. fire cues and fire alarm are high priority that will motivate them to evacuate the 
building. Detecting a burning smell is medium priority. It can be concluded that motivation for 
humans, regarding the evacuation processes in any of the fire emergency can be divided into 
three categories i.e. ‘Command’, ‘Encourage’, or ‘Insist’ (CEI). The intensity of motivation 
effects on person involved are different and largely determined by how serious is the effects 
would be on the affected person if they did not follow the CEI. Meanwhile, motivation from 
elements can be divided into two categories i.e. Active Equipment (AE) e.g. fire alarm, bell 
ringing, siren, etc. and Passive Element (PE) e.g. fire cues, burning smell, etc.  
iii. Exit chosen for evacuation: - Everybody has a choice of his own. An opportunity to 
choose any egress in an emergency situation should be given by the building’s owner by 
providing an alternative escape route in their buildings. People can behave differently with the 
changing of the building environment, the opportunity or choices available and the knowledge or 
know-how about the egress provided in their building. On the other hand, the building elements 
or building environment should be designed to suit human behaviour.. Human behaviour 
influences the design of escape routes in any building and the circulation environment inside the 
building. This is to ensure that those elements can provide the best possible way to ensure all 
occupants can evacuate the building safely when needed. 
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iv. Evacuation behaviour factors: - Humans are sometimes being influenced by the situation 
happening around them. The degree of influence may be different among a group of people and it 
is mainly due to the level of passion and patience they have. Many would say that people panic if 
they are faced with a chaotic situation, difficulty in moving in congested traffic, etc. This is based 
on a popular assumption without any concrete evidence to support it. As mentioned earlier, 
people are very constructive and cooperate when they are faced with an emergency situation.  
Even though one’s mood can change, there is no certainty what causes one to change their 
behaviour. Are there people or structured element factors that have more influence to cause one 
to change their character? From the survey, it was found that people and structural elements play 
an equally important role in causing one to change their behaviour. Therefore, structural design, 
i.e. escape routes should be designed with the optimum specification to ensure the safety of 
people is at the maximum level. Meanwhile, among the human factors that could cause one to 
change one’s behaviour are traffic congestion, havoc situation, and crowds in the evacuation 
process. Therefore, it can be concluded that people’s moods change not solely because of the 
human factors but the building element also plays an important role. 
6.6.5 Factors to control the human behaviour. 
There are two main factors that would be able to control the behavioural aspect in human life i.e. 
(1) enforcement of legislation, (2) threat or danger situation. These factors are believed to be 
among the effective measures to ensure every individual will follow the framework as desired by 
the authority.  
i. Enforcement in legislation is very important to ensure the effectiveness of any rules and 
regulations at the optimum level. Enforcement means  ensuring that all legislation regarding 
safety measures in buildings are followed by all respective parties. . The effectiveness of any 
laws and legislations in use are solely dependent on the capability of enforcement. 
ii. Threat or danger situation refer to the state that if any action are taken it could have 
serious consequences not only for the person but to the close family or  the community. This 
factor would be able to trigger people to swing their mood and behaviour. This is to enable them 
to react accordingly to ensure they and the people around them are safe and sound. 
6.6.6 Factors that should be followed the human behaviour  
Active Equipment and Passive Elements are the factors that should follow the human behaviour 
for the safety of the people. The equipment should be capable of being used by the people 
without difficulty. If they are designed and installed beyond the ability of humans to use them it 
is similar to it being non-existent.  
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i. Active Equipment refers to all fire suppression, detection and alarm systems e.g. portable 
fire extinguisher, hose reel, sprinkler system etc. Current regulations require all high-rise 
residential buildings to be installed with the minimum of dry riser or wet riser together with a fire 
extinguisher system. For reasons of economy in a competitive property market, developers did 
not install automatic water sprinkler systems in any of the high-rise residential buildings 
observed. All active equipment needs humans to activate it except for the automatic fire detection 
system. Therefore, the equipment workability must be suited to the ability of human to activate it. 
Level of workability can be divided into three categories i.e. skill, semi-skill or non-skill.  
ii. Building Element and Structural Design refer to the internal circulation of the building 
and egress route from the building. Building circulation includes corridors and staircases. One 
such building element is a fire door. This should be designed and installed to provide the best 
service to the building occupants to help them in evacuation if an emergency arises.  
6.6.7 Action to be taken by people during emergency situation 
Human behaviour in building fires is quite complex and involves many stages of interpretation of 
sequences of activities before any action can be taken. The most common activities involved are 
(1) Information gathering, (2) Information interpretation, (3) Risk calculation before action is 
taken, (4) Action taken based on the perceptions, (5) Environment and/or technological 
influences, (6) Intellectual capabilities, and (7) Person ability i.e. gender and age groups. Figure 
6.6 explains the integration of human behaviour model with the action to be taken during an 
emergency i.e. when people have seen fire cues or heard fire alarm. 
In the case of a fire breaking out, once occupants have been notified about the fire or if they have 
seen the fire cues, the actions to be taken by those respondents who were surveyed (see analysis 
survey results as in table 6.8, and model in figure 6.8) are; immediately evacuate the building 
after they alert other people to evacuate; seek help e.g. call 999; activate the fire alarm; and help 
others with evacuation, are other actions to be taken after information is gathered and analysed. 
Risk analysis is then taking place.  
Risk calculation in an emergency situation is often driven by the knowledge and information 
available such as what would they do to evacuate. The vast majority of respondents said that they 
would use the staircase and follow the exit signage available to the safe designation area.  
The specifications of the built environment i.e. internal circulation for egress, staircase design 
and specification, the orientation of corridors and fire doors are very important. Besides human 
motivation that would be able to trigger the evacuation to start, the equipment available in the 
building i.e. fire alarm system is among the important factors to motivate people to start. 
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Intellectual capabilities will determine how fast and accurate any information can be analysed. In 
the case of fire, a person with high intellectual capabilities, basically knows how to deal with the 
situation at minimum destruction and at what level is risk can be taken. Unlike machine intellect, 
human intellect can process data to give a possible result of irregular answer. Machine intellect 
will only process data 1 + 1 = 2, but human intellect may process data 1 + 1 = 2 or 3 or 4, etc., 
depending on the definition of what is 1, 2, 3, or 4, because the human cognitive system is able to 
convert numerical and non-numerical data automatically into meaningful information. This 
variability can be obtained due to the experience that is held in our cognitive system. Therefore 
knowledge and experience in fire safety is crucially important to everyone. As intellectual 
capability is reflected by the educational background, knowledge and experience can be gained 
through formal or informal learning processes. This can be accomplished by attending colleges or 
attending proper fire safety courses. Experience evolving from taking part in a fire drill or 
engaged in an actual fire tragedy is extremely useful. 
A person’s ability will determine how fast and smooth any evacuation process can take place. It 
is defined as the ability of one to move out from the high-rise building to the safe designated 
area. However, elderly people and people with a disability will not impede the evacuation 
process because most of them will wait in their flat to be rescued (Proulx, 1995). Nevertheless, a 
person’s health condition, body size and ages apparently will influence the smooth of evacuation 
process. However, if elderly people or people with a mobility impairment are rescued using the 
same staircase used by other occupants, it will slow down the traffic flow. 
6.7 Conclusion  
Human behaviour is e complex;. today’s decision by one person could be different on the 
following day, or even within an hour. Integration between human behaviour and escape routes 
in high-rise residential buildings needs further analysis. This can be carried out after we have 
understood how occupants of high-rise residential buildings are going to react if their building 
catches fire. 
Among the important points to highlight are that the occupants want to evacuate the building 
using the staircase instead of the elevator. They will evacuate the building immediately after the 
fire alarm goes off or after any fire cues are detected. However, they have a tendency to help 
other occupants after calling 999 for help. The majority of them will not to try to put out the fire 
as a first priority even if they have attended fire safety courses. There is a tendency for some 
occupants to carry along with them some possessions during evacuation. This is a common 
phenomenon in which every human being has a desire to save some valuables, even to the extent 
that it could put themselves in danger. 
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Occupants’ behaviour is highly influenced by crowds and traffic congestion in the escape stair. 
They are likely to react irrationally if a havoc situation occurs and furthermore, if they know that 
someone they love is still in the building. The smell of burning material can also highly influence 
the people’s behaviour. 
Factors that most motivate occupants to evacuate the buildings are a directive from a person with 
authority e.g. fire brigade officer, police or building security. Fire cues and fire alarm are also 
among the main factors that will motivate them to evacuate the building. 
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CHAPTER 7 
AN EVALUATION OF THE PROVISION OF ESCAPE ROUTES IN HIGH-
RISE RESIDENTIAL BUILDINGS IN MALAYSIA 
7.1 Introduction 
High-rise residential buildings have become a common structure in urban areas in Malaysia 
especially in the capital, Kuala Lumpur. Rapid development of Kuala Lumpur during the last few 
decades has attracted a large number of people from rural areas, rapidly increasing the 
population. People migrated to Kuala Lumpur for various purposes e.g. working, business, 
seeking a new life, etc, and this has created a high demand for new homes. This trend seems to 
have drastically increased in the past decade. With the limited land available in the town area, 
construction of high-rise residential buildings by various developers e.g. private or Government 
Link Companies to cater for the demand of new homes, near to the urban area, seems to be an 
alternative solution for the immediate needs. 
However, even though there is a high demand for new buildings fire safety should not be 
compromised. Residential buildings are exposed to high casualty risk, because if fire breaks out it 
would cause a high rate of casualties to the occupants, therefore careful design is needed, 
especially emergency fire escape routes. In order to maintain high-rise residential buildings at an 
acceptable fire safety level, means of escape should be designed according to the specification 
given in acts and regulations while taking into consideration the number of occupants and 
people’s behaviour.  
Purser, (2004), explains that the prescriptive approach concentrates on the structural aspects of 
means of escape and acknowledges only in a general sense the point that fire hazard and safe 
escape are basically time dependent. It does not consider occupant behaviour in emergencies and 
the time required for occupant responses. Best practice for structural design in relation to fire 
safety therefore takes into account the needs of building occupants for structural performance. 
This can be achieved by means of a performance-based Fire Safety Engineering approach. 
However Rasbash et al (2004) mentions that the consequences of inadequate means of escape 
have been highlighted in a number of incidents in which the absence of properly designed escape 
routes, inadequate protection, failure of alarm or warning systems, or some other shortcoming, 
has resulted in serious loss of lives. 
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This chapter will identify some important points in escape route design and specification if 
satisfactory escape is to be assured. Some basic principles of means of escape relevant to high-
rise residential buildings will also be discussed. Although means of escape can be tested to a 
degree during fire drills, the ultimate test of whether or not occupants are able to escape safely in 
an emergency comes when there is a fire. When it happens, it is too late to rectify any problems. 
The best possible way is by using the existing advanced technology to identify or predict 
plausible solutions to future problems that might arise. Based on past experience, human 
behaviour and structural design can be integrated to find plausible answers to give the best 
possible way for the occupants to evacuate their flats. In terms of evacuation planning, the 
provision of escape routes is normally alongside the needs for normal access and circulation 
routes within the building.  
In this chapter analysis of the specification of staircase, fire door and corridor will be carried out 
by simulating a number of people evacuating buildings of different layouts identified in the 
observation study.  The first simulation will be carried out using the specification in UBBL to 
study the floor clearance times of different layouts. Further simulations will study the effects of 
intermediate floor, and staircase, fire door and corridor widths, to determine which one 
contributes more in reducing the total evacuation time and is there any significant difference in 
terms of total evacuation time recorded. Analysis will be carried out on the proposed 
specification to determine whether there is any significant difference in terms of floor clearance 
time and total evacuation time between it and the UBBL specification. 
7.2 Evacuation Time 
Evacuation from building fire is essential and has to be initiated as soon as the fire alarm is 
sounded or fire cues have been detected. When evacuation is in progress, two important elements 
have a strong influence on the evacuation time i.e. Occupants’ characteristics and building 
characteristics. Purser (2004) mentioned that the behaviour of occupants escaping from fire 
depends on a range of factors including building characteristics i.e. occupancy types, method for 
detection and the provision of warnings, fire safety management systems and building layout. 
Other equally important building characteristics are spatial complexity of the buildings, travel 
distances, and escape route and final exit. However, occupant characteristics themselves also 
have a large influence on the evacuation time i.e. occupant numbers, state of alertness, whether 
they are awake or asleep, familiarity with the building environment, experience of fire drill, and 
physical abilities. 
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According to Rasbash et al. (2004), means of escape facilities such as maximum travel distance, 
number and widths of staircases should be designed according to the total evacuation time 
(ΔTevac ) based on the following equation: 
ΔTevac = (D + B +E).                                         (7.1) 
ΔTevac  = Total time from when the fire started to ignite until all occupants have completely 
evacuated the building. However, only sub-time E is generally considered explicitly 
in fire regulations, codes, and standards.  
D  = the period since the start of the fire until occupants are notified about the existence 
of fire. 
B  = refers to the recognition time and response time, i.e. the time between the occupants 
being notified about the fire and beginning to evacuate. This is known as pre-
movement time. 
E  = an escape time that refers to an emergency or non-fire situation. It means that E is 
the total time for an evacuee’s actual movement between beginning to evacuate and 
reaching a place of safety; i.e. entrance to a protected staircase, or outside the 
building. 
Purser (2004) stated that for each occupied enclosure in a building, total escape time (ΔTesc) 
depends upon a series of basically additive, sequential processes summarized in the following 
equation: 
ΔTesc  = ΔTdet + ΔTa + ΔTpre + ΔTtrav                                   (7.2) 
where: 
ΔTdet  =  time from ignition to detection. 
ΔTa =  time from detection to the provision of a general evacuation warning to occupants. 
Alarm time varies and largely depends on the types of alarm system installed in the 
buildings. It can range from 0 for the A17 alarm system, 2 to 5 minutes for A28 
alarm system and possibly longer and more unpredictable for A39 alarm system. 
                                                 
7 A1 alarm system: Automatic fire detection system which generally immediately activates after fire starts. 
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ΔTpre  =  pre-movement time is the time from when occupants become aware of the 
emergency to when they begin to move towards the exits. This may include the time 
required to recognise the emergency and then carry out a range of activities before 
traveling to exits. 
ΔTtrav  =  travel time. (The time required for occupants to travel to a place of safety. Initially 
this might be by a protected escape route such as a corridor or stairway; ultimately it 
will be a place of safety outside the building) 
In general, Total Evacuation Time is a sum of pre-movement time and travel time. Therefore; 
ΔTevac =ΔTpre+ ΔTtrav                                                  (7.3) 
Where pre-movement time consists of detection time and alarm time (ΔTdet + ΔTa).  
To summarise, Purser used terms Evacuation Time (ΔTevac) in equation (7.3) to differentiate the 
terms used in equation (7.2) i.e. Total Escape Time (ΔTesc) that consists of the last two terms in 
the escape equation: 
Meanwhile, Marchant (1976), mentions that there are three main components which contribute to 
the cumulative total escape time (ΔTesc) in an emergency situation i.e. perception time (Tp), 
action time (Ta), and travel time (Ttrav). The relationship between them is written in 
mathematical form as follows:  
 ΔTesc = Tp + Ta + Ttrav                                               (7.4) 
Where:  
ΔTesc  = a total escape time 
Tp   = perception time, i.e. that time from ignition to where people start to realise there is 
a fire or perception of fire,  
Ta   = a time from perception to the start of escape action, and  
                                                                                                                                                              
8 A2 alarm system: Automatic fire detection system with pre-alarm to management or security with pre set a fixed 
time-out delay usually 2 or 5 minutes. If a fire is genuine, alarm throughout the building will be activated manually. 
If there is no fire, the alarm can be cancelled manually. If neither of the both actions taken, alarm will sound 
automatically according to the time-out delay set. 
9 A3 alarm system: Manual alarm system that relies on the personal detection and activation of the alarm system. 
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Ttrav  = a travel time, i.e. time taken to move to a safe area.  
From the above description, the terms total evacuation time and total escape time have the same 
meaning. In the opinion of the author the term Total Evacuation Time is more appropriate to be 
used because it refers to prior, pre and post time action of occupants in the evacuation process. 
However the terms used by Purser, Rusbash and Marchant are not contradictory but can be 
understood as the same things. One thing that they are agreed on is that Total Evacuation Time 
consists of Pre-movement time and Travel Time. 
Travel time has two components mainly known as horizontal travel time (Th) and vertical travel 
time (Tv). Horizontal travel time refers to the time taken to evacuate the building by moving 
horizontally where occupants are walking from any room or along a corridor to the storey exit or 
protected staircase shaft or to the safe area or assembly area if the storey exit is also a final exit. 
Meanwhile vertical travel time refers to the time taken to walk down through the escape stair. If 
we incorporate this time into equation 7.4, it becomes: 
 ΔTesc = Tp + Ta + Th + Tv                                                      (7.5) 
To conclude,  these three periods of time basically refer to (1) Time from when fire started until 
occupants are notified, (2) time when occupants started to evacuate after been notified about the 
fire (this is called delay time or response time), and (3) time taken for evacuees to completely 
evacuate the building. This is called travel time. However periods one and two can be 
incorporated into one term i.e. Pre-Movement Time. Therefore equation (7.3) i.e. ΔTevac = 
ΔTpre + ΔTtrav is more appropriate.  
Where;  
ΔTpre = Tp + Ta          7.6 
ΔTtrav = Th + Tv         7.7 
7.2.1 Pre-movement time 
The response time is a time which indicates the occupants’ delay to respond when the first fire 
alarm sounds. As mention in HMSO, (1993) “No matter how good the means of escape is, and no 
matter how well the facilities are maintained, people might still end up being seriously threatened 
as a result of their own actions. This can arise from people delaying the start of their escape, 
often because of a lack of appreciation of the speed at which fires can grow in buildings, or the 
fire is not seen as an immediate threat, indeed it may be seen as an interesting event to watch”. 
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According to Proulx (1994), this delay time after which each of the occupants starts evacuation 
varies from between 30 seconds to over 24 minutes. Most of the occupants who have heard the 
fire alarm start their evacuation approximately 2½ minutes after the alarm has been activated. 
This was a result from the announced fire drills of occupants in four mid-rise apartment 
buildings. The occupants received a memo that a fire drill would take place during the upcoming 
week. The evacuation drills were recorded on video-cameras located throughout the buildings. 
As mentioned earlier, the result would be different if a real fire occurred and occupants have to 
evacuate from their flats under the threat of fire. This is due to the perception that this is only a 
drill and nothing to be worried about. Table 7.1 shows the action that occupants in high-rise 
residential buildings have taken before evacuating the building.  
 
Table 7.1: Pre-evacuation action (Proulx, 1995) 
Among the actions that cause the occupants to delay the start of their evacuation are; find pet, 
gather valuables, get dressed, find children, have a look at corridor, and move to balcony. This 
increases the pre-movement time or time to start as mentioned by Proulx (1995), i.e. Time to start 
represents the elapsed time between the fire alarm sounding and the moment the person leaves 
his/her apartment. Table 7.2 shows the frequency of pre-movement time for the first 5 minutes 
taken by high-rise residential buildings studied by Proulx. Most of the occupants who heard the 
fire alarm started their evacuation approximately 2½ minutes after the alarm was activated. 
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Table 7.2: Pre-Movement time for apartment buildings for the first 5 minute (Proulx, 1995) 
 
 
Table 7.3: Average Pre-Movement time in residential buildings (Proulx, 1995) 
Table 7.3 shows the average pre-movement times in four high-rise residential buildings studied 
by Proulx; the minimum average is 2 ½ minutes and maximum average is 9 min 42 sec. If we 
average the pre-movement times for the four buildings the overall average pre-movement time is 
5 minutes 55.5 seconds. It can be said that approximately 6 minutes are needed for the occupants 
to start evacuation after they have heard the fire alarm. Because they relate to different 
circumstances or building types, none of the pre-movement times recorded by other researchers 
is directly applicable here, but since the only comparison being made is between the buildings 
studied here, then the precise value assumed is unimportant so long as all the simulations have 
the same pre-movement time. In this case 30 seconds was used. 
7.2.2. Travel time 
Travel time was studied by Proulx (1995) as shown in table 7.4, and an average travel time of 
approximately 1 minute 2 second (62 seconds) to 1 minute 17 seconds (77 seconds) was 
determined for occupants moving out from the 6 – 7 storeys of four high-rise residential 
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buildings in Canada. There are two types of time indicated in table 7.2, time to evacuate and time 
to move. Time to evacuate is the time occupants spend between the sounding of the fire alarm 
and the time at which they reach an area of safety i.e. Pre-movement time plus Travel time. Time 
to move is the time taken by a person to reach at outside or at final exit from the moment that 
person left the apartment, regardless of the distance traveled. This time is known as Travel Time.  
 
Table 7.4: Average time to evacuate (Proulx, 1995) 
7.2.3  Occupant speed 
Occupant speed is the velocity of the people moving out from the building. It can be divided into 
two main categories i.e. speed when people are walking on a horizontal plane, and speed when 
they are walking down the staircase. The speed when people are walking on a horizontal plane 
can easily be determined by measurement. Measuring the speed of people walking down the 
staircase is more difficult, since walking speed down the staircase usually is not steady.  
The walking speed of the occupants is also influenced by the body type, age and physical ability. 
Because high residential buildings are normally occupied by various types of people, it is 
suggested that walking speed in simulation is set based on multiple occupancy and set at a typical 
distribution of types of people i.e. male, female, elderly and children. In the Simulex programme, 
different types of people have different walking speeds. Table 7.4.1 shows the range of occupants 
speed in Simulex. These walking speeds are obtained by checking each of the individual assigned 
in the models tested. 
People Male Female Elderly Children 
Walking speed 
(m/s) 
1.15 – 1.53 0.97 – 1.34 0.52 – 1.23 0.62 – 1.19 
Table 7.4.1: Range of occupants speed in Simulex  
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7.3 Simulation procedure on study models 
Models were designed using CAD software and saved in a dxf file. If more than one floor needs 
to be analysed, dxf files have to be uploaded as many times as desired and the floor then named 
accordingly. All floors have to be connected to each other by using staircases designed in the 
SIMULEX environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.0:  (a) Staircase without landing floor link to every floor, (b) Staircases with 
intermediate landing floors connecting the floors. 
To determine the number of staircases needed, analysis of the effect of the intermediate landing 
i.e. landing connecting between two staircases (see diagram in figure 7.0b) on the evacuation 
time, needs to be carried out. If there is no significant time difference between the two cases, 
only one staircase will be designed in Simulex linking to each of the floors served by the 
staircase as in figure 7.0a. Analysis of this requirement will be discussed in paragraph 7.4.1. The 
staircase needs to be linked to the appropriate floor. The link must be the same as the door width. 
After links have being made, an exit or exits need to be assigned to enable the occupants to get 
out of the building. The exit assigned is an end destination for occupants to get out of the 
building. People then have to be put in before we can start the simulation. People’s 
characteristics should be determined and selected from the choice given in the SIMULEX 
environment. These pre-installed people characteristics are easy to use and changes can be made 
at any time if wanted. 
Ground floor
1st floor
2nd floor
Intermediate 
Landing 
Link from 
the 2nd floor 
Link from 
the 1st floor 
Link to the 
Ground floor 
Staircase Staircases
(a) (b) 
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Figure 7.1: Example of the 1st and 2nd floor 
model 
 
Figure 7.2: Example of the ground floor 
model 
As described in chapter 4, there are 260 study models to test in the simulation software. Every 
model had to be designed in the CAD environment and uploaded into Simulex i.e. three building 
floor models for this purpose, floor one and two, and ground floor as shown in figure 7.1 and 7.2. 
Floor 1 and floor 2 models have been described in chapter 4 and the ground floor model designed 
as a rectangle to indicate the building line to enable people to move toward the final exit.  
Both models were then uploaded into Simulex and named accordingly to indicate the appropriate 
floor level they represent. Staircases are then designed according to the width and length as 
shown in table 4.9. In general, the simulation procedures were as follows; 
(i) Add floor; by clicking ‘Building’ button, floor plan can be added. Dxf file saved in 
appropriate folder can be imported and named accordingly i.e. ground floor. 
(ii) Procedure (i) can be repeated to add other floor plans i.e. Floor 1, 2, 3 etc. The number 
of floor plans to be added depends on the number of floors we wanted to investigate.  
(iii) Add staircases i.e. staircase 1, 2, 3, 4, etc by putting in the staircase specification e.g. 
staircase width as in table 4.9 and name them accordingly. 
(iv) Add links to every staircase designed to the floor level i.e. link 1 is to link staircase 1 
to the ground floor plan, link 2 is to link staircase 1 to the 1st floor, link 3 is to link 
staircase 2 to the 1st floor, link 4 to link staircase 2 to the landing floor, link 5 to link 
staircase 3 to the landing floor, link 6 to link staircase 3 to the 2nd floor and so on. All 
links widths have to be the same width as the staircase designed. 
(v) Add 2 metres exit to indicate the normal main entrance width at the ground floor which 
is normally uses by the occupants to enter and leave the building. It is placed opposite 
to the link 1 made in procedure (iv). 
(vi) Add people into all models by dividing equally into every chamber available in the 
study models. People characteristics are then set; in the analysis of the models the 
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same typical distribution of people is used in each model tested to reflect the normal 
occupancy type of people in residential buildings, i.e. male, female, children and 
elderly. 
(vii) Calculate the distance maps by clicking ‘DistMap’ button and then click ‘Calculate 
All’.  
(viii) Run the simulation by click ‘Simulation’ and then click ‘Begin’. The simulation can be 
recorded and saved in an appropriate folder under an appropriate name. 
(ix) After the simulation has been completed a popup window will show the simulation 
time. Click ‘Yes’ and another popup window will tell the time taken by all people who 
have reached the exit. 
(x) Note down the evacuation time in table as in appendix 7.1 for further analysis. 
Figure 7.3 shows one of the models that have been simulated in Simulex.  
 
Figure 7.3: Example of simulation process 
Figure 7.4 shows an example of a two storey schematic drawing of a common staircase in a high-
rise residential building.  There are four staircases with five landing floors for floor 2, 1, and 
ground floor. For the high-rise building, the same form of staircase is repeated to the number of 
the storeys required. 
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Figure 7.4: Schematic drawing of common staircase in high-rise residential buildings. 
7.4 Analysis of escape route specification 
The purpose of this simulation is to analyse the staircase, corridor, and fire door specifications. A 
further objective is to identify some important points concerning the internal layout of the 
building relating to the location of fire escapes. Analysis of various building floor layouts 
identified in the observation study will be carried out to investigate whether the design 
specification as stated in UBBL is satisfactory. 
Before further investigation on escape stair specification can be done, analysis of staircases with 
and without landing floors will be carried out to investigate the effect of the staircase landing 
floor on the evacuation time. If there is no significant difference between them, further analysis 
on staircase, corridor and fire door width will be carried out by designing only one staircase and 
link it to the respective floors. If there are significant differences between them, then, analysis of 
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staircase, corridor and fire door will be carried out by taking into consideration the existence of 
the landing floor on the evacuation process. 
7.4.1 Analysis of staircases with or without intermediate landing floor 
To analyse the effect of the staircase, comparison of two staircases is carried out, i.e. staircase 
width 914 mm with and without an intermediate landing. Tests have been carried out using 
Simulex software. The test results are shown in table 7.5. The test is carried out by adding the 
number of people in the model beginning from one person up to the maximum of 180 persons. 
The purpose of the test is to understand the effect of the intermediate landing on people’s 
movement. Comparison is made of two different staircases i.e. staircase with and without 
intermediate landing. In the first test the number of people is gradually increased from one to ten 
to investigate the effect of the number of people evacuating using both types of staircase. 
No. of 
People 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 36 72 180 
914w 33.0 33.0 33.1 35.5 42.3 43.0 45.4 43.1 48.6 48.1 87.0 163.4 391.7 
914wo 28.2 28.3 29.8 31.1 32.1 32.5 33.4 35.5 36.8 38.0 54.3 93.6 196.9 
Table 7.5: Evacuation Time for staircase 914 mm with and without intermediate landing 
In the second test the number of people is based on different numbers of people occupying each 
flat. There are three occupation types i.e. Normal occupancy, 2 persons per room; high 
occupancy, 4 persons per room; and very crowded occupancy, 10 persons per room. The total 
number of occupants simulated is based on the number of flats per floor  i.e. six flats with three 
bedrooms, normal density is 2 x 3 x 6 = 36 persons, high density is 4 x 3 x 6 = 72 persons, and 
over crowded  is 10 x 3 x 6 = 180 persons. The total number of people is equal distributed on 
each floor. For example, for the over crowded occupancy, 180 people are divided by 2 i.e. 90 
people to be placed on the 1st floor and another 90 people will be placed on the 2nd floor. The 
evacuation time recorded here is a total evacuation time when all people have evacuated the 
model. 
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Figure 7.5:  Evacuation time Vs No. of People of low occupancy for staircase 914 mm with 
and without intermediate landing floor. 
For the staircase without intermediate landing, Staircase Equivalence Length is used, which takes 
into consideration the distance that occupants have to walk on the staircase and through the 
intermediate landing. There will be only one staircase design in Simulex environment that links 
from floor level to the ground floor. For the staircase with intermediate landing, the actual 
staircase length is designed and links from floor level to the intermediate landing then to the 
ground floor. There will be four staircases, 1st staircase from the 2nd floor level to the 
intermediate landing located between 2nd and 1st floor, 2nd staircase from the intermediate landing 
to the 1st floor, 3rd staircase from the 1st floor level to the intermediate landing located between 1st 
floor and ground floor and 4th staircase from the intermediate landing to the ground floor. 
Occupants have to change the staircase at every landing floor on their way out. Those test results 
are as in figure 7.5, evacuation time versus no. of people of low occupancy and high occupancy 
respectively. 
The simulation shows that in increasing the number of people up to ten people, there is no 
congestion at any point on the staircase. People are smoothly moving down the staircase. In the 
case of the staircase with the intermediate landing, people have to change staircases at the 
intermediate landing, and this causes the walking speed to slow down. It causes a significant 
delay in the travel time. This demonstrates that the intermediate landing does have an effect on 
the travel time.  
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Figure 7.5 shows the analysis of travel time on the same width of staircase, i.e. 914 mm with and 
without intermediate landing. It shows that evacuation from the staircase with an intermediate 
landing takes longer than without. The difference is from 11.07% to 35.93%, with an average 
difference of 23.89%. A similar result occurred when a staircase 1524 mm wide with and without 
an intermediate landing was analysed. The results show that evacuation from the staircase with 
the intermediate landing took longer. The difference was from 8.87% to 29.74% maximum with 
an average difference of 14.63%. This is further evidence that the intermediate landing has an 
effect on the travel time, taking about 15% to 24% longer that the staircase without the 
intermediate landing.  
There are significant differences between staircase with and without an intermediate landing. 
Therefore further analysis of staircases, corridors and fire doors in the study models takes into 
consideration the existence of the intermediate landing. 
7.4.2 Analysis of floor clearance time and total evacuation time for different building 
layouts 
Data used for the simulations shown in tables 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8: 
No. of floors (Nf): =  10 floors 
No. of staircases (Ns): =  20 staircase i.e. two staircases between the floors. 
No. of platforms (Np): =  21 platforms i.e. 10 intermediate floors + 11 landing floors 
No. of steps per staircase: =  9 steps per staircase: based on the observation that the great 
majority of staircases were designed with 9 steps. 
Tread dimension: = 255mm i.e. minimum requirement by UBBL 
Riser dimension: = 180mm i.e. maximum requirement by UBBL. 
Staircase width (Ws): = 1100 mm i.e. minimum requirement by UBBL 
Door width (Wd): = 914 mm (3 ft): based on the observation that the majority of fire 
doors fitted to the staircase shafts were 914 mm. The Building 
Regulations do not mention specifically the width of fire door 
that should be used. Normal practice is for the fire department to 
accept any standard size of fire door, i.e. standard size produced 
by manufacturer, as long as it has been approved by SIRIM i.e. 
Malaysian Standard. 
Exit width: = Final exit door width or actual opening width. 
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Link width: = Storey exit door width. 
Staircase length (St):  =  102.4 m: calculated using equation 4.4 for a staircase of 
1100mm.  
Response time: = 30 seconds +/- 0.5 seconds. 
 
Example calculation of staircase length: 
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Ls = √ X2 + Y2 
Where; 
X  =  No of staircase steps multiplied by riser dimension. 
Y  =  No of staircase steps multiplied by tread dimension. 
From the above design data, 
X  =  9 x 180 mm 
     =  1,620 mm 
Y  =  9 x 255 mm 
     =  2,295 mm 
Ls  =  √ (1620)2 + (2295)2 
      =  2,809 mm 
Therefore, 
St = (20 x 2809) + (21 x 2 x 1100) 
 = 102,380 mm 
 = 102.4 m 
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Simulation results for various building layouts can be found in tables 7.6, 7.7, 7.8 i.e. for low, 
normal and high occupancy respectively. The simulations were carried out by assuming that 
people begin to evacuate the building approximately 30 seconds after the fire alarm goes off. The 
simulation results for the low occupancy suggest that no significant problems will arise, as the 
floor clearance times recorded were 50 to 75 seconds. A floor clearance time below 150 seconds 
(2.5 minutes) is accepted in the UK as reasonably safe. This an average clearance time was 
proposed after the evacuation experience during a fire in the Empire Palace Theatre in Edinburgh 
in 1911 (Kendit, 1986). If we consider the response times studied by Proulx (1995), i.e. that most 
of the occupants in residential buildings will only start their evacuation approximately 2½ 
minutes after the alarm has been activated, most of the people in the high-rise residential 
buildings simulated are at high risk because the floor clearance time will be more than 2½ 
minutes even for low occupancy. Therefore the conclusion is that there is no clear guidance at 
present on what is considered as a safe floor clearance or total evacuation time for a high-rise 
residential building.  
Building A B C D 
Floors per 
building 10 10 10 10 
Flats per floor 6 7 8 8 
Rooms per flat 3 3 3 3 
Occupants per 
room 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 1 2 4 
Total people 180 360 720 210 420 840 240 480 960 240 480 960
Table 7.5.1: Number of people simulated in the buildings studied. 
Table 7.5.1 shows the number of people simulated in the buildings studied for low, medium and 
high occupancy. Building C and D have the same number of people per floor level therefore any 
difference in evacuation time between the two is a result of the different layouts (see floor plans 
in Chapter 4). 
Buildings A and B are included for comparison as they are typical of high-rise flats in Malaysia. 
The minimum number of staircases and appropriate staircase width is related to the number of 
occupants expected and is described in Chapter 2, along with an example of the calculation used. 
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Floor 
clearance 
time (s) 
Low occupancy i.e. 1 person per room 
Building A Building B Building C Building D 
S1 S2 S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S1 S2 S3 
Floor 1 65 50 60 55 50 50 60 60 - 60 60 
Floor 2 55 50 60 70 50 60 65 60 - 55 50 
Floor 3 60 55 60 55 55 50 55 65 - 55 55 
Floor 4 60 50 55 50 55 50 60 60 - 55 55 
Floor 5 60 50 55 55 50 50 60 60 - 60 55 
Floor 6 60 50 60 65 50 60 60 60 - 55 60 
Floor 7 65 45 70 40 50 50 60 75 - 55 55 
Floor 8 65 50 60 45 55 50 65 65 - 55 55 
Floor 9 55 50 55 45 60 60 65 55 - 60 55 
Floor 10 65 55 60 40 60 50 60 60 - 50 50 
            
Total 
Evacuation 
Time(m:s) 
5:21.3 5:08.9 5:24.1 5:31.0 
Note: S1 = Staircase No. 1, S2 = Staircase No. 2, S3 = Staircase No. 3, S4 = Staircase No. 4 
Table 7.6: Floor clearance time and total evacuation time for low occupancy 
The simulations recorded (see table 7.6) that no occupants evacuated building D by staircase 
No.1 because it is the furthest from each flat, therefore the occupants have chosen either staircase 
2 or 3 to evacuate the building. The total evacuation time from the building was 5 to 5 ½ minutes. 
Although building B has more occupants than building A the evacuation time is shorter. 
However, building B has four staircases compared with two in building A, because the layout of 
building B is such that the maximum travel distance required by the bye-laws would otherwise be 
exceeded. 
Floor 
clearance 
time (s) 
Normal  occupancy i.e. 2 persons per room  
Building A Building B Building C Building D 
S1 S2 S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S1 S2 S3 
Floor 1 90 55 70 65 55 55 85 90 - 75 70 
Floor 2 75 55 80 70 55 65 80 80 - 75 75 
Floor 3 100 55 75 65 55 50 85 120 - 75 75 
Floor 4 80 55 70 60 60 55 85 85 - 80 75 
Floor 5 90 55 70 55 65 50 95 85 - 85 75 
Floor 6 85 55 75 65 50 60 80 90 - 85 75 
Floor 7 85 55 80 50 60 55 85 95 - 70 80 
Floor 8 100 60 80 50 70 65 100 155 - 80 80 
Floor 9 80 55 75 60 60 60 85 80 - 75 75 
Floor 10 65 60 65 45 65 50 65 65 - 70 65 
            
Total 
Evacuation 
Time (m:s) 
6: 35.7 5:57.3 6:51.8 6:09.8 
Note: S1 = Staircase No. 1, S2 = Staircase No. 2, S3 = Staircase No. 3, S4 = Staircase No. 4 
Table 7.7: Floor clearance time and total evacuation time for normal occupancy 
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For normal occupancy (see table 7.7), i.e. two people per room, the simulation results show that 
the floor clearance times were mostly below 150 seconds, except for the building C i.e. at 
staircase no. 2 on the eighth floor where the floor clearance time was 155 seconds. Building C 
has a foyer type internal layout, and the simulation shows that some of the people on the eighth 
floor who have chosen to evacuate building C by staircase no. 2 may be at risk because the floor 
clearance time was more than 150 seconds. Increasing the number of occupants in the buildings 
tested, i.e. doubling the number from 1 person per room to 2 persons per room, increases the 
floor clearance time by between 5 seconds and 1 ½ minutes. The total evacuation time increases 
by between 30 seconds to 1 ½ minutes. 
Floor 
clearance 
time (s) 
High occupancy i.e. 4 persons per room 
Building A Building B Building C Building D 
S1 S2 S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S1 S2 S3 
Floor 1 150 80 125 70 75 60 155 150 - 125 110 
Floor 2 150 75 135 75 75 60 160 160 - 120 165 
Floor 3 180 85 160 60 80 60 205 190 - 165 180 
Floor 4 180 80 150 80 75 65 260 215 - 195 170 
Floor 5 275 80 150 100 75 60 280 285 - 225 230 
Floor 6 305 75 150 75 75 70 320 200 - 250 245 
Floor 7 340 95 245 70 105 75 345 235 - 295 300 
Floor 8 380 85 270 70 85 70 315 415 - 240 270 
Floor 9 415 80 120 70 85 75 305 285 - 175 305 
Floor 10 90 70 105 60 70 60 95 90 - 80 85 
            
Total 
Evacuation 
Time (m:s) 
11:53.8 9:35.8 12:10.7 10:44.1 
Note: S1 = Staircase No. 1, S2 = Staircase No. 2, S3 = Staircase No. 3, S4 = Staircase No. 4 
Table 7.8: Floor clearance time and total evacuation time for high occupancy 
Table 7.8 shows the simulation results for high occupancy, i.e. 4 people per room. These 
simulation results show that at certain floor levels the floor clearance time recorded was higher 
than 150 seconds. Simulation on building A shows that staircase No. 1 recorded a higher floor 
clearance time than staircase No. 2. From 720 people placed in this building, 480 people 
(66.67%) exited the building by staircase No. 1 and 240 people (33.33%) exited by staircase No. 
2.  
The staircase used by each occupant is determined by the distance of their flat exit from the 
staircase – Simulex assumes that people will select the nearest staircase. Where there is more 
than one staircase the overall floor clearance time at each floor is the maximum of those recorded 
through the different staircases. 
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The results for Building B, with four staircases, show that staircase No. 1 recorded higher floor 
clearance times than the other staircases. Out of 840 people (i.e. 4 people/room x 3 room/flat x 7 
flat/floor x 10 floors = 840), 360 people (42.86%) exited the building by staircase No. 1, 174 
people (20.71%) exited by staircase No. 2, 186 people (22.14%) exited by staircase No. 3, and 
120 people (14.29%) exited by staircase No.4. The number of people occupied high-rise 
residential building is ranged from 2 to 15 people per flat (see table 6.2.1 in chapter 6) There are 
9.6% i.e. eleven flats occupied by 12 people per flat. Therefore 12 people per flat have been 
chosen (i.e. 4 people/room x 3 room/flat). 
Buildings C and D, with the same number of residential flats per floor, i.e. eight flats, recorded 
floor clearance times higher than 150 seconds except for the tenth floor. According to the 
simulation results, increasing the number of people i.e. double normal occupancy, will pose a 
high risk to the occupants. Building D has a more linear layout and in fact one of the staircases is 
not used in the evacuation simulation due to its greater distance from the flats (Tables 7.6, 7.7, 
7.8). The contribution of the different floor layout to floor clearance time appears to be related 
directly to the distance of the staircase from the flats. Under low and normal occupancy the floor 
clearance and overall evacuation times do not appear to pose a major problem, but under 
conditions of overcrowding, which are common in some buildings in Malaysia, excessive floor 
clearance times can occur. Also, the simulations show that some staircases are not used or under-
used, suggesting that their location is inconvenient for exit from some of the flats. Thus there is a 
possibility that the number of people using one of the staircases is greater than it was designed 
for, and the staircase width may therefore not be sufficient for the number of people using it. 
7.4.3 Analysis of study models 
Further analysis on the study models is important because technical solutions need to be 
determined, hopefully to reduce the risks to the building occupants by helping them in the 
evacuation process. It is difficult to change human behaviour but the building specifications can 
be changed more easily. From the opinion survey (see chapter 6) 72.6% of the occupants had no 
formal training or courses in fire safety and 77.4% had no experience of involvement in building 
fires. Even though 57.4% of them had experienced a fire drill, none of them had experienced a 
fire drill in their own residential building. In this regard, the building element best known as 
escape route, that is escape stairs, corridors and fire doors, should be designed and constructed to 
serve the occupants the best they can by not allowing any further delay in the evacuation process. 
The design and construction of escape routes needs to consider not only the evacuation time but 
also the construction time, economics, construction method and space utilization factors. The 
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objective of this section is to analyse the optimum staircase width, corridor width, and fire door 
width. Table 4.9 show the staircase, fire door and corridor sizes that have been selected to be 
used for further analysis in SIMULEX software. 
There are eight scenarios (refer to chapter 4.7.1) all together that were developed based on the 
observation of the high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia. The vast majority of high-rise 
residential buildings observed had emergency staircases, parallel, vertical, or straight with the 
corridor, or staircase without corridor that served the cluster flats. Those scenarios come with or 
without a fire door. The philosophy adopted here is the faster is the safer10. The purpose of this 
study is;  
(1)  To know at what point the design of staircase, fire door and corridor in the high-rise 
building provides an optimum safe route to be used by occupants.  
(2)  To test the popular assumption that wider staircase and corridor are better for 
evacuation process and the bigger space provided, the better people are evacuated.  
Time is the determining factor for analysing the staircase specification. In this sub-chapter, 
discussion will be centred on the travel time taken by 200 occupants evacuating the pre-designed 
model through the specific staircase dimension, fire door and corridor width. From 200 people, 
100 people will be placed at the 1st floor and another 100 at the 2nd floor. The number of people 
on each floor will be divided equally i.e. if the study model has two chambers, 50 people will be 
placed in each of the chambers. 260 models have been tested and the test results can be found in 
figure 7.8 to figure 7.15 below. 200 occupants were chosen based on the assumption of high 
occupancy i.e. 4 persons per room for a three bedroom flat. From the observation of high-rise 
residential buildings in Kuala Lumpur and Penang, the number of flats per floor level ranges 
from 6 to 16 flats with the majority having 8 flats per floor. Therefore; 4 persons/room x 3 
bedrooms/flat x 8 flats/floor = 96 people. The nearest round figure to 96 is 100, therefore 100 
people per floor level had been chosen for the simulation because in the seventh schedule of the 
UBBL says that the capacity in a number of persons of a unit of exit width (i.e. staircase width) 
varies from 30 persons per unit of exit width to 100 persons per unit of exit width for travel in 
horizontal direction. (Refer to Table 2.0 in Chapter 2 for example showing the maximum number 
of people per given staircase width).  In engineering terms designing any building elements, for 
the safety of people, the extreme condition has to be considered. We do not have to worry about 
                                                 
10 The faster means that in all models simulated, evacuation time will be compared and the shorten time taken by 
occupants to evacuate the studies models is consider the safest one. 
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the lower cases if we have considered the extreme condition. For example when designing a 
building column, the maximum load that could be carried by the column has to be considered. On 
top of that it is commonly practice that 5% – 10% of the safety factors are added to accommodate 
the unforeseen circumstances of possibly the building is overloaded in the future especially when 
dealing with the live load i.e. people and movable equipment. The optimum dimensions derived 
below are for overcrowded conditions and for lower populations the optimum dimensions may be 
different. 
(i) Model one 
Figure 7.8 shows the graph of evacuation time versus fire door width for model one. This 
scenario has a staircase with a fire door and not parallel with the corridor. This model is named 
“Opposite Direction with Fire Door”. There are five sizes of staircase from the minimum width 
914 mm to the maximum width 1524 mm. Every staircase is designed with one fire door in the 
range 762 mm (2 ft 6 inch) to 1524 mm (5 ft),  taking the evacuation times of 200 occupants.  
Overall analysis of the test result of 200 occupants evacuating the study model showed a 
difference of 84 sec between the shortest and longest of the staircase design tested. The shortest 
time taken was 225.0 sec for the 1372mm staircase with 838 mm fire door width. The longest 
time taken was 309.3 sec for the 914mm staircase with 914 mm fire door width.   
Analysis of Staircases for model 1
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Figure 7.8: Evacuation Time Vs Fire Door; Model 1 i.e. Opposite directions with fire door. 
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The staircases of width 914 mm and 1067 mm show the same pattern of evacuation time i.e. time 
increased when the fire door width increased. Fire door size 914mm (3 ft) has the longest time 
taken for all occupants to evacuate the model. The total evacuation time is slightly improved 
when the fire door width is increased to 990 mm (3ft 6inches). The shortest time taken recorded 
was when the fire door width was 1067mm (3.5 ft). The time is then increased again when the 
fire door width is increased to 1220mm (4ft) and 1370 mm (4.5ft) and remains about the same 
when the fire door width is further increased to 1524mm (5ft). Test results for staircases 1220 
mm, 1372 mm and 1254 mm wide show that this has no significant effect on evacuation time 
even after the fire door sizes changed. This suggests that there is no significant correlation 
between the evacuation time and the fire door width if the staircase width is wider than 1220 mm 
for the number of people tested. There is significant evidence that traffic is not congested either if 
the staircase designed is wider than 1220 mm. For the same staircase orientation, a test is needed 
to determine the effect of corridor width on the evacuation time. In this regard, model two has 
been developed and tested. 
(ii)  Model two 
Corridor analysis for model 2
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Figure 7.9: Graph Evacuation time Vs Corridor width, Model 2 i.e. opposite direction 
without fire door 
The second test has been carried out on model two, which has been slightly modified from model 
one i.e. without fire door increased corridor width. Corridor widths ranged from 1220 mm (4 ft) 
to 2440 mm (8 ft). This model is named as “Opposite Directions without Fire Door”. The result 
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of the test is in figure 7.9 i.e. evacuation time versus corridor width. The purpose of this analysis 
is to examine the corridor specification against the staircase width. 
The test results show that the time taken for the staircase 914mm wide is slightly higher than 
model one. The shortest time taken is 287.5 sec at corridor width 1220 mm and the highest time 
taken is 336.1 sec at corridor width 1828 mm. The time taken seems to improve when the 
staircase width increases. However, there is no significant difference between staircases 1220 and 
1372 wide, as for both models the time taken is around 4 minutes even though the corridor width 
has been increased. There is a significant time reduction in staircase 1524 that is around 30 sec 
faster than the time taken in model one. However, the time is seen to steadily increase when the 
corridor width increases from 1220 to 1524 and 1828mm. The evacuation time then decreases 
when the corridor width is further increased to 2134 and remains about the same after it is further 
increased to 2440mm.  
The phenomenon in staircase 1067 is similar in that the evacuation time increases when the 
corridor width increases. Staircase 1067mm has the best evacuation time when the corridor width 
is 1220 mm (4ft) i.e. 236.0 sec. The evacuation time increases when the corridor width increases 
to 1524 mm (5 ft) and remains about the same even after the corridor width is further increased to 
1828 mm. The evacuation time then increases again approaching the 300 sec when the corridor 
width is increased to 2440 mm (8 ft).  
However, this phenomenon does not happen to staircases 1220mm (4 ft) and 1372mm (4 ft 6 
inch) where the evacuation time is recorded steady throughout the test and shows no significant 
changes even after the corridor width has been changed. This suggests that the wider corridor 
does not contribute to improving the evacuation process in high-rise residential buildings if the 
staircase width does not increase.  
The results suggest that in staircases 914mm and 1067mm wide congestion is likely to happen 
because the evacuation time for both staircases, if corridor width is increased, was nearly 300 sec 
(5 minutes). For the staircase 914mm wide it is worst, when all cases were above 300 sec except 
for the corridor width 1220mm i.e. 287.5 sec. An anomalous result appeared for staircase 914mm 
when the corridor width was 1828 mm (6 ft) i.e. the evacuation time increased very significantly 
to 336.1 seconds. At the beginning, it seems that congestion at the staircase might have caused 
this phenomenon but the evacuation time reduced when the corridor width was increased to 
2134mm.  
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It can be concluded that: 
(1) The fire door can contribute to minimise traffic congestion in staircases if staircases are 
designed as in model one. 
(2) A wider staircase can improve the evacuation time provided that wider openings are 
designed to replace the fire door. 
(3) A staircase width between 1220mm to 1372mm inclusive is the best dimension where it 
can be substituted at any fire door or corridor width. 
(4) There is no significant evidence that increases in the corridor width will improve the 
travel time.  
Further analysis will be carried out on other types of model to test the effect of corridor, fire door 
and staircase width on the different orientation and staircase layouts. Tests on model three have 
been carried out and the test result is as in figure 7.10 i.e. evacuation time Vs Fire doors, Model 3 
i.e. One direction ‘L’ shape with fire door. 
(iii)  Model three 
Model three is designed with ‘L’ shaped corridor and fire door attached t. The fire door has the 
same width as the corridor. Therefore in figure 7.10, only the corridor width is shown in the 
graph of evacuation time verses corridor width. The overall result shows that increasing the 
staircase width will improve the travel time. However, there is insufficient evidence to prove that 
increasing the corridor width will contribute to the decrease in travel time. The difference in 
travel time between the widest staircase i.e. 1524mm and the narrowest staircase i.e. 914mm is 
about 1½ to 2 minutes. Meanwhile, travel time differences among the staircases e.g. staircase 914 
to 1067, staircase 1067 to 1220 and so on are within 20 to 30 sec. Analysis on every staircase 
shows that increasing the corridor width does not improve the travel time. The travel time 
remains about the same even though the corridor width is increased up to 2440mm.  
It can be concluded that:  
(1) Wider is not necessarily better for the corridor design.  
(2) The wider the staircase the shorter the evacuation time recorded.  
(3) The main attribute that can cause the increase of evacuation time is the number of 
people occupying the building. The evacuation time can increase by about 160% to 
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200% if the number of people occupying the building is multiplied i.e. doubling the 
occupant numbers.  
(4) In terms of staircase orientation and layout as in model three, there is no correlation 
between evacuation time and width of corridor. Therefore a corridor width between 
1220mm to 1524mm is sufficient for high-rise residential buildings. 
 Corridor analysis for model 3
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Figure 7.10: Graph evacuation time Vs corridor or fire doors width for Model 3 
However, further tests on the corridor orientation with staircase designed straight with fire door 
needed to be done to test this correlation. Tests on the model have been carried out and the test 
results are as in figure 7.11. This model is known as model 4 i.e. straight direction with fire door. 
The fire door and corridor are the same width.  
(iv) Model four 
Model four is designed with the staircase attached at the end of the corridor. The corridor is fitted 
with fire doors having the same width as the corridor. The test results in figure 7.11 show that 
there is not a significant difference in terms of marginal differences of evacuation time recorded 
on the same staircase when the corridor width increases compared to the test results on model 
three. The tests on model four show about the same pattern as in model three. The difference in 
evacuation time between the widest and the narrowest staircase is nearly double i.e. 2 ½ to 3 
minutes. However, the evacuation time for staircases 1607, 1220 and 1372mmwide are within 30 
sec to 60 sec. The evacuation time for the staircase 1067 and 1372 mm wide is slightly increased 
when the corridor width is increased. The difference between model three and model four in 
terms of the total evacuation time recorded i.e. model four recorded higher total evacuation time 
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for the same width of staircase e.g. staircase 914 mm gives 320 – 330 seconds but model four 
gives over 510 seconds because the corridor length in model four is nearly 2/3 longer than the 
corridor length in model three. The emphasis of the analysis is on the increase or decrease margin 
of evacuation time when the corridor width increases. 
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Figure 7.11: Evacuation time Vs corridor width for model 4 i.e. Straight direction with fire 
door. Fire door width is the same as the corridor  
It can be concluded that:  
(1) There is significant evidence that corridor width does not have much influence on the 
evacuation time but staircase width does.  
(2) However staircases of width 1067mm and 1372mm show a slightly different pattern 
compared with the rest of the staircases. These staircases show that travel time is 
slightly increased when corridor width increases from1524 mm up to 2440mm. The 
increase of travel time occurs gradually and up to about 30 sec differences (depending 
on the number of occupants). 
(3) A positive correlation of the staircases widths 1067mm, 1220mm, and 1372mm show 
that by increasing the corridor width, the evacuation time is slightly increased. It seems 
that the wider corridor does not necessarily give the better evacuation time.  
(4) The others staircase test results show that there is no correlation between the corridor 
width and evacuation time. It is about the same pattern as the model three test results. 
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However, further tests are needed to understand the effect of the different design of the staircase 
layout. Tests on model five i.e. horizontal opposite direction with fire door have been carried out 
and the results are as in figure 12. 
(v) Model five 
Model five is designed with the fire door orientation parallel with the corridor. The occupants 
have to go through the fire door located at the side of the staircase shaft. Figure 7.12 shows the 
test results and small plan of model five. The test results from five different staircase widths i.e. 
914mm to 1524mm show that staircase 914mm takes the longest time to evacuate. It shows that 
evacuation time increases when the fire door width increases. 
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Figure 7.12: Evacuation time VS fire doors; Model 5 i.e. Opposite directions horizontal 
with fire door 
Test results on the other model shows that staircase of width 914mm takes the longest time to 
evacuate. Therefore, there is significant evidence to say that staircase 914mm is not viable to be 
used in high-rise building because;  
(1)  It would not permit the occupants to exit from the building fast enough. However it 
depends on the number of occupants i.e. high occupancy. It would be no problem for 
the low occupancy.  
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(2)  Traffic congestion is likely to happen in a staircase 914mm wide even though the fire 
door and corridor width increase, because the evacuation time increases when fire door 
widths increase. 
(3)  It only permits traffic to move in one direction, while in the real world rescuers may 
need to use the same staircase to enter the building while the occupants are moving out 
from the affected building. 
The other staircases are seen to have quite steady recorded evacuation time. The test shows that 
the fire door widths do not make any significant difference even if they are wider. The 
evacuation time seems to fluctuate within 20sec for staircase width 1067mm to 1524mm. 
However, evacuation from the staircase 1220mm wide takes slightly above 3 minutes and 
staircase 1372mm about 3 minutes. This is significant evidence that staircase widths 1220mm 
and 1372mm are viable for high-rise buildings. However further tests need to be carried out to 
confirm this finding. Tests on model six, that is modified from model five by removing the fire 
door are carried out and the results are as in figure 7.13. 
(vi) Model six 
Corridor analysis for model 6
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Figure 7.13: Graph evacuation time Vs corridor width for model 6 i.e. Opposite directions 
horizontal without fire door 
The outcome of the test results on model six are not significantly different from model five in 
that the 914mm staircase takes the longest time to evacuate (see figure 7.13). The rest of the 
staircases show a roughly steady evacuation time except for staircase 1524mm which shows the 
evacuation time is slightly increased when the corridor width is increased. Staircase 1220mm and 
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1372mm indicated that they can let people out of the building within 3 minutes. This result was 
in line with the test result in model five.  
The test results from the other models show that staircase 1220mm and 1372mm have no 
significance difference in evacuation time taken in the various fire door widths tested. It is 
significant evidence that these staircases are viable. It is evident that these staircases can be used 
as a benchmark to further analyse the fire door and corridor specification. 
However, tests on model seven and eight are necessary to confirm this finding. Models seven and 
eight have a different staircase orientation and layout compared to the rest of the models 
described. 
(vii)  Model seven 
Model seven is designed to enable the occupants to move in one direction to the staircase. 
Staircase orientation is horizontal with a fire door. The occupants have to make a ‘U’-turn at the 
landing floor before they can reach the escape stair. The test results on model seven are in figure 
7.14. Staircase 1220mm, 1372mm and 1524mm wide show about the same pattern in evacuation 
time taken i.e. evacuation time decreases when the fire door width increases from 762mm to 
990mm and remains about the same when the fire door widths are further increased. Whereas, 
staircase 914mm and 1967mm show a unique evacuation time taken where evacuation time 
decreased, increased, then decreased again to form a ‘S’ curve graph when fire door width 
increased.  
The evacuation time for staircase 914mm decreased from 354.6 sec to 271.3 sec when the fire 
door width increased from 762mm to 914mm respectively. The time is then gradually increased 
until it reaches the maximum of 388.6 sec when the fire door width is further increased up to 
1372mm. It then sharply decreases when the fire door width further increases to 1524mm. 
Staircase 1067mm follows approximately the same pattern but the evacuation time is further 
decreased when the fire door width increases to 990mm and 1067mm at 214.7 sec and 212.7 sec 
respectively and increases again to 285.8. It then gradually decreases to 206.9 sec when the fire 
door width further increases. 
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Analysis of Staircase for model 7
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Figure 7.14: Evacuation time Vs corridor width for model 7 i.e. One direction horizontal 
with fire door 
The graph in figure 7.14 shows that the best evacuation time recorded was when the fire door 
width was 990mm i.e. 196.7 sec. That was for staircases 1220, 1372 and 1524mm wide. The 
evacuation time remained about the same after the fire door width was further increased and 
recorded no significant changes throughout the test. Therefore, there is sound evidence to suggest 
that a fire door designed in high-rise building should be between 990mm and l067mm inclusive. 
There is no point in designing fire door wider than 1067mm because it will not improve the 
evacuation time, instead it will increase if the staircase is smaller than 1067mm. 
As discussed in the previous test models, there is sound evidence that staircase widths 1220mm 
and 1372mm are the best staircase widths for high rise buildings. However, this finding needs to 
be tested on model eight which has a slight difference in terms of building internal circulation. 
Model eight is designed such that all residential flats are scattered and located near to the escape 
stair. 
(viii) Model eight 
In model eight, the best travel time recorded was when the staircase width is 1524mm and fire 
door width 1372mm (see figure 7.15). The worst travel time recorded was for staircase width 
914mm when fire door width is 1524mm. The evacuation time recorded for staircase 914 mm 
was approximately the same pattern as in model 5. The evacuation time decreased at the 
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beginning when the fire door width increased from 762mm to 914mm, then it gradually increased 
when the fire door width further increased.  
Traffic congestion at the staircase could have caused this pattern when the fire door width 
increased. Staircase 1067mm shows that the evacuation time fluctuated i.e. increased slightly 
before decreasing, and increased again when the fire door width further increased. Staircase 
1220mm has about the same pattern as the staircase 914mm, in that the evacuation time 
decreased when the fire door width increased from 762mm to 914mm, and then gently increased 
when the fire door width further increased. 
Analysis of Staircase for model 8
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Figure 7.15: Evacuation time Vs corridor width for model 8 i.e. Cluster types with one 
staircase 
Staircases 1372mm and 1524mm wide follow about the same pattern as the 1220mm staircase. 
The evacuation time started to increase when the fire door width increased from 990mm to 
1067mm. The evacuation time then remains about the same without any significant changes even 
after the fire door width has been increased. It can be concluded, from the overall observations of 
the evacuation time versus fire door width, there is a small correlation between them. To some 
extent, it has a negative correlation i.e. when fire door increased from 762mm to 990mm. It has a 
positive correlation when fire door is further increased i.e. from 1067mm to 1524mm. 
7.5 Analysis of staircase, fire door and corridor drawn from the study models 
Table 7.10 summarise the staircase, fire door and corridor widths from the models studied. The 
analysis was made based on the assumption that if the evacuation time recorded fell within 30 
  - 243 -
seconds, it was considered as being of no significance. Therefore the staircase, fire door and 
corridor are assumed to offer the same efficiency i.e. able to allow people to evacuate the 
building safely. The assumption made is based on 30 seconds response time allowance for the 
occupants to start their evacuation once a fire alarm goes off. 
For the optimum width, more staircases recorded within 30 seconds differences of evacuation 
time on any fire door or corridor width in any models are assumed as an optimum width. 
Optimum means that consideration is not only given to the minimum evacuation time recorded 
but at what fire door or corridor width is the most staircases recorded the evacuation time close 
together within 30 seconds differences. For example if there are three staircases recorded 
evacuation time within 30 seconds differences at fire door width 1067mm but evacuation time 
recorded says 180 seconds, even though the minimum evacuation time recorded was 160 second 
but only confers to one staircase at fire door width says 914mm, therefore fire door width 
1067mm considered as the optimum one. 
Model Staircase Width (mm) Fire Door Width (mm) Corridor Width  (mm) 
1 1220, 1372, and 1524 914, 990, 1067, 1220 - 
2 1220, 1372, and 1524 - 1220, 1524, 1828 
3 1220, 1372, and 1524 - 1220, 1524 
4 1067, 1220, and 1372 - 1220, 1524, 1828 
5 1067,1220, 1372, and 1524 914, 990, 1067, 1220, 
1372, 1524 
- 
6 1220, 1372, and 1524 - 1220, 1524, 1828, 1232 
2436 
7 1220 , 1372, and 1524 990. 1067, 1220, 1524 -  
8 1220, 1372, and 1524 914, 990, 1067, 1220  - 
Table 7.10: Optimum specifications suggested resulting from the models studied based on the 
evacuation time recorded. 
The second analysis is what staircase, fire door and corridor width conform to the majority of the 
models tested. For example, staircase 1220mm and 1372mm conform to all models, therefore 
staircase widths 1220mm and 1372mm are considered as an optimum dimension for the staircase. 
Meanwhile, the optimum fire door width is 990mm, 1067mm and 1220mm, and optimum 
corridor width is 1220mm and 1524mm. These optimum specifications relate to the specific 
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number of people simulated, i.e. overcrowded situation. For different occupancy levels the 
optimum specification may be different. 
7.5.1 Escape route specification model 
The escape route specification model can be summarised; 
Staircase 
Staircase width: 1220mm or 1372mm 
Overall evaluation of the evacuation time taken by the occupant show that increasing the 
staircase width will increase the evacuation time within 10 to 15 sec. Staircase 1220mm and 
1372mm remain within the best evacuation time recorded i.e. less than 3½ minutes. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to say that in terms of the staircase width, wider is not necessarily better. 
Fire door 
Fire door width: 990mm, 1067mm or 1220mm 
It can be concluded that the best fire door dimension to be installed at any sort of staircase either 
in staircase compartment or protected staircase as a storey exit is between 990mm and 1220mm 
inclusive.  
Corridor 
Corridor width: 1220mm or 1524mm 
Evacuation time does not show significant changes when corridor width increases. It seems that 
the corridor width does not have any effect on the evacuation process. Therefore, it is suggested 
that corridor widths between 1220mm to 1524mm inclusive are suitable fort a high-rise 
residential building. 
Model 
Analysis of the models with fire door found that models 5 and 8 are the best models in terms of 
evacuation time recorded for 200 people evacuating the model. However, it depends on the 
staircase width used. The time taken for the 1067mm staircase was around 3½ minutes, 
the1220mm staircase was around 3 to 3½ minutes, the 1372mm staircase was around 3 minutes 
and the 1524mm staircase was around 2½ to 3 minutes.  
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Analysis of the models without fire door and varying the corridor width showed that model 6 was 
the best among them. The time taken for 200 people evacuating the models was around 3 to 3 ½ 
minutes, depending on the staircase width used. The time recorded for the 1067mm staircase was 
around 3 ½ minutes and the 1220mm, 1372mm and 1524mm staircases was around 3 minutes. 
7.6 Analysis of the effect of fire door and staircase width tested on building A.  
Table 7.11 shows the simulation results of high occupancy people in building A using the same 
specification as in section 7.4.1 but varies in fire door and staircase widths i.e. 914mm and 
1067mm for the fire door, and 1100mm and 1220mm for the staircase. The total evacuation time 
recorded that when fire door width increased from 914mm to 1067mm without increasing the 
staircase width, total evacuation time had increased from 11 minutes 53.8 seconds to 12 minutes 
1.8 seconds.  
Floor 
clearance time 
(s) 
High occupancy i.e. 4 persons per room: Building A 
D914, S1100 D1067, S1100 D914, S1220 D1067, S1220 
S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 
Floor 1 150 80 145 80 150 80 145 75 
Floor 2 150 75 155 80 160 80 155 75 
Floor 3 180 85 235 95 175 85 185 80 
Floor 4 180 80 225 75 140 75 165 80 
Floor 5 275 80 175 75 130 75 185 75 
Floor 6 305 75 320 80 240 80 250 75 
Floor 7 340 95 240 100 245 100 275 80 
Floor 8 380 85 400 75 140 75 210 85 
Floor 9 415 80 415 80 130 80 145 75 
Floor 10 90 70 90 70 90 70 85 70 
         
Total 
Evacuation 
Time (m:s) 
11:53.8 12:01.8 10.27.9 10.12.4 
Note: S1 = Staircase No. 1, S2 = Staircase No. 2, S3 = Staircase No. 3, S4 = Staircase No. 4 
Table 7.11: floor clearance time and total evacuation time of the building A on various fire door 
and staircase widths. 
However when the staircase width increased from 1100mm to 1220mm without increasing the 
fire door width i.e. fire door width 914mm, total evacuation time had decreased from 11 minutes 
53.8 seconds to 10 minutes 27.9 seconds. The total evacuation times were further decreased 
when both fire door and staircase width increased to 1067mm and 1220mm respectively that total 
evacuation time had decreased from 11 minutes 53.8 seconds to 10 minutes 12.4 seconds i.e.1 
minute 41.4 seconds decreases or 14.2% decreases if fire door and staircase designed as specified 
in the UBBL. 
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7.6.1 Proposed specification tested on different building layouts 
Simulation data: 
No. of floors (Nf): =  10 floors 
No. of staircases (Ns): =  20 staircases i.e. two staircases between the floors. 
No. of platforms (Np): =  21 platforms i.e. 10 intermediate floors + 11 landing floors 
No. of steps per staircase: =  9 steps per staircase: based on the observation that the great 
majority of staircases were designed with 9 steps. 
Tread dimension: = 280mm i.e. from analysis of treads in chapter 4 that majority of 
staircases were designed in the range of 275mm to 284mm and 
the most popular dimension was 280mm or 11 inches. 
Riser dimension: = 153mm i.e. from analysis of risers in chapter 4 that majority of 
risers designed between 151mm to 160mm and the most popular 
dimension was 153mm or 6 inches. 
Staircase width (Ws): = 1220 mm i.e. from the analysis of staircase width as proposed in 
study model analysis. 
Door width (Wd): = 1067 mm i.e. from the analysis of fire door width as proposed in 
study model analysis. 
Exit width: = Final exit door width or actual opening width. 
Link width: = Storey exit door width. 
Staircase length (St):  =  108.68 m: calculated using equation 4.4 for a staircase of 
1220mm.  
Respond time: = 30 seconds +/- 0.5 seconds. 
Example calculation of staircase length: 
X =  No. of steps x Riser dimension 
9 x Riser dimension 
 9 x 153 
 1377 mm 
Y = No. of steps x Tread dimension. 
9 x Tread dimension 
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 9 x 280 
 2520 mm 
Ls =  2,872 mm 
St = (20 x 2872) + (21 x 2 x 1220) 
 = 108,680 mm 
 = 108.68 m 
Floor 
clearance 
time (s) 
High occupancy i.e. 4 persons per room, proposed design 
Building A Building B Building C Building D 
S1 S2 S1 S2 S3 S4 S1 S2 S1 S2 S3 
Floor 1 155 75 90 105 60 65 145 180 - 115 115 
Floor 2 130 75 85 100 60 80 165 155 - 125 145 
Floor 3 165 85 100 90 60 65 165 165 - 145 155 
Floor 4 185 80 80 95 65 85 170 230 - 175 125 
Floor 5 220 80 85 80 60 85 185 205 - 150 190 
Floor 6 250 75 85 75 70 75 155 190 - 205 135 
Floor 7 270 95 85 95 65 85 135 220 - 150 250 
Floor 8 135 75 105 95 70 75 150 215 - 120 195 
Floor 9 135 75 95 95 65 75 180 195 - 155 180 
Floor 10 85 70 70 65 65 70 75 90 - 80 80 
            
Total 
Evacuation 
time (m:s) 
10:33.7 6:33.1 10:32.4 9:15.0 
Note: S1 = Staircase No. 1, S2 = Staircase No. 2, S3 = Staircase No. 3, S4 = Staircase No. 4 
Table 7.12: Floor clearance time and total evacuation time for the proposed design 
Table 7.12 shows the simulation results for high occupancy i.e. 4 persons per room, applying the 
proposed staircase and fire door width to the building layouts used in the previous simulations. 
The staircase tread and riser dimensions are different from those used in table 7.11, therefore the 
overall staircase length is increased. Low and normal occupancy have not been simulated; in 
these cases there appears to be no significant problem, since the floor clearance times recorded 
were below 150 seconds (2 ½ minutes), which is accepted as reasonably safe. 
The simulation results suggest that with the proposed specification the floor clearance time could 
be reduced by about 20% to 50% for some floor levels e.g. for building C, floors 3 to 9, in 
comparison with the figures for the same occupancy level but the original specification, as shown 
in table 7.8. According to the simulation results, floor 10 appears to be the safest as the floor 
clearance time was below 150 seconds even with high occupancy. A possible explanation for this 
is that the stair between floors 9 and 10 is used only by the occupants of floor 10 therefore has 
low occupancy and people can enter the stairs easily, whilst the lower staircases are used not only 
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by the occupants of the adjacent floor, but also by those from the floors above, therefore there are 
large number of people trying to get into these stairs, leading to a certain amount of congestion 
and increased floor clearance time.  
It is not certain how Simulex deals with the mingling of the streams of people already on the 
stairs and those leaving to join the stairs from an adjacent floor, but clearly a number of models 
are possible; those already on the stairs exit first, those coming from the corridor to the stairs exit 
first, or they mingle on a one-to-one basis like two lanes of traffic merging into one. 
Alternatively, a more random mingling seems likely to take place, depending on the individuals 
concerned and their state of mind. 
7.7 Chapter conclusion 
Appropriate escape routes specification i.e. corridors, fire doors and staircases, can help to 
smooth the evacuation process in high-rise residential building. The simulation results suggest 
that increasing the widths of the fire door and staircase together will improve the floor clearance 
time and the total evacuation time by about 14%. Based upon the simulation test results, it can be 
concluded that increasing the number of people i.e. high occupancy will increase the evacuation 
time to an unsafe level. These high occupancy levels are quite common in this region. Where 
there is overcrowding throughout the building, then the simulations show that the optimum width 
of staircase is 1220mm. 
The simulation results suggest that with the proposed specification the floor clearance time could 
be reduced by about 20% to 50% for some floor levels.  
In addition, the simulation results show that for some building layouts certain staircases may not 
be chosen as exits because of the distance from the flats, and they are therefore ineffective for 
evacuation. Also, some staircases are more likely to be chosen by the evacuating occupants and 
therefore become congested, causing floor clearance times to increase.  
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CHAPTER 8 
FIRE SAFETY MODEL FOR HIGH-RISE RESIDENTIAL BUILDING 
8.1 Introduction 
Malaysia as a developing country in South East Asia is making good progress towards achieving 
the vision 2020 proposed by the then Prime Minister of Malaysia to achieve a fully developed 
country by the year 2020 (www.wawasan2020.com/vision/). The development of infrastructures 
i.e. road, highway, commercial and high-rise residential buildings are seen to be very progressive 
ways to meet the immediate needs for high living standards in the metropolis.  
The development of housing schemes, including high-rise buildings for accommodation, has 
been rapid, and although some have achieved a very good standard in terms of building quality 
and space utilization, there is still have room for improvement in the fire safety aspect of these 
buildings.  The specifications for the design and construction of escape routes in high-rise 
residential buildings currently is based on the building regulations i.e. Uniform Building By-
Laws 1984 in Malaysia.  It is now about 25 years since UBBL first come into force, therefore it 
is timely to review the Uniform Building By-Laws. A new chapter purposely for residential 
buildings should be introduced, similar to building regulation 2006, UK, because if we compare 
between residential and non-residential buildings, the number of fire cases and the deaths toll 
involving residential buildings is much higher. According to Wolski et al (2000) approximately 
60% of civilian fire deaths occur in homes and garages and he questions why there so much more 
safety in high-rise office buildings when there is so much more risk in single family homes. 
However, further research is needed to look in more detail at what aspects of UBBL should be 
revised. At this moment, the researcher is only looking on the possibility of how a good fire 
safety standard in high-rise residential building can be achieved.  
The researcher has investigated the problems encountered in high-rise residential buildings and 
found a lot of issues that could affect fire safety. These were discussed in chapter 5. The 
researcher also has carried out an opinion survey in five high-rise residential buildings in 
Malaysia, the findings of which were discussed in chapter 6. Because of the complexity of the 
topic, further investigations on the building designs and specifications are needed. Investigating 
of the escape route layouts and specifications has been completed, as discussed in chapter 7.  
In this chapter the outcomes of those investigations are put together to propose a fire safety 
model for achieving acceptable fire safety standards in high-rise residential buildings. Before the 
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researcher discusses further about the model developed, let we look what is actually the meaning 
of models. 
8.2 What is model? 
Tate and Jones (1975) defined a model as a representation of reality made sufficiently explicit for 
one to be able to examine the assumptions embodied within it to manipulate it and experiment 
with it, and, most important of all, to draw inferences from it which can be applied to reality. 
According to Babrauskas (1996), a model of anything is, simply, a systematic representation of 
that thing and proposed there are three examples of models that are normally used by scientists 
i.e.  
i. Thought Models or Conceptual Models,  
ii. Scale Models, and  
iii. Mathematical Models.  
Churchman et al (1957), explained that there are three types of models, known as Iconic, 
Analogue, and Symbolic. Iconic models are similar to the Scale Model proposed by Babrauskas 
that normally refers to architectural models or structural engineering models which represent a 
scaled down version of the building. Analogue models are models that represent the data found in 
research activities and represented in graph form, curved lines, contour lines, etc. Symbolic 
models are similar to Mathematical Models proposed by Babrauskas that represent a 
mathematical equation to be solved either by simple calculation or by computer program. 
Mathematical models in general are a series of mathematic equations which describe a certain 
process. Tate and Jones (1975) proposed that there is one more model called a Conceptual 
Model. This model is similar to the model proposed by Babrauskas as a Thought Model. The 
Conceptual Model represents our concept of which variables are relevant and how they are 
related. It normally takes the form of flow charts, diagrams, tables, or such like. However, 
because of the advances of computer technology available nowadays, another form of model is 
available, known as Computer Model or Simulation Model. These Simulation Models some time 
call Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) models simulation or Fire Dynamics Simulator (FDS) 
model simulation. There is another model known as building evacuation simulation model which 
developed to study the evacuation of people from the building in fire safety study. From the 
above overviews, to be concluded that there are basically five types of model, i.e. 
i. Scale Models,  
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ii. Mathematical Models,  
iii. Analogue Models, 
iv. Conceptual Models, and  
v. Computer Simulation Models 
8.3 Literature review of models in fire safety related field 
According to Bartlett (1990), “Fire safety evaluation system or grading systems are used 
throughout the world as a means of determining levels of fire protection in buildings. Insurance 
interests have used such methods for decades dealing mostly with items related to risks and 
building protection”. From the literature review by Bartlett in 1990, he found that there were four 
credible Fire Safety Evaluation Systems (FSEF) which could be used for hospitals i.e. U.S. –  
Fire Safety Evaluation System; U.K. – Fire code: Assessing Fire Risk in Existing Hospital 
Wards; Australia – Dr. Vaughn Beck has developed a probabilistic method of evaluating the risk 
associated with office occupancies under the jurisdiction of the Australian building codes against 
the risk deemed to be acceptable under a given code; and France – A method of evaluation of 
health care facilities. 
Meanwhile, Rasbash et. at., (2004), pointed out that there are four categories of point system, e.g. 
Gretener System, Dow Fire and Explosion Index, Fire Safety Evaluation System (FSES), and 
Multiattribute Evaluation Models. 
The Gretener method measures the ratio of negative features that increase risk to the positive 
features that decrease risk. These relationships are best explained by the following equation;  
)(
)(
FSN
ApR ××
×=          (8.1) 
Where; 
R = Risk,  
P = Potential Hazard,  
A = Activation or Ignition Hazard,  
N = Normal Protection Measures,  
S = Special Protection Measures, and  
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F = Fire Resistance of the Structure. 
Each of these five factors comprising fire risk is the product of several components, e.g. P, i.e. 
Potential Hazard, has nine components, e.g. P1, P2, ….. P9. The values of these components are 
multiplied together to acquire the value for P. The same principle applies to the other factors. The 
process is normalized so that a standard building has a computed fire risk value of 1.00 and an 
acceptable risk if the risk value is equal to or less than 1.30. 
The Dow Fire and Explosion Index developed by Dow in 1964 for the Dow Chemical Company 
was a modified version of the Chemical Occupancy Classification rating system developed by 
Factory Mutual prior to 1957. It is mainly used to quantify the expected damage from potential 
fire, explosion, and reactivity of an incident and to identify equipment that could contribute to the 
creation or escalation of an incident. This system can be used to evaluate the risk associated with 
the flammable, combustible, or reactive material stored, handled, or processed in a chemical 
plant with the intention of suggesting approaches to fire protection and loss prevention design.  
The Fire Safety Evaluation System was developed in the late 1970s at the Centre for Fire 
Research, National Bureau of Standard which is currently known as The Building and Fire 
Research Laboratory, National Institute of Science and Technology. It was developed with the 
intention of providing a uniform method of evaluating fire safety for certain occupancies and 
what measures provide a level of safety equivalent to the Life Safety Code i.e. NFPA 101, 
published by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA 101, 2000). The new edition of 
NFPA 101 Life Safety Code 2006 edition includes the maximized fire safety through new 
sprinkler mandates for all new 1 and 2 family dwellings, all nursing homes, and existing 
nightclub assembly occupancies.  
It is understood that different occupancies will have different risk parameters. Risk parameters 
determined for certain occupancies will be valued by expert judgement of a group of fire safety 
professionals. For example, FSES for health care occupancies has fire risk parameters e.g. patient 
mobility, patient density, fire zone location, ratio of patient to attendants, and average patient 
age. FSES uses 13 fire safety parameters and up to seven levels of safety for each parameter. 
According to Rasbash et al (2004), the important concept of the FSES is redundancy through 
simultaneous use of alternative safety strategies, i.e. containment, extinguishment, and people 
movement. This serves to ensure that failure of a single protection device or system will not 
result in a major life loss.  
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This approach used the contribution values assigned as a points scheme based on the checklist 
provided as an evaluation tool. Using a point scheme is basically to form the basis for further 
judgement on the adequacy of fire safety components or the level of safety against the level of 
risk or hazard of fire that is available within the system in a particular area. The areas then can be 
summarised in terms of their acceptable or not acceptable level of fire safety based on the 
number of points scored compared to the stated benchmark. 
Multiattribute Evaluation Models: By nature of the circumstances, fire safety decisions often 
have to be made under conditions in which the data are sparse and uncertain. It is complex and 
involves a network of interacting components, factors, elements, attributes, parameters, variables 
and so forth. Interactions are normally nonlinear and multidimensional. Sparseness and 
complexity of data, however, does not make it impossible to happen. A complex circumstance 
needs a complex system to solve it. Therefore one applicable approach to fire safety evaluation is 
Multiattribute Evaluation.  
Rasbash et at, (2004) described that if the attributes for the decision problem are x1, x2, x3,....., 
xn, then the evaluation function E(x1, x2, x3, ….. xn) needs to be determined over these 
measures in order to conduct a performance assessment. According to Keeny and Raiffa (1976), 
quoted by Rasbash et al, if trade-offs among the attributes do not depend on the levels of the 
remaining attributes, then a single measure of the overall outcome of a system is given by; 
E(x1,…… xi …… xn) = ∑
−
n
i
iii xRw
1
)(       (8.2) 
Where wi are weighting constants greater than zero, and the Ri(xi) are normalizing functions of 
attributes. 
In the real world where resources are scarce, and efficiency is highly appreciated, maximizing the 
utility of point system approach to fire safety evaluation is clearly desirable for the many 
situations in which the evaluation of fire safety is fundamental.  
There are five basic characteristics of multiattribute evaluation as mentioned by Rasbash et al 
(2004): 
1. Multi Attributes: The nature of the decision is one of screening, prioritisation assessment, or 
selection of an object from among alternative objects based on values of a set of attributes for 
each object or alternative. Thus, each problem has multiple decision criteria of performance 
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attributes. These attributes must be generated for the specific problem setting. The number of 
attributes depends on the nature of the problem. 
2. Trade-offs among attributes: In the typical compensatory evaluation, good performance of 
one attribute can be least partially compensated for low performance of another attributes. 
This is also call trade-off or equivalency. Since most attributes have difference measurement 
scales, accommodating trade-offs among them generally means that the method incorporates 
procedures for normalising data that are not commensurate. 
3. Units that are not commensurate: The attributes of the problem are generally not all 
measurable in units that are directly proportional. In fact, some attributes may be impractical, 
impossible, or too costly to measure at all. This typically requires methods of subjective 
estimation. 
4. Attribute weights: The formal methods of analysis generally require information regarding 
the related importance of each attribute, which is usually supplied by cardinal scale. Weights 
can be directly supplied or developed by specific methods. In some simple cases the weights 
default to equality. 
5. Evaluation vector: The problem can be concisely expressed as a vector whose values 
correspond to the performance rating of each attribute for the specific object. If the attributes 
for a decision problem are x1, x2, x3, ….. xn , then an evaluation function E(x1, x2, x3, ….. xn) 
needs to be determined over these measures to conduct a performance assessment. 
Multiattribute Evaluation Process 
1. Generation of Attributes: Also called parameters, elements, factors, variables, and so forth. 
Those identify the ingredients of fire safety. Attributes can be measurable or non measurable 
attributes. 
Pardee (1969) quoted by Rasbash et al (2004) suggests that the attributes list should be complete 
and exhaustive, mutually exclusive and restricted to the highest degree of importance. As 
suggested by Keeny and Raiffa (1976), attributes can be identified by literature survey or opinion 
by a panel of experts of the particular problem. 
2. Attribute Weighting: Not all fire safety attributes are equally important. The role of weight is 
to express the importance of each attribute compared with the others. It is a key component of 
multiattribute evaluation. 
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Rasbash et al (2004) suggested that the attribute weights are generally normalized to sum up to 
one, that if yi is the raw weight of attribute I, then 
∑
=
= n
i
i
i
i
y
yw
1
         (8.3) 
And 
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=
=
n
i
iw
1
1         (8.4) 
This produces a vector of n weight is given by; W = (wl, ….., wj., …., wn). Where wi is the 
resultant weight assigned to the ith attribute. 
Points system 
Fire safety evaluation points systems have been referred to by various names such as risk 
ranking, index system, and numerical grading. They originated as insurance rating schedules in 
the nineteenth century, but in the last few decades the basic concepts have appeared in a wide 
variety of formats (Rasbash et al, 2004).  
Point system assigns values based on the professional judgment and experience. The selected 
variables represent both negative and positive fire safety features and the assigned values are then 
operated on by some combination of arithmetic functions to arrive at single value or index. The 
variables are referred to as attributes. According to Rasbash et al, (2004) the purpose of a points 
system is to provide a useful aid to decision making. Usefulness requires the methodology to be 
simple yet credible. Applying it must be not only easy but also sophisticated enough to provide a 
minimum technical validity. The method includes identification of attributes and a method of 
weighting them. Point systems can be simple but powerful ways to use our increasing body of 
knowledge in the evaluation and communication of fire safety. If properly constructed, point 
systems offer a defensible combination of relevant attributes of fire safety. However, because 
they are heuristic models they are difficult to verify. What is a heuristic model? Point systems are 
heuristic models of fire safety. There are processes of modelling and scoring fire hazard and 
exposure factors to produce a rapid and simple estimate of comparative evaluation. The process 
heuristically relates known fire safety attributes that have varying degrees of accuracy in their 
measurement. The most valid point systems are those that follow the well-founded principles of 
multiattribute evaluation. 
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Defensibility, both internally and externally, is one of the strongest assets of a scientifically 
constructed point system. Internal defensibility provides management with justification of fire 
safety policies and expenditures. It facilitates the allocation of limited resources among fire and 
other risks. External justification of priority setting is important in litigation and in dealing with 
regulatory agencies (Rasbash et. at., 2004).  
Edinburgh Model 
The Edinburgh model was developed in 1982 at Edinburgh University with the intention of 
improving the evaluation of fire in United Kingdom hospitals through a systematic method of 
appraisal. In the Edinburgh model, a hierarchical point system was used i.e. hierarchy of fire 
safety decision-making levels. It consists of five factors with hierarchy levels as follow: 
1. Policy,  
2. Objectives,  
3. Strategies, 
4. Attributes and 
5. Survey items 
These factors were used to identify the importance of each fire safety attribute (Rasbash et al, 
2004). This hierarchy suggests that a series of matrices is appropriate to model the relationship 
among the various fire safety factors. According to Rasbash et al defining fire safety is difficult 
and often results in a listing of factors that together comprise the intent. These factors tend to be 
of different sorts. They agreed with the Edinburgh Model concept that it is a meaningful exercise 
of constructing a matrix of fire safety goals versus more fire safety features and it will help to 
identify the roles of two concepts, i.e. goals and aims, in both theory and practice. 
8.4 The outline of a fire safety model developed 
Based on this concept and multiattribute evaluation models, the researcher developed a study 
background by adopting a basic approach developed by NFPA (2000) called Fire Safety Concept 
Tree (FSCT). Attributes are weighted according to the priority level as in figure 8.1 that high 
priority will have high weighting. 
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Figure 8.1: Equivalency of attribute weighting and priority level. 
There are two fundamental principles of fire safety objectives in managing the fire impact i.e. 
minimising the impact to the people and structure. Among the factors considered in managing 
fire impact are containing fire by construction and allowing time for people to evacuate from the 
building. Therefore it is necessary to investigate the integration between human behaviour and 
structural design known as Variable A and Variable B respectively, and integrating them into a 
conceptual study outline model. 
Figure 8.2 shows a conceptual study outline model and table 8.1 is the hierarchy of fire safety 
decision making levels which the researcher used to develop research methodologies to evaluate 
the evacuation process and escape route specifications in high-rise residential buildings in 
Malaysia.  
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Figure 8.2: Conceptual study model 
 
Level Name Description 
1 Philosophy General description of a whole fire safety concept and process 
adopted by organization based on the FSCT developed by NFPA 
2 
 
Policy 
 
Course or general plan of action adopted by organization to achieve 
security against fire and its effects. 
3 Objective Specific fire safety goals to be achieved. 
4 
 
Strategies 
 
Independent fire safety alternatives, each of which contributes 
wholly or partly to the fulfilment of fire safety objectives. 
5 
 
Attributes 
 
Components of fire risk that determinable by direct or indirect 
measure or estimate. 
6 Survey items Measurable features that serve as constituent parts of fire safety 
parameter. 
Table 8.1: Hierarchy of fire safety decision making levels (After Rasbash et al, (2004) 
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The fire safety conceptual model for high-rise residential buildings begins with the definition of 
fire safety philosophy, policy and objective to be achieved. These philosophy, policy and 
objective are defined based on the priority hierarchy of decision making level proposed in the 
Edinburgh Model as mentioned by Rasbash et al (2004). Descriptions of these factors are as in 
table 8.1 above. The researcher proposes the definition of philosophy, policy and objective is 
grouped under one attribute called Fire Safety Concept because these factors normally remain 
unchanged in many circumstances. However, when to carry out a fire safety audits to suit the 
specific organisation, it needs to be precisely defined. 
An example definition of a fire safety concept i.e. the philosophy, policy and objectives of fire 
safety for the high-rise residential buildings, is given in table 8.2. It gives a general description of 
the fire safety concept regarding the construction of high-rise residential buildings. In this 
research, the emphasis is not on the strategies, fire safety performance and fire safety level 
because of the time constraint and the limited resources available to carry out the research on 
those aspects.  
The philosophy of fire safety  
(regarding the construction of high-rise residential building) 
“All buildings designed and built should meet the following criteria i.e. Fire Safety 
Objective, Fire Safety Performance, and Fire Safety Level”. 
Policy: Implementing all fire safety measures to ensure fire safety standards in 
high-rise residential building can be achieved. 
Fire Safety 
Objectives: 
The purpose of fire safety objective is to ensure that: 
(1) The people in the buildings are safe if fire breaks out.  
(2) Structural protection i.e. building and its contents, so that the 
building itself is protected from serious damage if fire breaks out. 
Table 8.2: The philosophy, policy and objective of the fire safety concept 
Therefore, the emphasis will only be on the fire safety attributes to achieve the first 
fire safety objective i.e. to ensure that the people in the building are 
safe if fire breaks out. In order to achieve that, three methodologies are 
adopted i.e. observation, questionnaire survey and computer 
simulation. Figure 8.3 shows those methodologies used and summaries 
of the attributes analysed. Those attributes are generated from the 
literature review and the observation studies that have been carried out 
on a number of high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia. 
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Those identified attributes analysed using priority analysis method. There are three priority levels 
set i.e. high, medium and low priority based on the point score on the variables analysed as 
described in chapter six. Those attributes are then divided into two groups i.e. known as variable 
A, attributes related to human behaviour, and variable B, attributes related to structural design 
and incorporated into five fire safety components suggested as in figure 8.3 i.e. model 8.4. This 
model has been validated by professionals in the construction industry and by fire brigade 
officers in Malaysia as reported in section 8.6. 
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Model 8.3 
Structural 
Design & 
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Study 
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Suggestions to achieve fire safety standard in high-
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Fire Safety 
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Fire Safety 
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Fire Safety 
Enforcement
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3 4
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Figure 8.3: The conceptual model of development process of fire safety 
model for high-rise residential buildings. 
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8.5 The development of the fire safety conceptual model for high-rise buildings 
Figure 8.3 shows the development processes of how the conceptual fire safety model was 
developed. There are five integrated models with parameters linking to each other. Those five 
models are: 
Model 8.1 – Problems encountered in high-rise residential building model,  
Model 8.2 – Human behaviour model,  
Model 8.3 – Structural design and specification model, 
Model 8.4 – Fire safety components model, and  
Model 8.5 – Effective evacuation and escape routes design model. 
Model 8.1 was formulated based on the analysis in chapter 5 (refer to table 5.1), there are five 
parameters analysed, based on the observation of the condition of escape routes in a number of 
high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia. Categorization of the problems encountered is made 
based on the principle of similarity behaviour analysis i.e. the actual problems are grouped 
together if they are similar, e.g.: 
Problems occurring on escape routes structure, for instance, treads shorter than the minimum 
specification, risers exceeded the maximum height permitted, corridor designed detached 
from the occupants’ flats and so forth. Because these problems are mainly related to the 
building elements, they are categorised as problems of Structural Design and Construction.  
The same analysis techniques are applied to the rest of the problems by listing them out in a table 
and rearranged to form model 8.1 i.e. the problem encountered model. Variables in this model 
are as in table 5.1. 
Model 8.2 is a human behaviour model that derived from the questionnaire study and detailed 
descriptions can be found in chapter 6. Figure 6.6 shows a human behaviour model with the 
factors involved either influencing or being influenced by the human behaviour. From the 
questionnaire study, it is suggested that those factors have significance impacts on the evacuation 
process.  
Model 8.3 is a structural design and specification study and detailed analysis and descriptions on 
this matter can be found in chapter 7. Table 8.3 shows the specifications model for structural 
design. The smooth operation of building evacuation partly depends on the structural elements 
designed, orientations and specifications, facilities provided in the buildings and availability of 
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alternatives to escape. 
Based on the best knowledge and ability the researcher has at this moment, with the research data 
analysed, using a professional judgement and experience, and after prudently analysing all data 
and information available, the researcher suggests fire safety components model 8.4 to be 
adopted to achieve a fire safety standard in high-rise residential buildings. This model will be 
incorporated with model 8.5 i.e. effective evacuation and escape route design model as in figure 
8.4. There are five fire safety components in hierarchy order i.e. 
i. Fire Safety Awareness, 
ii. Fire Safety Design, 
iii. Fire Safety Equipment and Evacuation Skill, 
iv. Fire Safety Audit, and 
v. Fire Safety Enforcement. 
8.6 Suggestion to achieve fire safety standard in high-rise residential buildings 
Figure 8.4 is a conceptual fire safety model i.e. how to achieve fire safety standard in high-rise 
residential buildings. There are two models incorporated i.e. Model 8.4 and model 8.5. Model 8.4 
is a fire safety component model and model 8.5 is suggestions how to achieve fire safety standard 
and what factors need to be increased, enhanced, enforced, audited and/or designed in order to 
achieve the fire safety standard in high-rise residential buildings. 
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Suggestions  
To achieve fire safety standard in high-rise residential buildings (Effective Evacuation 
and Escape Routes Design)
Fire Safety 
Design
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Fire Safety 
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Equipment & 
Evacuation Skill Fire Safety 
Enforcement
Fire safety 
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Fire plan in every 
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priority 
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Facilities require 
in high-rise 
buildings for 
emergency escape 
as in model 8.3 in 
figure 8.6. 
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assessment form 
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Escape route 
design 
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8.4 
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human factors are 
as in figure 6.6, 
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Figure 8.4: Fire safety conceptual model i.e. to achieve fire safety standard in 
high-rise residential buildings.
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8.6.1 Fire safety awareness 
From the questionnaire survey and observation study, it is found that fire safety awareness in 
high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia needs for improvement. Therefore fire safety 
awareness programmes should be enhanced in order to increase fire safety awareness on the 
high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia. The researcher suggests, not in hierarchy order, the 
following programmes i.e. how fire safety awareness can be increased. Some of the programmes 
suggested may be run concurrently. However at this moment there is no time limit suggests for 
the programme. The effectiveness of any programme can only be assessed after the programme 
has started. This suggestion is based on the finding of questionnaire survey and observation 
studies done as reported in chapter 6 and chapter 5 respectively. 
Figure 6.1 (a) shows that 67.8% respondents never attended any fire safety courses. Meanwhile, 
appendix 8.0a shows the survey results analysed based on the age groups i.e. 78.6% (44 people) 
among the age group 1 (15 to 30 years old), 53.8% (21 people) among the age group 2 (31 to 40 
years old) etc never attended any fire safety courses.  
When analyse on the evacuation behaviour, table 6.12 shows that 59.1% would do something 
else instead of immediately evacuate the building if fire alarm goes off. From the fire safety point 
of view, occupants should immediately evacuate the buildings once fire was discovered in the 
building. Therefore it is suggested that fire safety awareness programmes should be introduced as 
follows: 
i. Fire safety awareness modules should be offered at school and advance fire safety 
courses should be offered at college and university. 
ii. Regularly advertise on TV and radio about the appropriate steps to follow if fire started 
in flats. 
iii. Occasional seminars, colloquiums, short courses, etc. should be conducted at community 
centre and national level. 
iv. Every residential flat should be provided with an easily understood fire plan i.e. what to 
do if fire breaks out and where to assemble after evacuating the building. 
Two aspects should be emphasized in the fire safety awareness programme i.e. the appropriate 
action to be taken, and the importance of keeping the escape routes safe at all material times. 
This is because among the problems encountered in the observation studies were problems 
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related to the attitude of people as discussed in section 5.5.4. Therefore, the following elements 
of fire safety awareness should be improved:  
i. What to do in the event of fire. 
ii. Life safety should be the top priority, therefore immediately evacuating the building is 
essential and it should be done immediately after the fire alarm goes off. 
iii. The consequences if escape routes obstructed by any obstruction. 
iv. The consequences if fire doors are illegally locked by any means. 
v. The importance of keeping all fire suppression systems in a good working order. 
vi. The importance of keeping all fire doors shut at all times. 
vii. The importance of every residential unit having smoke detectors installed at a strategic 
location. 
viii. The consequences if fire becomes uncontrollable. 
8.6.2 Fire safety design 
From the studies on escape route design and specification, there are a number of significant 
suggestions can be drawn on how escape routes should be designed and what elements should be 
included when designing it. These suggestions are based on the findings from the observations, 
questionnaire surveys, and simulation of the different layouts of high-rise residential buildings 
and further simulation analysis on the 260 study models developed. Detailed experiment and 
discussion can be found in chapter 5, 6 and chapter 7. 
How to design? 
i. Escape routes should be designed according to the specifications as proposed in table 
8.3, figures 8.8 until 8.11 in appendixes 8.3 until 8.6 respectively. 
ii. Escape routes also should be designed according to the requirements as proposed in table 
8.4. 
iii. Corridors should be designed attached to all flats to enable windows to be used as an 
alternative to escape. 
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iv. Corridor design should avoid a foyer type to limit the possibility of it being abused by 
the tenants.  
v. When designing escape routes in high-rise buildings, consideration of human factors as 
in figures 6.6, 6.7, 6.8, 6.9 in chapter 6 should be given appropriate attention. 
What to design? 
Escape route elements and building services equipment that to be designed as follows: 
i. Internal circulation in the buildings i.e. corridors, compartment floors, protected lobby, 
escape stairs, and fire doors. 
ii. Communication systems in building: i.e. signage, exit signs, fire alarm and inter-
communication. 
iii. Building facilities systems: i.e. lighting, emergency lighting, ventilation and smoke 
control systems. 
iv. Fire protection systems: i.e. fire detection system, fire suppression system, fire 
compartmentation. 
8.6.3 Fire safety equipment and evacuation skills 
From the questionnaire survey (see figure 6.2) the majority of the respondents had experience of 
fire drill, at their office building (41.7%), at college (10.4%) or at a public building (5.2%). None 
of them had any experience of a fire drill at their residential building. In terms of equipment 
skills, 59.1% of the respondents’ surveyed do not know how to use any fire fighting equipment, 
27.0% know how to use a portable fire extinguisher, and 13.9% know how to use a hose reel 
system (see appendix 8.0d).  
Among those who had never attended a fire safety course, 84.6% of them said that they did not 
know how to use any fire fighting equipment. Only 14.1% knew how to use a portable fire 
extinguisher and 1.3% knew how to use a hose reel system (see appendix 8.0e). For those who 
had attended a fire safety course, 54.1% said they could use a portable fire extinguisher, 40.5% 
said they could use a hose reel system. It seems that knowledge and experience have significant 
influences in increasing the ability of respondents to use the fire fighting equipment. 
In terms of the ability to activate a fire alarm system, 56.5% know how to use the Break Glass 
alarm, 21.7% will only shout if fire breaks out, 18.3% will call the fire brigade, etc (see appendix 
8.0b). In terms of the ability to activate fire alarm system after attending fire safety course, 75.7% 
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said they knew how to activate a break glass alarm system and percentage of only know how to 
shout has reduced to 8.1% (see appendix 8.0c). As discussed in section 6.5.2.6 (factors highly 
influencing the occupants’ behaviour during evacuation from the building fire), among the top 
factors which will influence the occupants are traffic congestion, havoc situation etc. Therefore it 
is proposed that the skills detailed below should be given to all residents in high-rise residential 
buildings. 
How to acquire? 
i. Fire drill should be carried out at least once every three years.  
ii. Training on how to use the fire safety equipment should be organised by the relevant 
authority at regular intervals. 
What skills required? 
i. How to evacuate the building in a proper manner 
ii. How to deal with the havoc situation in a case of fire emergency 
iii. How to use a portable fire extinguisher 
iv. How to activate a fire alarm in an emergency situation 
8.6.4 Fire safety audit 
From the observations on a number of high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia, (details can be 
found in chapter 4 and 5), a number of the problems encountered (see table 5.1) could be solved 
if a fire safety audit was carried out. Therefore, it is proposed that a fire safety audit should be 
carried out to ensure that all escape routes in high-rise buildings are safe to be used at all material 
times. 
How to audit? 
i. Audit procedures are as in table 8.5, which it should be carried out by a fire safety 
consultant, either in-house or privately appointed. 
ii. A fire risk assessment form as in appendix 8.1 is proposed for use in the auditing 
process. This form has been constructed based on the research done here and 
benchmarked on the requirements in the UBBL. 
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What to audit? 
i. Elements to assess are as in appendix 8.2 
8.6.5 Fire safety enforcement 
As discussed in chapter 5, there are a number of problem encountered in high-rise residential 
buildings in Malaysia. To ensure all escape routes are in a good condition and safe to be used in 
an emergency situation, regular inspection by relevant authority should be carried out.  
Who should carry out the inspection? 
i. Building Management (i.e. Management Corporation or Joint Management Corporation) 
ii. Fire Brigade officers 
iii. Local authority 
iv. Building owners 
v. Residents or tenants 
What to enforce 
i. Ensure all exit signs are appropriately installed. 
ii. Ensure all escape routes are cleared from any obstruction. 
iii. Ensure there is no abuse of public area by residents. 
iv. Ensure all fire suppression systems are always ready to use. 
v. Ensure all escape routes elements of structures comply with regulations. 
vi. Ensure all fire doors and staircases are well maintained. 
vii. Ensure all fire doors are easily to open and no unauthorised locking devices fastened at 
any fire doors. 
viii. Ensure all fire suppression systems, facilities for smoke control and illumination systems 
are maintained at an appropriate standard. 
8.7 Model validation 
Model validation has been carried out by sending the proposed model to the professionals who 
have participated in the questionnaire survey earlier. A validation questionnaire (See appendix 
8.8) was used to collect the validation data. Table 8.6 shows the comparison of percentage of 
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respondents who has answered the validation questionnaire survey. Figure 8.8 shows a pie chart 
of those respondents who has participated in the opinion survey earlier and figure 8.9 shows a pie 
chart of those who has participated in validation survey.  
Table 8.7 shows the results of the validation survey. It can be concluded that those professionals 
who participated in the validation survey i.e. 7 Architects, 5 Fire Brigade Officers, 3 Contractors, 
2 Engineers and 2 Quantity Surveyors, agreed that models and tables show to them were original, 
workable, reliable, had integrity and were easy to understand. The model frame-work on how to 
achieve fire safety standards in high-rise residential buildings can be implemented provided that 
those parties involve are willing to work together. There are suggestions from some of them to 
carry out a pilot project on a selected high-rise residential building in Malaysia. 
8.8 Chapter Conclusions 
Construction of high-rise residential buildings to provide a proper shelter for the people and to 
meet a high demand for housing should not compromise the fire safety aspects. Construction of 
high-rise residential buildings should not only be viewed from the perspective of economics, 
construction and space utilization, but it is equally important to view them from the perspective 
of fire safety. Fire safety models for high-rise residential building proposed are:  
(1)  Escape route designs and specifications, table 8.3.  
(2)  Human behaviour model, figure 6.6.  
(3)  Fire safety model to achieve fire safety standard in high-rise residential buildings, figure 
8.4.  
It is proposed that to achieve the fire safety standard in high-rise residential buildings, there are 
five fire safety components suggested i.e. Fire Safety Awareness, Fire Safety Design, Fire Safety 
Equipment and Evacuation Skill, Fire Safety Audit, and Fire Safety Enforcement. It is proposed 
that a fire safety audit form as in appendix 8.1 to be used to audit the fire safety aspects in high-
rise residential buildings. 
A fire safety audit should be carried out once every three years and a fire safety certificate issued 
by the fire brigade should be introduced to all high-rise residential buildings if fire safety is to be 
assured. From the observation study, it can be concluded that the conditions of escape routes 
need significant improvement if the safety of people is to be assured. 
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           Component 
Element Staircase Corridor 
Intermediate 
Floor Fire Door 
Optimum Width 1220 – 1372 1220 – 1524 1220 – 1372 990 – 1220 
Effective Width 1220 1220 1220 1067 
Optimum Length 7 – 10 steps < 45* m 2 x SOW - 
Effective Length 8 – 9 Steps  < 30* m 2 x SEW - 
Treads 275 – 284  - - - 
Risers 151 – 160 - - - 
Handrail height 900 - 900 - 
FRP (minute) 30 – 90  30 – 90  30 – 90  30 – 90  
Lighting A & E A & E A & E - 
ventilation N or M N or M N or M - 
Signage ? ? x ? 
Uniformity ? ? ? ? 
Self-Closing  X x x ? 
Smoke-Seals ? ? ? ? 
Protected Lobbies Protected lobbies shall be provided to serve staircases if the 
staircase enclosures are not ventilated through external walls. It 
has to be inline with By-Laws 197 
Compartment floor Compartment floor shall be provided if the building exceeded 
30 m in height which every alternate floor shall be constructed 
with materials enabling to withstand fire of not less than 30 
minutes. It has to be inline with By-Laws 136 and 137. 
All dimensions are in mm unless mentioned. 
FRP = Fire Resistant Period; SEW = Staircase Effective Width; SOW = Staircase Optimum 
Width; A = Artificial, E = Emergency, N = Natural, M = Mechanical 
* 30 meters for unsprinklered, 45 meters for sprinklered. 
Table 8.3: Associated with model 8.3, Fire Safety specification for escape route components 
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Fire Safety Attributes: Escape Route Design Requirements 
(To Achieve fire safety Objectives) – Part 1 
Escape Route 
i. Providing a safe egress and protected zone i.e. protected lobby at every 
alternate floor for refuges. 
ii. The number, distribution and dimensions of escape routes and exits should be 
adequately designed to accommodate the maximum number of people 
occupying the building. 
iii. Escape routes and exits should lead as directly as possible to the place of 
safety. 
iv. Limit “Dead End” designs in residential units. 
v. No obstructions of any kind or obstacles of any form in escape routes can be 
permitted.  
vi. A place of safety or assembly area is designated and able to cater for the 
maximum occupancies. 
Fire Door 
vii. All emergency doors should open in the direction of escape. 
viii. Escape and exit doors should be easily and immediately opened by any 
person requiring to do so and should not be locked. 
ix. Fire doors must be kept shut. If it needs to be kept open, it shall be fastened 
with an automatic release device operated by an automatic fire detector.  
x. All fire doors and fire barriers constructed shall be able to withstand fire for a 
reasonable period. 
Escape Staircase 
xi. Escape stair location within a maximum travel distance permitted. 
xii. Escape stairs designed with a minimum bend and ‘U’ turn. 
xiii. Staircase width shall be maintained throughout the flight. 
xiv. The depths of landings shall not less than the depth of staircase. 
xv. All staircases shall have a fire-resistance rating of not less than 30 minutes. 
xvi. Tread and riser dimensions must be consistent throughout the staircase. 
Table 8.4: Escape route design criteria for high-rise residential buildings 
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Fire Safety Attributes: Escape Routes Design Requirements 
(To Achieve fire safety Objectives) – Part 2 
Signage 
xvii. Escape routes and exits shall be indicated by appropriate signs.  
xviii. All exit signage shall be constantly illuminated at all material times during 
the time of occupancy. 
xix. All exit signage shall be in a white lettering against a green background with 
directional arrows and graphic symbols of running man toward the open door. 
xx. All exit signage shall be posted at a clear visible area and shall not be 
obstructed by any obstructions. 
Alternative Escape 
xxi. Evacuation lift and fire-fighting lift should have features and safeguards 
which may allow them to be used in the event of fire. Override by the fire and 
rescue services to enable the lift to be used for emergency purposes. 
xxii. Alternative escape routes and exits shall be provided. Corridors designed 
should be allowed windows to be used as an alternative to escape. 
Fire Suppression 
xxiii. Portable fire extinguishers and other types of fire suppression systems shall 
be provided and well maintained. 
xxiv. Smoke control systems in an enclosed escape route where necessary are 
sufficiently designed and installed to ensure the egress route is free from 
smoke. 
Ventilation System 
xxv. Ventilation systems shall be provided in enclosed escape routes either by 
mechanical ventilation i.e. pressurisation system or natural ventilation i.e. 
permanent opening or an automatic opening ventilator operates by automatic 
smoke detector system. 
Illumination System 
xxvi. Escape routes and exits should be adequately illuminated at all material times. 
xxvii. Adequate provision of emergency illumination systems should be made to 
substitute the failure of normal lighting. 
Table 8.4: Escape route design criteria for high-rise residential buildings (Cont.) 
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Fire Risk 
Analysis 
Procedure 
Define 
Hazard 
and Risk 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
Analysis 
Elements 
Hazard* 
Risk** 
Identify 
Potential 
fire hazard 
Identify 
who might 
be in 
danger 
Evaluate the risk 
components 
Record finding 
and suggestion 
for remedial 
action 
Review 
and revise 
finding 
Assessment 
tasks to 
carry out 
 Source of 
ignition; 
fuel; heat 
generator 
Identify 
people at 
significant 
risk in 
case of 
fire 
Existing fire safety 
measures; Control of 
ignition; fire detection; 
means of escape; 
system maintenance; 
Training; evacuation 
plan. 
Emergency 
plan; 
Instruction; 
recommendati
on, 
Revise if 
situation 
changed 
Evacuation 
Index 
      
*Hazard: A hazard is something that has the potential to cause harm. 
**Risk: A risk is the chance, high, or low, of that harm occurring 
Table 8.5: Fire safety audit and risks analysis procedure 
 
Profession A %A  B %B 
1 10 38.5 7 36.9 
2 4 15.4 2 10.5 
3 2 7.7 2 10.5 
4 4 15.4 3 15.8 
5 5 19.2 5 26.3 
6 1 3.8 0 0 
Total 26 100% 19 100% 
Table 8.6: Response to the validation exercise for the studied models 
Note: Profession:  
1=Architect, 2=Engineer, 3=QS, 4=Contractor, 5=Fire Brigade Officer, 6=Developer. 
A = Frequency of respondents responded to the questionnaire. 
B = Frequency of respondents validated the model. 
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        Elements    
Items     
Easy to 
understand Originality Reliability Workability Integrity 
Model 8.2 ? ? ? ? ? 
Model 8.4 ? ? ? ? ? 
Model 8.5 ? ? ? ? ? 
Table 8.3 ? ? ? ? ? 
Form 8.1 ? ? ? ? ? 
Table 8.7:  Validation table 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION 
9.1 Introduction 
Research on fire safety for high-rise residential buildings ranges across several disciplines i.e. 
integration between the fire safety engineering field, building design and social sciences. This 
study investigated the integration between human behaviour and structural design, particularly 
escape route design and specification, the aim is being to produce a fire safety model to assess 
and improve fire safety standards in high-rise residential buildings. 
In order to achieve this aim, mixed methodologies are used throughout the research i.e. a 
combination of both quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. There are three 
mains components of the research carried out i.e. observation, computer simulation and 
questionnaire survey.  
This research has explored the current state of escape route conditions in high-rise residential 
buildings and investigated the requirement for upgrading fire safety and design specification for 
staircase, corridor, fire door, etc. It has also considered the behaviour of occupants of high-rise 
residential buildings in case of fire, perceptions of behaviour and looked at the factors that most 
motivate them to evacuate the building. 
9.2 Conclusion 
From the observations of the research finding, it is evident that improvements in fire safety 
standards in high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia are needed. Provision for escape route, 
i.e. corridors, fire doors and staircase design and specification, should be improved, along with 
the occupant’s awareness of evacuation procedures in an emergency situation and how to use fire 
suppression systems. Also, regularly checking and auditing of fire safety aspects in building and 
strict enforcement of regulations to ensure that escape routes are safe for use at all times should 
be carried out. This suggestion is to ensure that the standard of fire safety in high-rise residential 
buildings can be achieved. From the simulation studies, it is recognised that the escape routes 
specification proposed are reflected to the number of people simulated. The result may be 
different if the number of people used in the simulation is different. 
The issues with which this work is consent are what are the current states of the escape routes in 
high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia?; Does the escape route design and construction 
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comply with the current regulation?; What are the optimum dimension of escape routes that can 
permitting all occupants to evacuate the building safely and fast?; What are the actions that the 
occupants of high-rise residential buildings would do if a fire breaks out in their residential 
building?; What people perceptions when fire alarm goes off?; What factors that most motivating 
people to evacuate the building once the alarm sounded? What factors that most influencing the 
human behaviour when they are in emergency situation e.g. in building fire? To answer these 
questions, investigations have been carried out and the outcomes are discussed in the relevant 
chapters. Summarise of the findings can be found in the following sub-sections. 
9.2.1 Building observation  
There are 438 staircases in five high-rise residential buildings in Kuala Lumpur observed and 
overall 38.84% staircases steps inspected and an average of the staircase steps per stair was 9 
steps. In terms of compliance to the UBBL, 73.6% treads complied with the regulation and only 
1.16% complied at the minimum requirements i.e. treads depth designed slightly about the 
minimum requirement i.e. 255mm wide. The majority of the treads depths i.e. 35.33% are 
designed between 275mm to 284mm and the tread depth mode was 280mm (11 inches). 
In terms of the step riser high, 99.99% complied with the regulation. Majority of the rises i.e. 
39.22% are design between 151mm to 160mm and the riser high mode was 153mm (6 inches) 
(maximum requirement is 180mm).  
From the observations of a number of high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia, there are eight 
scenarios of staircases orientation and layout in terms of people moving direction i.e.; Opposite 
directions with fire door; Opposite directions without fire door, L-Shape direction with fire door; 
Straight direction with fire door; Opposite direction horizontal staircase with fire door; Opposite 
direction horizontal staircase without fire door; One direction horizontal staircase with fire door; 
and Cluster types with one staircase. From the eight scenarios, 260 study models had been 
developed for further analysis of the staircase specifications i.e. staircase width, fire door width 
and corridor width. 
9.2.2 Escape Routes condition in high-rise residential buildings 
The current state of escape routes in high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia needs an 
immediate attention from the building authorities or Management Corporation (MC) to reinstate 
its conditions for the safety of occupants. From the observations, there are five main categories of 
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issues and problem encountered i.e. Structural Design and Construction, Facilities for Fire Safety 
in Buildings, Maintenance, Attitude of People, and Management. 
Most of the problems arose mainly due to the lack of checking, inspection and enforcement by 
the building management i.e. Management Corporation. If a regular checking and inspection was 
made and action was taken against those who have committed offences e.g. locked the fire door, 
left personal items in corridors or stairwells, dumped rubbish in stairwell, etc. some of the 
problems arose could be solved, the safety of people could be assured, the risk of injury or 
fatality could be reduced and the management integrity could be trusted. As a result, fire safety 
objectives in high-rise buildings could be achieved.  
It is proposed that fire safety assessment which is currently applicable to the factory buildings 
should be extended to the high-rise residential buildings too. Appropriate amendments to the 
related rules and regulations should be made to impose a fire risk assessment at least once every 
two years for all high-rise residential buildings in Malaysia. Currently, every year assessment is 
needed for the factory buildings and a fire safety certificate will only be issued by the fire 
department if fire safety aspects in factory buildings are in place. 
9.2.3 Questionnaire surveys on occupants of high-rise residential buildings 
From the questionnaire surveys, a number of people occupy the flat ranges from 2 to 15 people. 
The majority of the flats are occupied by 6 people (20.9%), follow by 4 or 8 people (17.4%), 5 
people (13.0%), 12 people (9.6%), etc. The highest occupancy was 15 people (only one flat). 
This case assumed as special case, therefore it was not considered in further analysis. The second 
highest was 12 people per flat (11 flats in this case). Therefore it considers as a high occupancy 
and considered for further analysis in simulation processes. There are 56.5% males and 43.5% 
females participated in this survey and their ages range from 15 to 70 years old. 53.0% of them 
have at least diploma or highest. In terms of fire safety knowledge, only 32.2% had attended at 
least one day fire safety course and in terms of experience fire drill, 57.4% had an experience of 
fire drill but majority of them (41.7%) had fire drill at their office. 
From the opinion surveys, 40.9% occupants said that they will immediately evacuate the building 
if a fire alarm goes off but 59.9% of occupants will do something else before evacuating the 
building. Among the important points to highlight are the occupants wish to evacuate the 
building using the staircase instead of the elevator. Majority of them will evacuate the building 
after calling 999, help other occupants and try to save as many as possible of their effects. 
Among the gender, 64.6% males would do something else before evacuate and 52.0% of females 
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would do the same before evacuating the building. In terms of age groups, people age between 31 
to 40 years old (51.3%) more lightly to evacuate rather than to do something else but people 
above 40 years old (86.7%) more likely to do something else before evacuating the building in 
fire emergency. Meanwhile among the respondents who have attended a fire safety courses, 
64.9% would do something else before evacuating the building. In contrast, 56.4% who never 
attended fire safety course will do the same. Analysis on the education level shows that those 
with high education (57.4%) more likely to do something else but among those with low 
education (61.7%) more likely to do something else before evacuating the building. There is an 
evident that gender, age, knowledge and education level will influent the human behaviour in 
terms of action to be taken during a fire emergency.  
In terms of perceptions when fire alarm goes off, from the questionnaires survey, it found that, 
people perception it was a genuine fire alarm and they will alert all people in their flat to 
immediately evacuating the building to the safe designated area. On the perception of exit 
choices to evacuate, they knew where escape stairs are, will use the staircase to evacuate and will 
follow the exit signage when evacuating the building. 
In terms of motivation factors to evacuate the building, the factors that most motivate are 
command from a person with authority e.g. fire brigade officer, police or building security. Other 
factors are fire cues, fire alarm and people start moving out from the building. These factors are 
among the high priority factors that will motivate them to evacuate the building. 
In terms of the evacuation behaviour, the main factors that will influence the occupants’ 
behaviour are crowds i.e. traffic congestion in the escape stair, havoc situation, the number of 
people in the building and smell of burning materials. 
9.2.4 Computer simulation studies 
Analyses were done on five high-rise residential buildings of different internal layouts. The 
staircases and fire doors designed for the simulations were as specified in UBBL to compare with 
the specifications suggest from the finding of the studies. There are four stages of simulation 
done i.e. analysis of the effect of staircase intermediate landing floor, the effects of different 
internal layout and staircase orientations, escape routes specifications analysis, and the effect of 
fire door and staircase width on the total evacuation time.  
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i. The effect of intermediate landing floor 
From the simulation studies, it found that the intermediate landing floor has an effect on the total 
evacuation time recorded. There was a significant evident that the intermediate landing floor will 
increase the total evacuation time about 15% to 24% longer than the staircase designed without 
the intermediate landing floor. 
ii. The effect of internal layout and staircase orientation 
The simulation results show that building B recorded the best total evacuation time and floor 
clearance time for the low, normal and high occupancy (see tables 7.6, 7.7, and 7.8). Building B 
is a ‘U’ shape building designed with four escape stairs. In terms of the number of occupancy in 
the building, if the number of occupant increases i.e. doubling the number e.g. from low 
occupancy (1 person per room) to normal occupancy (2 persons per room), the floor clearance 
time would increase between 5 seconds to 90 seconds and the total evacuation time would 
increase between 30 seconds to 90 seconds. If the number of occupant increases to the high 
occupancy (i.e. 4 persons per room) the total evacuation time would increase between 3½ 
minutes to 5½ minutes compare to the normal occupancy. In the high occupancy tested, the result 
shows that people who stay in the third floor to the ninth floor level might be at risk because the 
floor clearance times recorded were more than 150 seconds. Therefore, increasing the number of 
people above than the normal occupancy will pose a high risk to the occupants. In addition, the 
simulation results show that for some building layouts certain staircases may not be chosen as 
exits because of the distance from the flats, and they are therefore ineffective for evacuation. 
Also, some staircases are more likely to be chosen by the evacuating occupants and therefore 
become congested, causing floor clearance times to increase. 
iii. Escape routes specification analysis 
The optimum width of the staircase, fire door and corridor is 1220mm to 1372mm, 990mm to 
1220mm, and 1220mm to 1524mm respectively. The optimum means that the consideration was 
not only be given to the minimum evacuation time recorded but how many of these elements i.e. 
staircase, fire door and corridor widths recorded the evacuation time within 30 seconds 
differences. The more these elements recorded close together within 30 seconds differences the 
most optimum it was.  
In terms of the study models with the fire door, model 5 and model 8 have the best total 
evacuation time recorded. The total evacuation times recorded were within 3 minutes to 3½ 
minutes of all fire door widths for the staircases 1067mm, 1220mm and 1372mm. Meanwhile, 
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model 6 is the best model with the corridor i.e. the total evacuation time recorded for the 
staircase, 1220mm, 1372mm and 1524mm was within 3 minutes to 3½ minutes. 
iv  the effect of fire door and staircase width on the evacuation time 
When tested the effect of fire door and staircase width on the ten storeys building upon the 
dynamic flows of high occupancy of people, i.e. assumed 4 people per room, simulation results 
suggested that enlarging the fire door width alone without enlarging the staircase width will not 
improve the evacuation time. However when enlarging the staircase width without enlarging the 
fire door width, the evacuation time improved from 11 minutes 53.8 seconds to 10 minutes 27.9 
seconds. However, if the fire door width enlarged to 1067mm and staircase width as well 
enlarged to 1220mm, the evacuation time was further improved by about 14.2%.  
The simulation results suggest that with the proposed specification i.e. staircase length, tread, 
riser and fire door as proposed in appendix 8.3, the floor clearance time could be reduced by 
about 20% to 50% for some floor levels e.g. for building D at floors 3 to 9. According to the 
simulation results, floor 10 appears to be the safest as the floor clearance time was below 150 
seconds even with high occupancy. 
9.2.5 Fire safety model  
Fire safety conceptual model of how fire safety standards in high-rise residential buildings can be 
achieved was developed after prudently analysed all research data from the mixed methodologies 
discussed earlier. There are two main sub-models integrated to the model developed i.e. human 
behaviour model and structural design model. Table 8.3 and figure 6.6 show the fire safety 
specifications for escape routes and a human behaviour model respectively. The factors from 
these two models have been integrated into five fire safety components to form a fire safety 
conceptual model of how fire safety standards can be achieved in high-rise residential building as 
in figure 8.4. The five fire safety components are: 
i Fire safety awareness, 
ii Fire safety design, 
iii Fire safety equipment and evacuation skill, 
iv Fire safety audit, and  
v Fire safety enforcement. 
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It is proposed that to achieve the fire safety standards in high-rise residential buildings, those five 
fire safety components need to be put in place together. It is proposed that a fire safety audit form 
as in appendix 8.1 could be used to audit the fire safety aspects in high-rise residential buildings. 
A fire safety audit should be carried out once every two years and fire safety certificate issue by 
the fire brigade should be introduced to all high-rise residential buildings. From the observations, 
it can be concluded that the conditions of escape routes need some significant improvement if the 
safety of people is to be assured. 
9.3 Recommendations for further research 
Although the work documented in this thesis represents a contribution towards achieving the 
objective set and to answer the research questions, a number of issues were identified for further 
research. Further research and investigation of these issues would provide a better understanding 
in measuring the effectiveness of the implementation of the fire safety programme in high-rise 
buildings. These will provide the policy maker, building managers, designers, etc with additional 
knowledge and information to be used in determining appropriate decision making strategies and 
planning for fire safety implementation in future high-rise buildings inclusive high-rise 
residential buildings. Some potential issues include: 
• Field study on evacuation time taken of unannounced fire drill of high-rise residential 
buildings with fire cue fabricated i.e. smoke compare with the time taken of announced 
fire drill on the same building. The study should cover recording the movement of people 
within the building i.e. in corridor and staircase, the location where people will gather 
after evacuated the building, to determine whether lift or staircase is mainly chosen for 
evacuation, and the factors that would have caused the evacuation delay. 
• Investigation on the effectiveness of fire safety awareness programmes introduced into a 
selected high-rise residential building, as a pilot study, can be measured by conducting an 
unannounced fire drill after a certain period of the programme being introduced. This 
information is very useful before a full scale of programme introduction nationwide. By 
measuring the effectiveness of those programme’s implementation, all uncertainties can 
be identified and continued improvement can be made. 
• Deeper evaluation on various orientation and layout of internal circulation areas i.e. 
corridor designed, the location of staircases and lifts, the location of flats, and final exits 
using simulation software package can be conducted to evaluate the safest internal layout 
design for future high-rise residential buildings. Consideration should be given to more 
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internal circulation layouts of different building shapes. This investigation can provide 
invaluable information to the designers and the policy makers for the safety of people in 
the future high-rise buildings. The study should include but not be limited to the 
construction technology and construction cost for those design proposed. 
• Among the problems encountered in high-rise residential buildings are related with the 
provision of facilities for fire safety in building i.e. smoke control, illumination, 
emergency lighting and exit signage. Those problems will have consequences of smoke 
penetration into escape stairs, concentration of fume and smoke in the corridor and 
stairwell, limited range of vision, difficulty in walking, risks of slipping on staircase, 
slowing down the evacuation process, etc. Research on optimum cost, energy 
consumptions and alternative solutions for providing effective facilities for fire safety in 
high-rise buildings is important. The finding will be of benefit to the building designers, 
building occupants, local authority, etc. 
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